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Abstract 
This study was focused on Business Reengineering (Hammer, 1990; Hammer & 
Champy, 1993); aka Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The main aim of the 
study was to test the authors' (2001) claims that BPR was'alive and well, ' and that'in 
fact' it had been 'one of the success stories of business history, ' but in this case 
within the context of local government organisations (LGOs) within the UK public 
sector. 
Throughout the final decades of the 20th Century, and continuing to date, there has 
been a relentless pace of change within the public sector during which managers 
have been under constant pressure to improve performance within their 
organisations (McAdam & Mitchell, 1998; Zeppou and Sotirakou, 2003). This 
pressure was increased in 2004 with the publication of Sir Peter Gershon's 'Spending 
Review 2004: Efficiency Review - Releasing Resources for the Frontline: 
Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency. ' By 2007/08 Gershon was looking 
for'auditable and transparent efficiency gains of over £20 billion, ' and 'a gross 
reduction of over 84,000 posts' across the military, civil service and administration. 
Councils across the UK have responded to these demands in differing ways, but 
some chose to adopt 'reengineering' as part of their range of change management 
strategies. This study has focused on two such LGOs over that 4-year period. 
The study commenced by reviewing the literature surrounding reengineering - or 
BPR, as it has become more widely known - including as appropriate other 
approaches to quality and change management. Focusing also on critical 'success' 
and 'failure' factors (CSF & CFF; Al-Mashari & Zairi, 1999), two key issues emerged 
that were relevant to BPR's potential for success in such organisations; the concepts 
of 'Organizational Readiness' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995), and that of 'degrees' of 
BPR, or'Project Radicalness' (Kettinger et al., 1997). 
A qualitative research approach was adopted, with 28, semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews held with 29 participants from the two co-operating LGOs. 'Purposive 
sampling' (Saunders, et al., 2000) was employed with participants selected from 
those organisations' BPR training cohorts and those involved more directly at junior, 
middle and senior management levels. Access was also granted to meetings and 
organisational documentation. Impact analysis was undertaken with group and 
individual interviews as necessary. 
The study's contribution to knowledge is firstly in the combination of the two concepts 
mentioned above, to create a more comprehensive 'self-diagnostic' mechanism by 
which UK LGOs might assess and increase their 'readiness' to undertake change of 
this nature, and/or modify the 'ambition' level of their change projects prior to 
embarking upon them, thereby greatly improving their likelihood of success. The 
research therefore has important findings in the areas of diagnosis, planning, 
implementation and performance measurement, and will be of significant interest to 
academics and practitioners engaged in understanding or implementing change 
within the services sector generally and public sector and LGOs in particular. 
Secondly, the research will also be of wider public interest revealing substantive 
issues for the future effective management and use of public finances. Whilst some 
change has been noted, real change does not appear to have yet been achieved, 
particularly at more senior and organisation-wide levels, and a more concerted and 
serious approach is necessary based on this new, composite, self-diagnostic 
process. 
There are indications that some of the change agencies themselves may be guilty of 
adding to further waste creation, and the evidence of low levels of 'understanding' of the true meaning and portents of 'reengineering' draws into serious question the oft- 
stated 70W failure rate of BPR. 
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Part One: Introduction, Research Proposal, Researcher Background 
Chapter 1: Introduction to Thesis 
1.1: Introduction 
This chapter forms the first section of Part One and its purpose is to present 
an overview of the thesis, which is concerned with the implementation of 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in two Local Government 
Organisations (LGOs). 
The thesis is structured into four main parts: 
" Part One - Introduction 
" Part Two - Literature Review 
" Part Three - Methodology & Analysis 
" Part Four - Conclusions 
This first part will deal with the background to the research itself, including 
brief personal details of the researcher, to enable the reader to understand 
the context against which this qualitative research study has been conducted. 
Second, the Literature Review deals primarily with BPR since its inception, 
almost two decades ago, its growth and diffusion through that final decade of 
the 20th Century, and beyond. The review also looks at relevant aspects of 
Change Management, Public Sector context and culture, and Critical Success 
and Failure Factors (CSF & CFF), along with more emergent issues 
surrounding 'Organizational Readiness', Leadership, the concept of 'Degrees' 
of BPR, and links to systems thinking. 
Part Three deals with Methodology and Analysis, and Part Four with 
Conclusions. 
1 
1.2: Research Proposal 
Back rq ound: 
The background to this study is the continued and increasing requirement for 
reform and improvements across the UK public sector, and in particular within 
local government: 
'But too often residents have perceived and experienced local government as 
impenetrable, uninformative, unresponsive and patronizing. They have been passed 
from pillar to post -'not my responsibility, sorry, you could try... ' - and have felt 
helpless, angry and fobbed off. They wonder who is responsible for what, and what 
their Council Tax is paying for' (Gaster & Squires, 2003: 117). 
With 'reengineering' one of the approaches adopted by some local authorities 
in their drive for improvement, the purpose of this study was to test Hammer 
and Champy's (2001: 2) assertion that reengineering is 'alive and well, ' and 
that it had, in fact, been 'one of the success stories of business history, ' but in 
the context of its employment in these local government change programmes. 
The primary research objectives therefore were to: 
" identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR, with 
particular emphasis on practice in the public sector; 
" investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change management 
practices in two selected local authorities; 
" make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners regarding the 
adoption of BPR as a change management technique within the public sector; 
" contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation within the 
public sector. 
The proposal for this study emerged from a combination of events, but 
primarily from this University's involvement with two local government 
organisations* (LGOs) who had embarked, or were embarking, upon a series 
of strategic change initiatives. Other factors were the publication of Sir Peter 
Gershon's 'Spending Review 2004: Efficiency Review - Releasing Resources 
for the Frontline: Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency, ' and the 
opportunity within the University of Derby's Faculty of Business, Computing 
2 
and Law, to present a full-time research proposal. Additionally, both LGOs 
had stated their intentions to adopt 'reengineering' (although one chose to call 
it something else) as part of their change management strategies, and early 
enquiries elicited the facility to engage with them in this study, whilst they 
implemented these aims. 
Existing teaching partnerships with both LGOs provided additional, valuable 
and contextual 'preunderstanding' (Gummesson, 2000) on which to found the 
research. A'generally (but not exclusively) inductive' case study approach 
(Hartley, 1994: 211) allowed the 'opportunity to explore issues in depth' (ibid) 
on a primarily cross-sectional basis. These 'in depth' interviews were 
augmented by observation at meetings, access to organisational 
documentation and, later, impact analysis interviews to validate findings. 
Emergent concepts -'organisational readiness' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995) 
and 'project radicalness' (Kettinger, et al., 1997) - were investigated with a 
range of interviewees in both organisations, and developed in combination to 
provide a contribution to knowledge through additional guidance to policy- 
makers and practitioners engaged in understanding or implementing 
potentially radical change within the services sector generally, and the public 
sector and LGOs in particular. 
* Overviews of both LGOs are given in section 6.1 (pp. 226-229). 
1.3: Researcher Background 
I was on BT (formerly the GPO and Post Office Telecommunications) for 34 
years from 1962 until I took early voluntary retirement in 1996. In 1997 
commenced a full-time MBA at the University of Derby (gaining a Distinction, 
and the'Master's Level Prize for Outstanding Performance'), after which I was 
taken on as a 'sessional' lecturer. Since then I have taught locally and abroad 
(Switzerland, Israel), with over the later years an increasing focus on Post- 
graduate Leadership and Change programmes (including Business Process 
Reengineering and Service Redesign) - within large public sector 
3 
organisations - more recently embracing also the concepts of 'Lean', and 
systems thinking. During my latter years on BT I was directly involved in a 
number of 'reengineering' experiences, giving me valuable 'preunderstanding' 
(ibid) to underpin this study. For a full background see Appendix 1. 
4 
Part Two: Literature Review 
Chapter 2: Introduction; background, origins and definitions of BPR 
Working 'smarter not harder'? 
(Skinner, 1986) 
This review of the literature will consider the position to date on BPR, its use 
within the context of the UK Public Sector alongside other alternative vehicles 
for Change Management, and emerging from this also will be the issues of 
Leadership and Organisational Culture. 
It would not be possible to review all of the available literature on BPR in the 
time available, but enough must be considered so that this 'report from the 
archives', with its inevitable 'selecting, pruning, editing, commenting, 
interpreting, delivering (of) judgements', is sufficiently 'scholarly' to provide an 
adequate foundation -'a comprehensive search of relevant published 
material' (Phillips & Pugh, 1994: 36) - on which to proceed to build a new 
investigation. As Jackson (1996: 587) said, 'As academic researchers, we 
have to make a concerted effort to reach practitioners and compellingly 
engage them with rhetorical critiques that are informed by all that is good 
about the academic tradition'. We have to make a difference. This 
comprehensive search will therefore begin with BPR - its background and 
origins, history, context and track record - as part of a basic overall structure 
(overleaf, Fig. 2.0), with the intention of leading the researcher towards any 
gaps in current knowledge in order to clarify the ultimate focus of this 
research. 
What it may not do is cover every aspect of BPR - for example, whether or 
not it is truly 'innovative' (Grint, 1994: 183), riddled with 'masculine idealism' 
(Case, 1995), simply 'rhetoric' (Jackson, 1996), or'violent rhetoric' (Grint and 
Case, 1998), a 'panacea' or 'managerial obsession' (Gill and Whittle, 1993), or 
whether Michael Hammer really was 'reeng i nee ring's John the Baptist' 
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(Stewart and Davis, 1993) - but instead it will accept BPR as a change- 
management technique, evinced by the continued abundance of writing on 
the topic to date. 
Fig. 2.0: Literature Review Flow Diagram 
'Reengineering Corporation Street: An Empirical Study of Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR) in Two Local Authorities' 
Literature Review Flow Diagram 
Business Process Reengineering 
(BPR) 
BPR & Local Government Change Management- 
Process Change Organisations Alternative Vehicles 
(LGOs) 
BPR & Change in LGOs 
I Primary Research 
2.1 Background to Business Process Reengineering 
The history of BPR could be approached like the history of the human race: 
one could commence with the appearance of the first humanoid form capable 
of walking upright, or start right back at the 'beginning' 13.7 billion years ago 
as Bryson (2004: 29) did in 'A Short History of Nearly Everything', but that's a 
lot of ground to cover. As Bryson says - perhaps even epistemologically - 
'It's not so much about what we know, as about how we know what we know, ' 
and the 'what we know' about BPR has to start somewhere. So this review 
will choose the walking humanoid point, the 'Lucy' (Johanson & Edey, 1982) 
of BPR, as the first step into the literature, whilst acknowledging also that the 
background and origins will of necessity take the story at least some way back 
into its pre-erectus period. 
The first recorded use of the term 'reengineer' in the context of 'business' (as 
opposed to pure engineering) appears to have been in 1990, and the at least 
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initial suggestion is that this was in Michael Hammer's seminal article, 
'Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate', in the Harvard Business 
Review (July-August). In the sentence, 'We should "reengineer" our 
businesses: use the power of modern information technology to radically 
redesign our business processes in order to achieve dramatic improvement in 
their performance' (Hammer, 1990: 104; his double-quotation marks), he not 
only uses the term 'reengineer', but, missing only the term 'fundamental 
rethinking', also articulates the details of his (1993: 32; along with James 
Champy) embryonic definition of the concept of BPR. And similarly, whilst he 
doesn't use the phrase, 'Business Process Reengineering', all three words are 
present in the sentence. As Macintosh (2003) notes, the 'definition of re- 
engineering proposed in Re-engineering'` the Corporation has become largely 
synonymous with the term BPR (which was not explicitly used in any of the 
seminal articles)'. For example, Kim and Ramkaran (2004) state that, 
'Hammer, in particular, is widely recognized as the inventor of reengineering, 
and the one who coined the term, BPR'; except where the former might be 
true, the latter is not. 
Balle (1995) also cites Hammer and Champy (1993) as 'the consultants who 
coined the expression 'business re-engineering' (p. 27), and in his 
'Acknowledgements' also made the link between 'systems thinking' and 
'business process re-engineering' with: 
'As I was working on practical applications of the Systems Thinking framework*, i came 
across Michael Hammer and James Champy's Re-engineering" the Corporation: a 
Manifesto for Business Revolution which, in a way, established the programme for 
business process re-engineering. The concepts they exposed enabled me to draw a 
link between the general dynamic structures I had previously been studying, and the 
very pragmatic workplace improvement techniques I was using in practical applications' 
(Balle, 1995: 9). 
(* Ball&, 1994) 
(** NB Hammer and Champy used the non-hyphenated 'Reengineering' in their original title. ) 
This does not mean that nothing prior to then will be considered. The 
opposite applies: the concepts of 'processes', 'systems thinking', and the uses 
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of information technology towards business improvement, will have to be 
considered as the underpinning foundations on which the first courses of 
BPR's structural brickwork were laid. In fact Mingers (2000: 738), in a paper 
acknowledging Peter Checkland's work in developing 'soft systems 
methodology' (SSM), comments: 
'This recognized that systems ideas were helpful for structuring messy situations rather 
than solving problems, constructing notional systems rather than simply redesigning 
what already existed, and recognizing that information needs followed from properly 
designed organizational activities, thus predating BPR by some 20 years. ' 
It was some years later, in Thomas Davenport's cautionary reflection on 
where some of it had gone wrong -'The Fad That Forgot People' - that he 
referred to the 'primal soup' from which 'reengineering' had 'emerged' 
(Davenport, 1995: 70), recalling, 'It was the late 1980s and reengineering was 
in the air. ' In his and James Short's key article, 'The New Industrial 
Engineering: Information Technology and Business Process Redesign' 
(1990), he did not, however, specifically use the term 'reengineering' in the 
business context, preferring to use'redesign' instead. 
Published in the 'Summer*** 1990' issue of the (then) Sloan Management 
Review (renamed MIT Sloan Management Review in 2001), Davenport and 
Short talked of 'business process redesign', and this was almost coincident 
with the publication of Michael Hammer's seminal article, 'Reengineering 
Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate', appearing in the'July-August' issue of the 
Harvard Business Review (Hammer, 1990: 104). Arguably this Sloan/MIT 
article provided the first opportunity for the abbreviation 'BPR' to be applied, 
as indeed it was (p. 11), although the phrase business process redesign was 
then subsumed alongside information technology into Davenport and Short's 
preferred term, 'New Industrial Engineering' (NIE? ). 
(*** Confirmed as'June 1990' by Davenport in his 1993 text, p. ix. ) 
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The need for businesses to realign their focus on to 'processes' emerged from 
the realisation that the contemporary focus on Information Technology (IT) 
had not'yielded the dramatic improvement companies need[ed]' (Hammer, 
1990: 104) and that, in his words, it was 'time to stop paving the cow paths. ' 
In his apparent frustration at the failure of what he perceived as the 'usual 
methods for boosting performance, ' Hammer was encouraging managers to 
'release the power of computers by challenging centuries-old notions about 
work, ' and that instead 'of embedding outdated processes in silicon and 
software, we should obliterate them and start over. ' His concern that 
companies were tending to'use technology to mechanize old ways of doing 
business' was simultaneously echoed by Davenport and Short's assertion that 
the 'organizations that have used IT to redesign boundary-crossing, customer- 
driven processes [had] benefited enormously. ' 
This audit-trail back to MIT and the apparent (at the time) non-delivery of IT- 
based efficiencies is reinforced by Greasley (1999), with: 
'In fact the thinking behind 'business process re-engineering' goes back to the late 
1970s when a research programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
looked at investment by the US and Europe in technology. It was discovered from this 
research that despite the billions of dollars spent on technology during the 1970s there 
had been only a one percent increase in productivity. Further research then showed 
that instead of breaking down the barriers between business functions and specialisms, 
information technology departments were reinforcing them, making them higher and 
damage proof (Towers, 1994). ' 
And there are still examples of other, modernising organisations falling foul of 
an over-reliance on technological solutions: 
'According to rival retailers, Sainsbury and the army of management consultants that 
were involved in the modernisation of its supply chain have quite simply over- 
automated the process' (Richard Fletcher; 'Sainsbury's Basket Case', The Sunday 
Times, Business Focus, October 17th, 2004, p. 5). 
Early in the 1990s the first BPR books by those original authors followed, and 
became equally seminal texts; 'Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto 
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for Business Revolution', by Michael Hammer and James Champy, and 
'Process Innovation: Reengineering Work through Information Technology' by 
Thomas Davenport, both published in 1993. 
It is also interesting to note, however, that a third, perhaps equally seminal 
text therefore, appeared earlier, in 1991; 'Business Process Improvement: 
The Breakthrough Strategy for Total Quality, Productivity and 
Competitiveness', by H. James Harrington. Harrington opens with the 
express belief that'there was one major breakthrough in the 1980s, ' and that 
it wasn't statistical process control (SPC), employee involvement, just-in-time 
(JIT), total quality management (TQM), quality function (or'policy') 
deployment (QFD), benchmarking, poor-quality cost (Crosby, 1980,1986), 
Taguchi methods or the Malcolm Baldridge Award(s), etc., but that it was 'the 
realization by management that business and manufacturing processes, not 
the people, are the key to error-free performance' (Harrington, 1991: vii). This 
almost suggests that the claim (largely emanating from the TQM movement) 
'Our People are our Greatest Asset' (Sic.; Peters & Waterman, 1982: 238) 
should be rewritten to say, 'Our Processes are our Greatest Asset'. Whilst 
this was unlikely to be the intention, Harrington's statement will warrant further 
reflection later in a fuller discussion on the people issues, and impacts on 
them, of BPR. 
At the same time as Hammer's original 'reengineering' article, another text by 
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990; 'The Machine that Changed the World') was 
delineating Toyota's new production system and the 'Rise of Lean Production' 
(but see also Krafcik, 1988, who first articulated the term) as a systems 
approach to automobile manufacture. 
Given their (Hammer, Davenport & Short, Harrington) calendric proximity of 
publication, Harrington's possible (if not resolute) avoidance of the term 
'reengineering', in favour of the milder'improvement', in his 1991 text is 
possibly surprising, given Davenport's (albeit later) comment that by'the late 
1980s', ... 'reengineering was in the air' (1995: 71). 
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2.2 What is a 'Process'? 
It was W. Edwards Deming who said, 'If you can't describe what you are doing 
as a process, you don't know what you are doing. ' And, if one is permitted to 
substitute the word 'system', he also made the point, 'People work in the 
system. Management create the system. ' Deming himself (1986: 315) used 
this similitude when stating - re. the 'confusion between common causes and 
special causes': 
I should estimate that in my experience most troubles and most possibilities for 
improvement add up to proportions something like this: 94% belong to the system 
(responsibility of management) and 6% special' (also cited in; Harrington, 1991: vii). 
The word process -'the fourth key word in our definition' - was highlighted by 
Hammer and Champy (1993: 35) as also'the most important in our 
definition... ', and that, 'it is also the one that gives most corporate managers 
the greatest difficulty, ' so perhaps it would be best here to provide its 
definition, or, definitions. 
Whilst Hammer did not define 'process' in his 1990 article, Hammer and 
Champy (ibid) defined 'a business process' as a 'collection of activities that 
takes one or more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the 
customer. ' Davenport and Short (1990: 12) defined it as 'a set of logically 
related tasks performed to achieve a defined business outcome. ' 
Interestingly also, earlier that same year, but continents apart, in the February 
issue of TQM Magazine (1990, pp. 21-23) Boehling and Joksch defined 
process as 'a group of logically related tasks (decisions and activities) that, 
when performed, utilize the resources of the business to produce definite 
results, ' suggesting that these two Brussels- and Stuttgart-based 
(respectively) consultants were thinking along similar lines to the previous two 
pairs of authors, although considerably earlier, if the dates are anything to go 
by. In their TQM Magazine article, 'Strategies for 1992 and Beyond, ' they 
promote the view that since 'all work is viewed as a process and the quality 
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focus of business process management is continuous improvement' ... 
'the 
concept of Cross-Functional Cooperation is required to achieve continuous 
improvement of process effectiveness, efficiency and adaptability' (this 
author's italics). 
More simply, Albitz and Baldridge (1991: 351) suggested that 'business 
processes' -'often called horizontal processes, cross-functional processes or 
white collar processes' - were 'better known as 'the way things move through 
the company'. ' But Albitz (1989) had defined it earlier as, 'every task 
performed in a work activity needed to assure that the work activity yields a 
product or service that conforms to requirements. ' Her'process model' is 
shown below (ibid): 
Fig. 2.1: Process Model 
Input Input Tasks Output Output 
requirements requirements 
Supplier Customer 
Boundary 
Albitz (ibid) separates a 'process' from a 'series of tasks', because a process 
has a 'measurable input and output, it has customers and suppliers, it has 
added value, and is repeatable. ' 
Davenport later (1993: 5) defined a process as 'simply a structured, measured 
set of activities designed to produce a specified output for a particular 
customer or market, ' and reinforced this with, 'A process is thus a specific 
ordering of work activities across time and place, with a beginning, an end, 
and clearly identified inputs and outputs: a structure for action. ' 
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Harrington (1991: 9) had already nailed this quite firmly to the mast with the 
very similar, and therefore perhaps prescient (as far as the published texts 
were concerned) process definition; 'Any activity or group of activities that 
takes an input, adds value to it, and provides an output to an internal or 
external customer, ' adding that processes, 'use an organization's resources to 
provide definitive results. ' 
The four key words that appear to emerge from these early process 
definitions are; activities, input, output and customer, and a fifth might be 
value, or the notion of added-value. 
The other non-reengineering'R-words' that need capturing from that time are: 
'Reinvent', as Hammer and Champy used it in their 1993 text when they state, 
'In this book we demonstrate how existing corporations can reinvent 
themselves', continuing, 'We call the techniques they can use to accomplish 
this business reengineering' (ibid: 2), their italics in both cases. 'Redefinition' 
appeared as the 'R' in 'BPR' in the ARMA Conference Programme of October 
1992, aligned to'Zero-Based Systems Analysis, ' but became 'Redesign' again 
within the text (ARMA/Williams, 1992: 5/6). 
2.3 Terminology 
This tussle for the terminology was fought in the early 1990s with, initially, 
Davenport & Short's 'Business Process Redesign' (June 1990); 
'Reengineering' appearing by itself in Hammer's July/August 1990 article; 
Boehling & Joksch's 'Business Process Management' (BPM; 1990); 
Harrington's'BPI' (Business Process Improvement) in 1991; Parnaby's (1991) 
'Manufacturing/[Engineering] Business Redesign' (M[E]BR? ); Davenport's 
reductive 'Process Innovation' (PI; 1993); 'Business Reengineering' (BR? ) in 
Hammer & Champy's (1993) text; Heygate's (1993) 'Core Process Redesign' 
(CPR); and Watson's (1994) 'Business Systems Engineering' (BSE). Watson 
(ibid: 3), though, was one of those to capture in print the term 'Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR)', creating that precise link, whilst citing (ibid: 5) 
Hammer and Champy's (1993: 32) definition of 'reengineering', when in fact 
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those two seminal authors never actually brought those three words together 
in that text, nor used the 'BPR' abbreviation. Very clearly they stated: We call 
the techniques they can use to accomplish this business reengineering,... ' (p. 
2), and, We called it business reengineering' (p. 5), their italics. 
Watson's usage of BPR, however, is not the one sought, as his clear intention 
was to challenge and move away from it in favour of his own 'Business 
Systems Engineering'. 
Obolensky's (1994) text presents a minor semantic conundrum with its main 
title of 'Practical Business Re-engineering' (PBR? ), and his definition that it is; 
'what an organisation undertakes to change its internal processes and 
controls from a traditional vertical, functional hierarchy to a horizontal, cross- 
functional, team-based, flat structure which focuses on the process of 
delighting customers' (1994: 15). This definition includes the words 
'processes' and 'process', but later in his text he makes an apparently clear 
distinction between his title and the term'BPR' within the sentence 
commencing, 'One of the failings of some Business Re-engineering 
programmes, especially those focused on business process re-engineering 
(BPR), ... 
' (1994: 114), seemingly suggesting that his own 'business re- 
engineering' is a 'non-process-based' activity? This inconsistency is made 
worse by'BPR' never appearing once in his six-page index, with're- 
engineering' warranting only four mentions, but never in its own right, with the 
main focus of the index being a section titled 'business engineering', the first 
reference in which (p. 15) starts with the title, WHAT IS BUSINESS RE- 
ENGINEERING? '. 
Watson (1994) does, however, cite another previous usage of the phrase 
'Business Process Reengineering' when in his Bibliography (p. 277) he 
references a 1993 text (as 'a collection of articles on Business Process 
Reengineering from 1990 until the middle of 1993') by the'Institute of 
Industrial Engineers' (Industrial Engineering and Management Press), which 
might possibly be the first specific usage, the front cover's full title being, 'BPR 
- Business Process Reengineering - Current Issues and Applications. ' 
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Tantalisingly prescient, perhaps, and part of the above 'collection', was 
Knorr's (1991) article, 'Business Process Redesign: Key to Competitiveness, ' 
where whilst never actually using the abbreviation 'BPR' or the specific term 
'Business Process Reengineering, ' does use the phrases, 'reengineering of 
business processes, ' 'process reengineering, "reengineering business 
processes' and 'reengineering processes. ' 
Given the much wider, international, and now very different agricultural usage 
of the abbreviation, it is perhaps fortuitous that Watson's 'BSE' did not catch 
on 
Other early followers of the genre assisted the semantic evolution with (again) 
'Business Process Redesign' (Knorr, 1991: 48) -'BPR', but not at that time 
'Reengineering' - and 'process simplification' (Sirvanci & Durmaz, 1994: 
2). 
In their 1992'review' (presumably pre-publication? *) of Davenport's 'recent 
book', Craig and Yetton comment that: 
Terms for the activity proliferate - business process redesign, core process redesign, 
re-engineering, the new industrial engineering and horizontal structures. This diversity 
is echoed in the variety of descriptions of business process redesign offered by different 
authors' (1992: 285). 
(* NB According to the text, this book was first published in '1993', but in 'The Fad That Forgot 
People', 1995 [p. 71] Thomas Davenport states quite clearly that "'Process Innovation, " my 
reengineering book, came out in November 1992. ' Even here, just two or three years on, 
Davenport himself appears to have reverted to'Reengineering', as he commences with, 
'Reengineering didn't start out... ', and continues to use this term predominantly throughout 
the article. ) 
Balle (1995: 11) steps in to bring a touch of reality with: 
'Beyond the hype, BPR is fundamentally about redesigning processes. ' 
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Yet, none of these writers were the inventors of BPR (although Watson, 1994, 
might have been one of the first to coin it specifically in his own individual 
publication, even then he was not writing as an advocate). No-one invented 
it. More, they discovered it. As we have seen, in its various species - part of 
the 'quality' genus - BPR had evolved; it was out there roaming in the jungle 
that was corporate America, as evinced within Sasaki and Hutchins (1984): 
'In other words, what Japanese manufacturers have achieved so far is process 
innovation rather than product innovation, ' (p. v, their emphasis); 
and: 
'The 1960s was the era of the miraculous growth of the Japanese economy and, 
therefore, of the successive introduction of new machines and equipment which 
brought about "process innovation"' (p. 115). 
But there was further evidence elsewhere, although much earlier, when 
Brenner (2000) talked of one company owner who 'lectured on quality with the 
zeal and regularity of a Sunday preacher': 
'He left the managing to others and spent his time tinkering with new products, new 
manufacturing techniques, new ways to improve quality and efficiency. Those who 
worked for him described him as a dictator. But he was much more than that. He was 
an explorer, a conqueror. He wanted everything made cheaper and faster than the 
competition. To do that, he brought the wisdom of outside industries into his business. 
He studied the production of steel to learn how to conduct a product through his plant 
without touching it. He studied the manufacture of cement to better understand how to 
mix his own ingredients. He borrowed DuPont's planning system and patterned his 
management structure after T. G. Rose's Higher Control in Management, a British book 
that emphasizes flat, simple organization. He routinely rebuilt the standard [product] 
manufacturing equipment, making it less wasteful and easier to operate. And he was 
never satisfied' (Brenner, 2000: 67/68). 
And, with prescient shades of Toyota's TPS today, there was also worker 
empowerment and the 'authority' to 'stop the line': 
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'He also installed a complicated system of checks and balances to ensure the quality of 
his [product]. All workers on the factory floor were authorized to halt production if they 
noticed something wrong, and they were berated by [name] if they didn't do just that' 
(ibid: 68). 
The product? Candy, chocolate. 
The name? Forrest. 
The company? Mars. 
And the year? 1934. 
Without the words being used, this also was process innovation, continuous 
improvement, process redesign, re-invention, and BPR; allied with worker 
empowerment, committed leadership and a'zeal' (ibid: 66) for quality. In 
Peters' (1988) words, this was 'A Passion for Excellence'. Brenner continues, 
giving some up-to-date perspective to these practices: 
'Today, business gurus loudly espouse the merits of such practices. Total Quality 
Management, Worker Empowerment and Total Responsibility - these are modern 
business buzzwords. But what they really mean is, be like Forrest Mars - give workers 
a sense of ownership in the final product; rewards employees for their performance; 
encourage workers to make decisions for themselves; focus on quality, quality, quality. 
Such popular new products as General Motors's Saturn have been built on these so- 
called innovative ideas' (ibid). 
In succeeding decades this approach was being fed, nurtured and 
accommodated in places like IBM ('process management'), Ford (cited by 
Hammer, and Davenport & Short, 1990), Du Pont, Westinghouse, Baxter 
Healthcare Corporation, Rank Xerox UK, GUS Home Shopping, Silicon 
Graphics, Mutual Benefit Life, and Hewlett-Packard (ibid), when these almost 
pith-helmeted scientists from Ernst and Young (Harrington was their 
International Quality Adviser), MIT/Sloan School of Management and Hammer 
& Co. spotted it there, lurking amongst other, known species of improvement 
techniques. Except, this creature appeared more aggressive (Grint & Case, 
1998). And in an apparently, yet quintessentially Kolb-like way (see Fig. 2.2, 
overleaf), these concrete industrial experiences, once observed, were taken 
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back to the laboratories, their Ivy-League 'Beagles', and reflected upon, 
dissected and identified, until it was clear, or at least clearer, what, exactly, 
was happening, and then conceptualized, before being described in detail to 
an improvement-hungry commercial and industrial world (Hammer, 1990; 
Davenport & Short, 1990; Harrington, 1991), where the 'active 
experimentation' could proceed: 
Fig. 2.2: Kolb & BPR Experiences 
IBh1, Ford. Du Pont, Westinghouse, 
Concrete experience 
stage: 
Pnrr er of the obiectiveworld 
1994 on... 
Active experimentation Observational and reflective 
stage: image: 
Davenport & Short, 
Check out theories and hunches 
Hammer & Champy, 
by testing in newsitustions Beginning of internalisation 
Harrington, etc... 
Abstract conceptualisation 
IL 
stage: 
Step back from realty and draw 
conclusions and generalisations 
BPR (x2), R, BPI, BPM, BR, Pl. etc? 
Adapted from Kolb, D., (1984), cited in Mullins, L. J., (2002) Management and 
Organisational Behaviour, 6th edition, London, FT/Prentice Hall, p. 369, Fig. 10.4 
Based on these discoveries, the rest of corporate America, and elsewhere, 
were then free to plan their experiments, and test out this new, radical species 
of improvement technique, in anticipation of their own dramatic results. There 
then began far more concrete experiences, followed by yet more observations 
and reflections, not all of them positive. 
2.4 BPR becomes established 
One, quick, sample search of 'BPR' literature for'1990', '1991' and '1992' 
produced seven new results. '1993' delivered 28, but 1994' immediately 
exposed more than 100. This, then, appeared to be the period of shakedown 
for BPR's identification - how it really became to be known. Rather like the 
battle for supremacy of VHS over Betamax and U-Matic (see; Cusumano, et 
al., 1991), 'Business Process Reengineering' became the corporate 
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household name - the VHS of BPR - leaving 'Process Redesign', 'Process 
Innovation' and 'Process Improvement' floundering in its conceptualised wake. 
And as Albitz (2006; cited also again below) says of 'reengineering', 'Thanks 
to Hammer we have a name for it now. ' 
Although, in reality, those 'thanks' might more appropriately be owing to 
Georgia's Institute of Industrial Engineers for their 'collection of articles'? 
From a sample of 36 of those 1994 articles that used the term BPR in this 
context - i. e., as opposed to 'Business Property Relief (1988), 'Bureau of 
Public Roads' (1990), and 'Black Public Relations' (1991) - 32 of those (89%) 
used either the specific descriptor, 'Business Process Reengineering, ' or 
'Reengineering, ' as opposed to other forms. Perhaps it was the punchiness of 
Hammer's 'Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate' that appealed, 
over Davenport and Short's possibly more staid, 'The New Industrial 
Engineering: Information Technology and Business Process Redesign. ' 
Either way, Scribbins (1994: 7), in 'The Logistics Response', talked of 
'Business Process Re-engineering, which I suspect will soon be simply 
BPR... ' 
A victory of marketing over substance? Microsoft over Apple (with'windows' 
technology, and the 'mouse')? In Ries and Trout's (1994) terms, it was 'The 
Law of Leadership' ('It's better to be first than it is to be better. ') combined with 
'The Law of Focus' ('The most powerful concept in marketing is owning a word 
in the prospect's mind. ') - and Hammer was first with, and now owned, the 
word'reengineering. ' No matter, the species was established, and BPR, in 
the form of 'Business Process Reengineering', was there to stay. However, 
even though above I stated that'No-one invented it, ' Champy later laid claim 
to that ownership of 'Reengineering' for himself and Hammer with the 
statement, 'I was one of the two people who introduced the concept' 
(Champy, 1995: 1), although I have discovered a counter to that. 
An e-mail dated 19 January 2006 from Lisa Albitz states (edited extracts): 
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'Hammer is the one who made business re-engineering famous but I, too had a hand in 
that transformation. In 1989 I published a paper with the Juran Institute as part of their 
annual IMPRO conference called State of the Art Processes in Administration. This 
paper talked about the significance in organizational contribution of improving 
administrative processes that affect each and every employee in the company - the 
mail service, the copy center and the telephone services. The paper discussed not only 
the savings within the process itself but attempted to extrapolate the savings generated 
throughout the company by these types of improvements. My paper was voted the best 
paper of the conference and the smart people at the Juran Institute including Dr. Juran 
himself, asked that I be a part of their new service offering: Business Process 
Improvement. I went with them to several conferences describing the potential "gains" 
by using the concept and the Juran Institute sold the training materials and classroom 
time... 
'I do know of a specific reference to Process Management before'91 - but I don't 
remember all of the contents - Gabriel Pall published a book called Process 
Management ['Quality Process Management', actually. JC]. He had worked at IBM 
and when he left he wrote this book that was my primer! I believe it was published 
about 1986 or so [1987, JC]... 
'As I mentioned, the terms have become inter-changeable over time so the exact TITLE 
will be difficult to pinpoint, I suggest you follow the concept - how it evolved over time 
could be of interest, too. My personal opinion is that Process Management in 
manufacturing gave birth to Business Process Management[`] so that it had a name as 
it applied to administrative or business processes. Process Management which I was 
taught included both process fixes and significant improvement due to significant 
process changes. Someone capitalized on the latter and began to call that re- 
engineering -I suspect an industrial engineer saw the opportunity -I can't recall right 
now who did that but it might have been used by Hammer first when he focused on the 
organization and since it's such a catchy word, it got applied to processes as well - 
was using the term re-engineering and referring to processes in 1990 for sure... 
'Re-engineering which was applied to the whole organization by Hammer in his Re- 
Engineering the Organization, that might be the first use. My consulting team had been 
doing the same kind of work before the Hammer book was published but we just called 
it Change Management and Organizational Sponsorship because we felt that focusing 
on process was truly a cultural change. Thanks to Hammer we have a name for it now. ' 
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* Albitz may well be correct, for in Pall's (1987) book he specifically uses this term when 
discussing the 'consolidation stage' of a business improvement effort, commencing with 'the 
"business process management kickoff' meeting' (p. 248). 
Intentionally, or consciously, or not, Pall provides strong links between the 
work of (e. g. ) Crosby (1986), Hammer (1990), Hammer and Champy (1993), 
and Seddon (2003). 
For example, Crosby talks of 'Prevention' as no. 2, the 'System', in his (1986: 
64) 'Four Absolutes of Quality', and Pall (1987: 48) states that 'process 
improvement is 'part of prevention - the management of intent. ' He defines 
'prevention' as 'dealing with a situation beforehand: hindering or averting the 
occurrence of something through planned countermeasures. ' And he goes 
on, 'In the context of quality management, it means ensuring the intended 
outcome, that is, conformance to requirements' - which, verbatim, is Crosby's 
1st'Absolute', his 'Definition' (of Quality Management), 'Conformance to 
Requirements. ' Further, under'Process Effectiveness', Pall argues that, 'Of 
the three basic characteristics of an independent process, effectiveness is the 
most critical because it, above all, ensures conformance to requirements' (p. 
151). 
Where Pall (p. 174) states that, 'At the process level, the process owner is 
responsible for this quality assessment', he is aligned with Hammer and 
Champy's (1993: 108) 'the process owner's job is to make it happen in the 
small, at the individual process level. ' 
And when Pall states; 'Process capability prediction is part of process design, 
which in turn is part of the management of intent - so are actions on the 
process, whose objective is process capability improvement, which, in turn, 
results in continuing quality improvement' (p. 80), he is preaching from the 
same sheet as Seddon's (2003: 71), 'Only capability measures should be 
used for managing. The discussion should focus on what can be predicted 
and what scope there is for improvement, which means working on 
understanding the nature and causes of variation. ' 
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Similarly, I suggest, it is not a huge stretch to interpret Pall's 'Process 
improvement by means of: 
1) definition of user requirements and specifications; 
2) analysis of process quality measurements; and 
3) corrective action on the process (process capability improvement 
and other preventive measures)' (p. 164); 
... as the same as what Seddon (ibid: 49) calls, 'Purpose, Measures, 
Method. ' 
Finally, under the heading of 'Process Theory, ' Pall, as have others, refers to 
von Bertalanffy (1968) when acknowledging that'General system theory 
classifies living organisms as open systems; by extension, any process that 
includes humans must also be classified as an open system - inherently 
capable of improvement and adaptation' (p. 158). 
In 'The Fad That Forgot People' (1995: 71), Thomas Davenport describes his 
version of that voyage of discovery through the 'late 1980s in Boston, ' when 
'reengineering was in the air. ' He describes how it was Hammer who'was 
arguing that technologists needed to try harder to change basic work 
processes, ' and that the 'concept' of reengineering 'brought together three 
components, none of which was new, but none of which had previously been 
connected': 
'It began with technology: the real value of computing was not simply in doing work 
more efficiently, but in changing how work was done as well. To that was added the 
notion of "business processes, " borrowed from the then-hot quality movement. The last 
piece of the puzzle was the idea of a clean-sheet-of-paper change program, an 
appealing prospect to large industrial companies seeking to escape the straightjacket of 
the past. Big companies with big problems were eager for Big Change' (Davenport, 
1995: 71). 
The terminology of that final sentence is interesting to compare with 
Hammer's more current'Deep Change: How Operational Innovation Can 
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Transform Your Company' (2004); and his phrase, '... the invention and 
deployment of new ways of doing work, ' is redolent of Seddon's (2003) 'a 
better way to make the work work' (although Seddon claims that BPR is just a 
'fad', when the two authors really do not actually seem that far apart), but 
more of that later. 
The 1980s connection is also provided by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984; 
cited in Greasley, 1999: 274/275), who 'outline how manufacturing companies 
were the first to pursue breakthrough business improvements in the 1980s. 
Towards the end of the 1980s the idea of re-designing or re-engineering 
business processes gained popularity. ' Greasley does not, however, evince 
any reference to the specific terminology, pre-1990, simply saying, 'Business 
process re-engineering became popular largely as a result of articles by 
Hammer (1990) and Davenport and Short (1990). ' 
The success stories of those early, pioneering organisations, where this 
technique was first discovered, are well documented and cited; now part of (at 
least America's) corporate history. Yet it has not all been success. BPR has 
its protagonists, its advocates, its evangelists, but it also has its detractors, its 
critics, and its abusers - even its obituaries: in 'Death to Cuts', Peltu (1996) 
claimed 'BPR is dead, ' yet clearly that is not the case. 
The rhetoric has abounded, and in fact that in itself was criticised by Grint and 
Case (1998) in 'The Violent Rhetoric of Re-engineering: Management 
Consultancy on the Offensive. ' The key 'concern' of this paper was the 
exposure of BPR as a'particularly bellicose product' (of US management 
consultancy), and 'the resurgence of explicit masculine aggression in 
managerial discourse. ' However, just as Hammer and Seddon might not be 
as far apart as they (or at least Seddon) would have us believe, Grint and 
Case's arguments do not always stand up to scrutiny either. For example, 
they cite Hammer and Stanton's (1995: xvi) 'metaphor'for their book being a 
'Swiss Army Knife', claiming it to be a 'provocative analogy which in this 
context looks remarkably like general Kiggell's threat of the bayonet charge 
and is evoked, ' and, they contend, 'with similar intent' (Grint and Case: 572). 
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Yet a closer read of Hammer and Stanton's text reveals their analogy simply 
to mean, 'a number of tools that share a housing' - hardly'violent rhetoric', 
unless one considers the average DIY toolbox to be some sort of domestic 
arsenal of WMD? 
Far from being 'dead', in their'updated and revised' edition of 'Reengineering 
the Corporation' Hammer and Champy claim that reengineering 'is not gone; it 
is alive and well, ' and that it is 'misleading' to say that reengineering is 'back', 
because the 'truth is, it never went away' (2001: 2). And they continue that, 
'Reengineering is, in fact, one of the success stories of business history' (ibid), 
and it is this assertion, really - perhaps one should say, 'fundamentally'? - 
that is at the core of this piece of research: is BPR truly'alive and well'? Is 
that the case in the UK public sector LGOs? And, more specifically, does that 
'success story', or do such 'stories', obtain within the recent experiences of the 
two local authorities being considered? 
Before that, however, we must consider where BPR has been since that 
period of discovery a decade-and-a-half-ago, what other successes - or not - 
might there have been along the way, what other vehicles for change are in 
the field of choice, and what are the current drivers of that change within the 
public sector in the UK? 
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Chapter 3 BPR to Date 
3.1 The Development of BPR in the Early 1990s 
'Although the definition and benefits of BPR are clear, that does not mean the way to achieve 
those benefits is obvious' (Manganelli & Klein, 1994: 20). 
If it was Harrington's (1991) express belief that the 'one major breakthrough in 
the 1 980s' was 'the realization by management that business and 
manufacturing processes, not the people, [were] the key to error-free 
performance' (Harrington, 1991: vii), and Deming (1986) who pointed out that 
'over 90 percent of the possibilities for quality improvement belonged to the 
system or process' (Tennant & Wu, 2005*), then that is perhaps the best 
place to start a more comprehensive analysis of systems- and process- 
thinking and BPR. Davenport (1995: 71) also pegged the emergence of 
reengineering at this time, by his assertion - as previously stated - that it'was 
in the late 1980s in Boston and reengineering was in the air', so initially we will 
need to look back to that decade. 
(* Deming actually said '94%'; Deming, 1986: 315. ) 
Further contemporary (mid-1980s) support can be found in Skinner's (1986) 
article, 'The productivity paradox', where he asserts that'Resolutely chipping 
away at waste and inefficiency - the heart of most productivity programs - is 
not enough to restore competitive health, ' yet this 'chipping away' could easily 
be seen as analogous to kaizen, the 'continuous improvement' ethos of 
contemporaneous TQM programmes. He was not, however, arguing against 
TQM, but rather that 'Productivity is the wrong tree to bark up, ' illustrating this 
with what he describes as the "'40 40 20" rule' where, 'Another (i. e. the 
middle) 40% comes from major changes in equipment and process 
technology, ' and that, 'Far more powerful are changes in manufacturing 
structure and technology. ' Processes, perhaps? 
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One can almost sense the emergence of a 'radical' new approach trying to 
escape from the chrysalis of incremental improvement methods, in line with 
Goss et al's (1993) metaphor of transformational change requiring a different 
animal -a 'butterfly', not an incrementally 'better caterpillar' (Fig. 3.0, below): 
Fig. 3.0: Transformation 
Transformation 
(There is none in between) 
tI 
Excellence 
Source: http: //www. harehall. co. uk/croc. htmi 
The synonymy of 'systems' and 'processes' - 'process: a systematic series of 
actions directed to some end' (Webster's, 1989) - in earlier biological contexts 
can be seen within von Bertalanffy's (1951: 341) article, 'General System 
Theory: A New Approach to the Unity of Science - 5. Conclusion', with: 
The same is true of the statements with which systems theory is concerned. It is not 
self-evident that organizations are governed by dynamical laws of interaction. On the 
contrary, the opposite view was accepted for centuries, namely that the organism is a 
machine, and that the processes within it are governed by one-way causality'; 
and, 
'The central point of system theory is the dynamic view, trying to explain phenomena of 
order in terms of the interaction of processes,... '. 
Is this 'one-way causality' similar to Albitz's (1989: 2) 'Process Model', or the 
'SIPOC' diagram - see example overleaf - showing the 'one-way', end-to-end 
26 
process from supplier through to customer (sometimes known as the 'Input- 
Transformation-Output' [ITO] model)? 
Fig. 3.1: SIPOC (ITO) diagram 
Figure 1: SIPOC Diagram 
SIP OC 
Process nano 
Process owner: 
Supplta Input Process Output Customer 
Source: httr): //www. i)owerandsystems. com/EN/resources/articles associates/lilla. html 
That the systems approach arose at least in part from the work of biologists is 
evinced also by Miller and Rice (1967, cited in Mullins, 2002: 69), who 'likened 
the commercial and industrial organisation to the biological organism. ' 
In Watson's (1994) text, 'Business Systems Engineering: Managing 
Breakthrough Changes for Productivity and Profit, he defines a system as: 'a 
grouping of parts that operate together for a common purpose, ' which - 
especially if we were to add the words 'value' and 'customer' - would be near 
enough to those earlier definitions of 'process. ' 
In the 1986 reprint of Rosemary Stewart's 1970 text, 'The Reality of 
Organizations, ' this concept of linked interactions is reinforced with: 
'The value of looking at an organization from the systems approach is that it changes 
one's viewpoint from the description and analysis of its component parts to that of their 
interrelationships. Such an approach emphasizes that one should not try and deal with 
problems in isolation but should be aware of their interactions' (Stewart, 1986: 20) 
And this linkage is further 'emphasized' with: 
27 
'... if we think, as we should, of the organization as being made up of interlocking and 
interacting parts, then the link will be clearer' (ibid). 
O'Connor and McDermott (1997: 2) concur with their definition of a system as 
'an entity that maintains its existence and functions as a whole through the 
interaction of its parts. ' They also appear to offer support to the principle of 
BPR's emergence - as opposed to its invention - with the implication that for 
systems to function as a whole they have to have 'properties above and 
beyond the properties of the parts that comprise them. ' These emergent 
properties "emerge' from the system when it is working' (ibid: 6); in the same 
way, perhaps that for Hammer and Champy's (1993) system of BPR to 'work' 
properly - to function as a whole - all of their'nine best practices' (Hammer, 
1990; Hammer & Champy, 1993) have to be enacted? 
The other inter-linking aspect of BPR's evolution at this time was advances in 
technology, but the realization that'the real value of computing was not simply 
in doing work more efficiently, but in changing how work was done as well' 
(Davenport, 1995: 71), whilst Hammer himself had apparently also been 
'arguing that technologists needed to try harder to change basic work 
processes' (ibid). 
Davenport talks of the'three components' of the 'puzzle' being technology, 
business processes and the 'idea of a clean-sheet-of-paper change program' 
coming together to create the concept of 'reengineering', even though none of 
the companies they were researching at the time used that term. 
Nonetheless the words 'Hammer', 'industry' and '(re)engineering' do suggest a 
hard and emerging tripartite structure, a sort of 'iron triangle, ' within which the 
early protagonists could frame their conceptualizations (overleaf): 
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Clean-sheet-of-paper Business 
change programme processes 
Skinner's (1986) view that chasing productivity was the 'wrong approach' and 
that simply applying technology to existing processes - what Hammer (1990) 
four years later was to refer to as 'paving the cow paths' - was supported by 
Krafcik's (1988) example of where 'GM had spent billions to learn that high 
technology does not necessarily mean high performance, ' and what Gulden 
and Reck (1992: 11) meant when they said, 'most automation efforts have 
only further cemented the steps in place, ' or the 'cow paths'? 
Citing the alternative -'best exemplified by Toyota' - Krafcik advocates the 
belief that'quality should be achieved within the process, not within a 
rectification area. ' Even though this is the right-first-time approach of TQM, 
the new emphasis on 'process' is telling, and it also links with Skinner's 
concerns regarding productivity with: 
'That there is a strong correlation between quality and productivity should not come as 
a surprise. The quality gurus of industry - Juran, Deming, Crosby, and others - have 
all espoused the "Quality Is Free" doctrine, the view that productivity tends to increase 
with improved quality because of reduced rework efforts, more attention to process 
controls, less inspection requirements, and the like' (Krafcik, 1988: 47). 
Crosby (1986) defined the cost of (poor) quality as 'the price of non- 
conformance, ' and Albitz (1991: 354) linked this to the context of business 
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Technology 
process improvement with, 'Business processes, because of their unfocused 
evolution, contain enormous amounts of cost of non-conformance, around 
and above 50%! ' Albitz cites 'many managers' as having 'said, "Process 
management makes sense, and now I know why I want to do the process 
review! "' - and this was in December 1991, so when she talks of 'process 
engineering' as a 'tool' that had been 'available to it ['manufacturing'] in the 
past, ' we could infer that the term also really had already been around for a 
while, even if unarticulated as that, specifically, or just as 'reengineering'? 
Albitz (2006) - as we have seen earlier also - shed further light on this point 
with: 
'Gabriel Pall published a book called Process Management. ... 
I believe it was 
published about 1986 or so' [the 'or so' was almost correct because it was 1987, see 
Refs; 'Pall, 1987'], adding, 'Someone capitalized on (that) later and began to call that 
re-engineering -I suspect an industrial engineer saw the opportunity -I can't recall 
right now who did that but it might have been used by Hammer first ... 
I was using the 
term re-engineering and referring to processes in 1990 for sure... '; and that Hammer's 
book, 'might be the first use' (Albitz; 19/01/06). 
The possibility of Hammer's potential claim to the 'first use' of the word 
'reengineering' in this business/process context is supported by his own 
website (httD: //www. hammerandco. com/about. as2), where it states, 'Dr. Michael 
Hammer has changed forever how businesses do business. He is the 
originator of reengineering and the process enterprise... ' 
Note: In Hammer and Stanton's (1995) book, 'The Reengineering Revolution', 
they state quite clearly that, 'We never claimed to have invented 
reengineering' (their emphasis), and add, 'At the most, we discovered 
reengineering' (p. 177). 
In the same year as Skinner's article and Crosby's second book, Kane (1986) 
also published his article on 'IBM's Quality Focus on the Business Process- 
subtitled, subtitled, 'A management approach to assure that major cross-functional 
processes remain competitive- in which he identified IBM's need to re- 
evaluate its early approach to quality activities because of the'realization that 
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the company's environment was changing faster than its processes could 
adapt' (Kane, 1986: 24). This may have been the articulation that Albitz had 
in mind, with Kane's early comment, 'The process management approach 
stemmed from IBM's early work in quality activities' (ibid). 
Kane also underpinned those earlier 'process' definitions with his initial 
description of, 'By "business process", we mean the closely related decisions 
and activities required to manage and administer the resources of the 
business' (ibid: 25), and subsequently defining a process 'as "a group of 
logically related tasks (decisions and activities) that, when performed, utilize 
the resources of the business to produce definitive results' (ibid: 26). 
However, neither of these made any reference to the 'customer', so these 
early definitions appeared to be more inward-looking, until 'customer' 
appeared to have been first included in the definition by Harrington (1991: 9), 
followed in 1993 by Hammer and Champy, and Davenport. 
Yet again, though, whilst 'process' was becoming the issue, incrementalism 
still obtained -'Continuous quality improvement is the objective rather than 
single-event problem solving; the steady improvement of the efficiency of 
every process should be the end result' (Kane, 1986: 27) -a view somewhat 
reiterated almost twenty years later by Ricardo Semler's comment that: 
'... a system should learn from its mistakes. Process is paramount to knowledge, and 
mistakes are powerful catalysts for the process. ' 
(Semler, 2003*: 76) 
[* Note: One version of this second book by Semler - not to the one 
referenced - has the sub-title, 'Changing the Way Work Works', which in the 
point it's making is very similar to Hammer & Champy's (1993,31; 2001: 34) 
'a better way of doing work', and Seddon's (2003) sub-title, 'A Better Way to 
Make the Work Work'. ] 
One paragraph in Kane's article possibly exemplified the emerging need for a 
more 'radical' approach over the continuously incremental philosophy of TQM: 
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In addition, it is essential that those who best understand the detail and have the best 
contact with the customer and the customer's environment continue to feed back 
changes to requirements and modifications to procedures. This is usually initiated at 
higher levels. In this way processes can be kept vital and competitive' (Kane, 1986: 
29/30). 
This 'feedback' is shown in his 'Customer/Supplier Relationship' model 
(below; p. 30, Fig. 6), which is not dissimilar from the Process/SIPOC/ITO 
models used earlier, except for showing the 'measurements' (at the 
process/'value-add' stage) and feedback loops: 
Fig. 3.2: Customer Supplier Relationship 
Customer/Supplier Relationship 
Requirements Requirements 
Supplier Value Add F Customer 
Work Activity 
Input 
Feedback 
Measurements 
Output 
Feedback 
Source: Kane, E. J., (1986) 'IBM's Quality Focus on the Business Process: A management 
approach to assure that major cross-functional processes remain competitive', Quality 
Progess, April, p. 30, Fig. 6 
Except, however, this continuousness did not really happen throughout the 
wider TQM world, because if (e. g. ) processes had been 'kept vital', more 
transformational change might not have been necessary, because as Kane 
himself (1986: 33) states, 'Processes do not naturally stay lean and 
competitive. ' 
32 
3.2 Strategic Drift 
Evidence for this might be found more in the strategic management texts and 
those on operations and quality management. For example, the mere 
presence of the 'Strategic Drift' model, below, in Johnson, et al. (2005: 27, 
Exhibit 1.4) and their claim that'strategies progressively fail to address the 
strategic position of the organization and performance deteriorates, ' suggests 
that 'continuous quality improvement' (Kane, 1986) might not have been 
happening - possibly due to what Thompson (1997: 83) called 'introversion 
and inertia in a changing environment. ' 
Fig. 3.3: The Risk of Strategic Drift: 
Cumulative 
change 
Time 
Source: Johnson, G., Scholes, K. & Whittingham, R., (2005) Exploring Corporate Strategy: 
Text & Cases, Harlow, FT/Prentice Hall, p. 27, Exhibit 1.4 
What Kane (1986: 32) cites, below, as the 'lessons to be learned in improving 
critical business processes' are not at all dissimilar from the points made later 
by, for example, Hammer & Champy (1993), Champy (1995), and Hammer 
and Stanton (1995), the primary BPR gurus, when identifying the critical 
success factors: 
Management commitment is essential 
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s 10 » 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3/4 
Incremental change Flux Transformational 
change or demise 
" Success is long-term, 
"A disciplined methodology is needed. 
" Experimentation is beneficial. 
" Error-free measurements at the task level must be employed. 
" Focus must be on improving the process itself. 
That this 'management commitment' is crucial for (e. g. ) TQM was reinforced 
by De Cieri (et al., 1991: 60) when commenting that: 
'Deming and the others have pointed out that both the support and active drive are 
required of senior management as leaders and practitioners of TQM, because the 
traditional system conflicts with the new and substantial inertias need to be overcome. ' 
This need for 'commitment' was emphasized in one of the 'difficulties' which 
must be overcome in implementation, in that, 'for any level in the organisation, 
if the immediate superior does not understand TQM or does not appear to 
apply the principles of TQM in his/her work, then adoption will be difficult for 
any individual employee' (ibid: 63/64); and this issue of understanding will 
feature more fully later. TQM or BPR, the 'leadership' issue of buy-in and 
application appears therefore to be paramount -'Reengineering leaders must 
encourage people to pursue stretch goals and to think out of the box; to this 
end, leadership must reward creative thinking and be willing to consider any 
new idea' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995: 25). 
Kane's second point - Success is long-term - hints at the next problem, that 
of timescale, when most'senior management' careers are rarely 'long-term' in 
many organizations. Albitz (2006) also hints perhaps at this urgency issue 
with, 'as you know, we Americans need something new each month, ' so when 
Deming (1986: 153) suggested that it takes 'ten years' to effectively 
implement TQM, he was possibly sowing the seeds for its own failure when 
more rapid solutions were required, or at least hoped for, by those senior 
managers carrying corporate responsibility for rapid improvements? And in 
terms of BPR specifically, Hammer and Stanton again bring this speed issue 
clearly to the fore with: 
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You must reengineer quickly. If you can't show some tangible results within a year, 
you will lose the support and momentum necessary to make the effort successful.... 
Stay focused and narrow the scope if necessary in order to get results fast' (Hammer & 
Stanton, 1995: 30). 
This was somewhat at odds, though, with Davis' (1993: 51; citing Larry 
Skinner of Texas Instruments) claim that 'Reengineering projects often take a 
year or more in the formulation phase and another 12 to 24 months to 
implement'? 
Hammer (1998) illustrated this'ongoing and endless cycle of process 
improvement that is conducted by the process owner' - pointing out for the 
'cognoscenti of the quality movement' that the model is 'clearly derived from 
Shewhart and Deming's Plan/Do/Check/Act cycle' (Hammer, 1998: 80) - and 
his model (Fig. 1; below) has been adapted to show, even more 'clearly', the 
differentiation between TQM-type incremental change ('Modify process'), and 
BPR-type radical change ('Replace process'): 
Fig. 3.4: Hammer's process improvement model 
Determine Identify 
customer needs Set vision and 
and benchmark 
performance goal 
competitors gap I 
Measure and 
assess process 
performance 
Modify Replace 
TQM process 
process 
Evaluate BPR 
results 
Hammer, M., (1998) Beyond Reengineering: How the Process-Centred Organization is 
Changing Our Work and Our Lives, London, HarperCollins Business, p. 81, Fig. 1; adapted, 
Chamberlin, 2005 
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He emphasizes the fundamentally continuous nature of processual scanning 
with, 'In the process-centred organization, this program of process 
improvement is not a secondary and peripheral activity. It is the essence of 
management, ' and this aligns clearly with Seddon's (2002: 52) assertion that 
'quality is the work, not extra work' (his italics). 
That both TQM and BPR can sit together within the same organization was 
confirmed by Hammer and Champy (1993: 49), and again in 2001 (ibid: 239) 
with, 'Reengineering and TQM are neither identical nor in conflict; they are 
complementary, ' but Hammer (1998: 83) also 'illustrates how TQM and 
reengineering fit together over time in the life story of a process' with his Fig. 2 
(below), which harks back to the 'Stage 3/4 Transformational change or 
demise' situation in the 'Risk of Strategic Drift' model shown previously -'First 
the process is enhanced until its useful lifetime is over, at which point it is 
reengineered' (Hammer, 1998: 83): 
Fig. 3.5: The 'life story of a process' 
Process R 
Performance 
Q 
R 
Q= Quality Programs 
QR= Reengineering 
Time 
Hammer, M., (1998) Beyond Reengineering: How the Process-Centred Organization is 
Changing Our Work and Our Lives, London, HarperCollins Business, p. 83, Fig. 2 
The sitting together' metaphor was more eloquently employed by Hammer 
(1998: 82) when he described reengineering and TQM as 'merely different 
pews in the church of process improvement. ' Different'pews' perhaps, but at 
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opposite ends, and on opposite sides of the church's centre aisle. And in the 
US, where there are more 'churches' than anywhere else - 'more vigorously 
competing sects and congregations than any other nation' (Peters, 2003: 42) 
- Tom Peters (2003: 40), citing Nicholas Negroponte of MIT Media Labs, 
describes 'incrementalism (as) innovation's worst enemy', hardly suggestive of 
a culture of mutual tolerance. 
This is where Hammer (1998: 82/83) makes a more oblique reference to the 
shift of culture organisations must embrace and maintain in order for the 
concept not just to succeed, but survive: 
'Note this means that reengineering is not a once-in-a-lifetime endeavor. As we have 
already observed, the reengineering revolution has two major themes: The first is 
concerned with aligning organizations around their processes, while the second 
focuses on replacing existing process designs with superior ones. The first of these is 
in fact a one-time shift in an organization's philosophy and self-perspective, but the 
latter must be a never-ending struggle. As business circumstances change in major 
ways, so must process designs. ' 
This was surprisingly less robust than Hammer and Champy's (2001: 228) 
warning that organizations must not allow'existing corporate cultures and 
management attitudes to prevent reengineering from getting started, ' in their 
'catalog of the most common errors that lead companies to fail at 
reengineering' (ibid: 222). 
Seddon (1992/2002: 134/135) emphasizes more firmly this requirement for an 
attitudinal ground-shift, and whence it must come, with: 
'There is no change without leadership. Leadership towards quality and service 
improvement will be largely ineffective if it is not based on a wholly different way of 
thinking... The initiative must come from management, and if they are to succeed in 
this endeavour they must first cast aside traditional thinking about their role and take 
responsibility as motivators and leaders of a team all working to the same goal. ' 
If managers would not take on this 'responsibility', or occasionally they even 
'opposed' the improvement initiative, Sid Joynson labeled these the 'villains': 
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'... some of the middle managers who could not or would not adapt to the new way, and 
who 'nobbled' his teams whenever they had a chance. 'When we find them, " he said, 
"these are the bastards we have to crush"' (Joynson & Forrester, 1995: 8/9). 
Watson (1994) disagrees with Hammer on two other key points: the first being 
that, whereas Hammer focused on 'the power of modern information 
technology to radically redesign our business processes in order to achieve 
dramatic improvements in their performance' (1990: 104) -what Watson (p. 
5) describes as reengineering being 'developed from the perspective of the 
chief information officer, ' in other words, IT-led - he believes that his own 
approach considers'all potential methods' for process problem resolution, e. g. 
'design of the process, training or capability of the people, structure or design 
of the data and information, or the enabling systems technology' (p. 6). 
Whether this difference warrants a full book is possibly debatable, because all 
Hammer and Champy (1993: 44; 2001: 47) say is, We say that in 
reengineering, information technology acts as an essential enable? (their 
italics), and their use of the indefinite article is possibly consistent with 
Watson's 'alternative process solutions'? 
In fact Hammer (cited in Moad, 1993: 24) answers this point quite specifically 
when questioned: 
Q. What is the role of IS when it comes to reengineering the enterprise? 
A. Reengineering must be a business- and executive-driven enterprise. Even though 
technology plays a central role, it's not a technology enterprise. If it's viewed as a 
technology enterprise it will fail. 
Q. But can't reengineering be driven by a technologist? 
A. It cannot be driven by a technologist. It can only be driven by an executive officer. 
The most common driver is the chief operating officer. The CIO does not have 
enough leverage in the organization to make reengineering happen. 
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Davis (1993: 54) possibly reinforces this with evidence from John Deere, 
'... Deere has learned that 50 percent of the cost-saving opportunities are 
usually in product and process design, ... and 20 percent in automating 
manufacturing and adding new computer technology. ' 
Watson's second 'difference' is over'the perceived value of benchmarking, ' 
where his own, overtly positive view of benchmarking is of it being 'another 
business practice that leads "reengineers" toward implementing strategic 
change initiatives in key business processes' (p. 6), claiming that 'Hammer 
takes a divergent view' [in that] 'benchmarking restricts the framework of the 
reengineering team by limiting it to its own industry' (ibid). Again, however, 
this can be challenged, because whereas Hammer and Champy (1993: 132; 
2001: 137) do state that, 'The problem with benchmarking is it can restrict the 
reengineering team's thinking to the framework of what is already being done 
in its company's own industry, ' [and that] 'By aspiring only to be as good as 
the best in its industry, the team sets a cap on its own ambitions, ' they then go 
on with, 'If a team is going to benchmark, it should benchmark from the best in 
the world, not the best in its industry. ' In fact, rather than criticizing 
benchmarking, they specifically state that, 'Before concluding we should 
comment on another tool that is available to reengineering teams, namely 
benchmarking' (ibid). . 
Watson's claim, therefore, that'Hammer's [is a] narrow perspective of bench- 
marking' and that it would not'permit what Xerox calls "creative imitation"', is 
perhaps a little uncharitable, given that his criticism of Hammer was his being 
'limited to competitive studies, ' when Watson himself is a 'competitor' of 
Hammer and Champy, in that, in the same year as their first book appeared, 
Watson also published his own text, unsurprisingly entitled Strategic 
Benchmarking, following it a year later with Business Systems Engineering. 
That benchmarking, per se, was an intrinsic part of reengineering at that time 
is confirmed by Davis in his report on 'The first conference featuring 
presentations by line managers implementing reengineering, ' held in Orlando, 
Florida, January 1993, where in the example of how'Marrion Merrel Dow 
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[MMD] Reengineers with a Customer Focus, ' he states, 'The company has 
begun to benchmark its process performance in these areas against process 
leaders' (1993: 53). 
3.3 BPR in the mid-1990s 
'Beyond the hype, BPR is fundamentally about redesigning processes' (Balle, 1995). 
3.3.1 'Tipping Point' and BPR 
Before progressing to focus on the more recent BPR literature, it is worth 
briefly visiting the concept of the 'Tipping Point'. First articulated by Morton 
Grodzins (1958) and then expanded and built on by Thomas Schelling in 
1972, the tipping point is a sociological term that refers to that dramatic 
moment when something unique becomes common. It was subsequently 
popularised by Malcolm Gladwell's (2000) book, 'The Tipping Point: How little 
things can make a big difference, ' since the publication of which, (the) 'Tipping 
Point' has become a common cliche (evinced by the simple example of its use 
four times in a ten-minute interview on climate change, on BBC Radio 4's 
Today Programme, at 08.10 on Monday, 30th January, 2006). Primarily it is 
an examination of the social epidemics that surround us, or, from the world of 
epidemiology, 'the name given to that moment in an epidemic when a virus 
reaches critical mass' (httP: //www. Gladwell. Com/Tir)pingPoint/index. html). 
In the 'social' world of business improvement it could be suggested that the 
'tipping point' for BPR was between the early- and middle-1990s. The table, 
below, based on a brief examination of one relevant academic database, 
shows how from 1994 onwards there was a sharp rise in articles referring in 
some way to 'BPR', whereas prior to that there were few or none*. 
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Table 3.1: BPR's 'Tipping Point' 
'Process 'Process 
Year 'BPR' Reengineering' Redesign' 'TQM' 'Quality' 
1985 0 0 0 0 2 
1986 0 0 0 0 1 
1987 0 0 0 0 4 
1988 0 0 0 0 1 
1989 0 0 0 23 148 
1990 0 0 0 58 198 
1991 5 0 0 96 290 
1992 0 0 0 144 371 
1993 8 0 0 157 414 
1994 28 0 11 312 1,568 
1995 62 11 37 350 1,767 
1996 81 21 49 320 1,972 
1997 77 25 30 304 2,109 
1998 101 60 58 299 2,156 
1999 80 61 40 310 2,192 
2000 96 74 56 313 2,361 
2001 79 78 34 283 2,331 
2002 71 76 38 277 2,662 
2003 80 70 40 284 3,017 
2004 74 65 54 267 3,197 
2005 81 98 56 288 3,367 
(* Searches elsewhere will produce other articles in the early 1990s - e. g. 
EBSCO Host: Gulden and Reck; ARMA [conference program]; Spencer; 
Carroll; DeJarnett; Short and Venkatraman; all in 1992 - but show similar 
results. ) 
The same theme is observed for the terms 'process reengineering' and 
'process redesign. ' There was of course the issue that this specific database 
could possibly have only started archiving BPR-related journal articles during 
the early'90s, so the 'test' terms of 'TQM' and 'quality' were also used, and 
the similarly sharp rise in numbers of those articles also appeared, but 
happened some six years earlier. 
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Fig. 3.6: The 'Tipping Point' of BPR 
BPR's'Tipping Point'? 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 -- 
150 
E 
z' 100 
11110 
50 
Lr) CO rl- oO O) ON CO LO (0 N- 00 6) ON Cl) 'T U') QO QO 00 00 aO O) OOOO Q) OO Q) OOOOOO O) O) O) O) O O) OO 0) OmO a) 0) OOOOOO 
rrrrrNNNNNN 
1985 to 2005 
'BPR' -=- 'process reengineering' 'process redesign' - TQM' A- 
'quality'/10 
(** The 'quality' series, above, has been divided by '10' because it is the 'shape' that is 
relevant, but it is also important to note the actual numbers of articles shown in the right-hand 
column of Table 3.1. ) 
Whilst in itself not conclusive, this does suggest at least the consideration of a 
possible relationship between the writings of the early protagonists - 
Davenport and Short (June, 1990), Hammer (July, 1990), Harrington (1991), 
Hammer and Champy (1993), Watson (1994) - and the subsequent rise in 
interest of the BPR phenomenon. 
3.3.2 The 'Law of The Few' 
Gladwell (2000: 33) talks of the 'Law of the Few, ' those people who are 
'critical to social epidemics, ' and this approach is extremely redolent of Al Ries 
and Jack Trout's (1994) book, 'The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing, ' where, 
specifically, 'Law 5: The Law of Focus' states that the 'the most powerful 
concept in marketing is owning a word in the prospect's mind' (also mentioned 
earlier). 
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Clearly, for example, when Michael Hammer wrote his seminal article 
'Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate, ' this was in essence a 
'marketing' exercise. He was marketing the concept, and was then at the first 
stage of that basic and ubiquitous marketing concept, the 'AIDA' model: 
Fig. IT The'AIDA' model 
Attention--º Interest -k Desire ---º Action 
Source. vy%w iearnmarketing. net 
With the primary 'A' sometimes shown also as 'Awareness' (see: 
http: //www. ftmasterinq. com/mmo/mmo02 3. htm), Hammer, in the summer of 1990, 
was trying to gain our 'attention. ' He was making us 'aware' of this 
'reengineering' term, and possibly for the first time when used in this context. 
His initial aim would have been to secure our'interest', but ultimately - as with 
any academic author promoting a new concept - to move us through 'desire' 
and on to 'action'. Hammer wanted people in the worlds of business and 
organisation management to actually use reengineering to 'radically' improve 
their businesses. And whilst he wasn't the first to write on this new discovery 
- Davenport and Short beat him by one month - he did a better job of 
marketing it. He had the 'stickiness factor' (Gladwell, 2000: 89-132) that the 
others didn't. One reason for this might simply have been his choice of title. It 
carried a definite punch -a challenge, a command, even, to the readers - 
compared to Davenport and Short's more staid, 'The New Industrial 
Engineering: Information Technology and Business Process Redesign', where 
the 'BPR-ish' element was relegated to the tail-end of a long, dry and 
perceptively 'technical' title. 
In Ries and Trout terms, almost immediately, Hammer had laid claim to 'the 
word' in the prospects' minds - our minds. From that moment forward, 
Hammer (later with James Champy) owned 'reengineering'. 
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The redolence continues here with the way that Apple TM first marketed 
'Wind ows'TM technology (or a 'graphic-based user interface' as it was initially 
known, first demonstrated by Xerox back in 1975) and its associated 'mouse', 
but MicroSoftT"" did the better marketing job and so became the world leaders, 
relegating Apple to second-place at best (see also below, the 'Law of Duality'). 
Ries and Trout's 'Law 6: The Law of Exclusivity, ' says that 'Two companies 
cannot own the same word in the prospect's mind. ' And so Davenport and 
Short, possibly by being too clever, had missed the opportunity, thereby 
proving Ries and Trout's 'Law 8', the 'Law of Duality: in the long run, every 
market becomes a two-horse race. ' Davenport and Short were the second 
'horse', and some evidence for this is in the relative sales of their initial 'core' 
texts: Hammer and Champy's 'Reengineering the Corporation: a manifesto for 
business revolution' has sold 'over 2 million copies'', whereas Thomas 
Davenport's 'Process Innovation: Reengineering work through Information 
Technology, sold only 'about 120,000'2. 
This also ties in with Ries and Trout's 'Law 1: The Law of Leadership' which 
affirms the importance of being number one in a category - BPR. But this 
issue of 'number one' does not necessarily refer to the inventor, but to 
whosoever can gain that position of leadership, possibly through better 
marketing. As Albitz (2006) says, 'Hammer is the one who made business re- 
engineering famous... ', adding, albeit modestly, 'but I, too, had a hand in that 
transformation. ' In 'tipping point' terms, Gladwell in his 'Law of the Few' talks 
of 'Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen' (ibid: 34), and whichever one (or 
more) of these descriptions Hammer and Champy might fit, the combination 
of Hammer's article and their joint 1993 text appears to have created the 
'stickiness factor' that BPR - in the form of 'business process reengineering' - 
needed. As can be seen from the earlier table, by 1998 there were, on that 
database alone, '101' search responses to the term BPR; having risen from '8' 
in 1993, through '28' in 1994. 
1 htt: //www. hammerandco. com/ ublications-cor oration. as Z e-mail from Thomas Davenport, 06 Feb., 2006 
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3.3.3 'Stickiness' and 'Context' 
The 'sticky' metaphor can relate also to the longer-term success stories, or 
otherwise, or the BPR concept. Blanchard's (1989) 'sticktoitiveness' was used 
to emphasise the tenacity, determination, resolution, drive, etc., required to 
see anything through to completion, or as Kane (1986) said, 'Success is long- 
term. ' Yet as we have seen from Albitz (2006) with, 'Americans need 
something new each month, ' this longer-term-ness might be the rarest of 
commodities, which might also indicate some prescience in Hammer and 
Stanton's (1995: 30) comment, 'You must reengineer quickly', otherwise your 
'management' might be looking elsewhere? Spencer (1992) also reinforced 
this need for 'stickiness' with: 
'If BPR fails it is unlikely to be for technical reasons, since most of its components are 
already proven. In my view the main issue that will determine its success or otherwise 
is the extent of management's preparedness to stick with it through the political and 
economic pressures to which all businesses are subjected' (this author's italics). 
And, ultimately, it is likely to be this management 'sticktoitiveness' that 
enables any business or organisation to move the 'prospect' from 'A' and 'I' 
(Attention and Interest) through the 'D' of 'Desire' (to do something), to the 
final 'A' ('Action); actually doing something. As Gladwell (2000: 139) says, 
'ideas have to be memorable and move us to action. ' 
The third issue within this 'tipping point' scenario is that of context, or what 
Gladwell (ibid) calls, 'The Power of Context' -'Epidemics are sensitive to the 
conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur. ' 
The 'conditions and circumstances of the times' relevant to the possible 
'epidemic' of BPR were perhaps those articulated by Skinner (1986) and 
Koenig (1993) when they talked of the 'productivity paradox', or the failure of 
the massive investments in IT to deliver the commensurate performance 
improvements. So with Deming (1986: 153) already having suggested that it 
would take 'ten years' to effectively implement TQM, and the potential solution 
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of IT having failed to deliver on its promise, the context was ripe for a new 
initiative. 
However, as we have seen already, this is not an 'either/or' scenario. As 
Gulden and Reck (1992: 11) point out, 'organizations need both reengineering 
and quality improvement to stay competitive, ' and in this context 
'reengineering' infers quick and radical, whilst 'quality improvement' implies 
TQM, or steady and incremental. They continue; 'Corporations must make: 
0 Continual improvement in a wide range of individual jobs, departments, functions, 
processes, and subprocesses through quality initiatives. 
9 Periodic breakthrough in a few key business process(es) spanning functional or 
departmental lines by reengineering these processes. ' 
And this could be the crux of the context that'tipped' BPR into the frame at 
that time in the mid-90s: IT hadn't (or had barely) delivered at all; TQM either 
hadn't delivered yet, or hadn't delivered enough even if it had; and there was 
both a sense that there was something else, and a hunger for it. BPR was 
therefore a prime candidate to whet these appetites, and Gulden and Reck 
hint at this context issue, further suggesting there was a possible readiness, 
now, amongst the practitioners: 
'Because quality programs raise awareness about process improvement, however, they 
are increasingly setting the stage for the radical process redesign that is reengineering. 
Furthermore, quality techniques can help an organization hold and build on the gains it 
has made by reengineering a process. They are therefore not mutually exclusive or 
competing phenomena. ' 
BPR + PDC*A 
(*or S: in'Plan-Do-Check-Act', 'Check' is sometimes shown as'Study; Deming, 1986: 
88; acknowledged there as 'The Shewhart cycle' - Shewhart, W. A., (1939) 
'Statistical 
Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control', Graduate School, Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, p. 45; Dover, 1986) 
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What Hammer and Champy (2001: 154) call their 'case for action' is repeated 
by Gulden and Reck (ibid: 12); 'The case for action. If quality improvement 
techniques are the recommended daily dosage for a chronic condition, 
reengineering is strong medicine that should be used only for an acute 
condition' - suggesting context. 
But 'context' and 'tipping point' might also have some resonance with 
individual organisations, because the context has to be right, and the'case' 
strong enough, to 'tip' the organisation from TQM, or kaizen-based 
improvement, and into the need for BPR. Gulden and Reck (ibid) again; 'The 
case has to be compelling enough to get the organization moving, and 
management must keep its resolve in the face of resistance to radically new 
ways of operating'- 'sticktoitiveness'! 
3.3.4 A Spectral Issue 
And as stated earlier, this is not an 'either/or' decision, it is a spectral issue, 
with, possibly, a range of emphases between the extremes of TQM in the 
'violet', 'incremental', end, and BPR at the 'red' and 'radical' other, dependent 
upon the context: 
Fig. 3.8: The 'Quality Spectrum' 
'Quality Spectrum' 
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This spectral range could be from the most minor change to the inflection in a 
receptionist's voice, in order to incrementally (and continuously, in kaizen 
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Violet Indigo Blue Green Yellow Orange Red 
terms) improve further a customer's perception of an organisation when 
contacted - at what Carlzon (1989: 3) called those 'moments of truth'- 
through to the most radical redesign of a cross-functional, company-wide, 
customer-related end-to-end process, in BPR terms. But at some stage in 
that whole decision-making process, the choice of what is contextually 
appropriate will 'tip', from 'incremental' to 'radical', and a fundamental 
rethinking will then have to take place, leading to that radical redesign. 
Fig. 3.9: BPR's 'Tipping Point' 
'Tipping Point' 
TQM 
BPR 
The fact that TQM and BPR are 'complementary' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 
239) does not, however, mean that this spectral range is a smooth transition 
between the two extremes. The fact that they are 'neither identical nor in 
conflict' (ibid) means that, at some stage, that choice will have to be made, 
and Gladwell's (2000: 133-168) case study of the 'Rise and Fall of New York 
City Crime' provides an unintentional but superb example of that 'tipping' to a 
BPR-type alternative 'process', when he describes how the 'graffiti' and 'fare- 
beaters' issues were tackled. 
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3.3.5 Subways, Police and Process Change 
In citing David Gunn, the new subway director who was brought in to 'oversee 
a multibillion-dollar rebuilding of the subway system' - "The graffiti was 
symbolic of the collapse of the system", and, "... you had to win the battle 
against graffiti" - Gladwell is emphasising the 'context' of New York City 
(NYC) and its high crime levels at the time. It is perhaps also interesting to 
note that the contextual environment of the (or any) city could be likened to 
the cultural environment of a company (or other organisation), where 
'symbols' (Gunn's word) are very much a part of 'culture', and therefore of the 
cultural web within contextual change (Johnson & Scholes, 2005: 301). 
The culture (or context) of the NYC transit police towards 'fare-beaters' at the 
time, meant that, 'Because there was only $1.25 at stake, (they) didn't feel it 
was worth their time to pursue it, particularly when there were more serious 
crimes happening down on the platform and in the trains, ' yet their new head, 
William Bratton, decided to tackle this issue head-on in order to 'signal, as 
publicly as possible, that the transit police were now serious about cracking 
down on fare-beaters' -a 'symbolic' approach, as well as a radical departure 
from NYC transit police's previously-held thinking. As Seddon (2007a) says, 
it's a 'thinking thing'. 
One of the problems in the past had been their process at the time of arrest - 
because the arrest itself, 'the trip to the station house, the filling out of 
necessary forms, and the waiting for those forms to be processed took an 
entire day' - so Bratton 'retrofitted a city bus and turned it into a rolling station 
house, with its own fax machines, phones, holding pen, and fingerprinting 
facilities. Soon the turnaround time on an arrest was down to an hour. ' This 
was fairly clearly a case of 'moving the mountain to Mohammed, ' but more 
importantly it was a case of quintessential BPR. Bratton had 'fundamentally 
rethought the process'; he then 'radically redesigned' it; and by doing that 
produced 'dramatic improvements. ' The measured improvement in process 
outcome terms was notionally 8: 1 at minimum, but the perceived improvement 
will have been 24: 1, because, prior to his redesign, the officers' perceptions 
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were that if you started the 'process' at 08.00 today, you wouldn't be starting 
the next one until 08.00 tomorrow. True or not, that's what they thought (it 
took a day), so that's why they didn't do it. 
And this was still pre-1990, so, technically, no-one had yet heard of 'business 
process reengineering. ' Not only was BPR still evolving -'out there, roaming 
in the jungle that was corporate America- it was also clearly lurking, like an 
urban fox, scavenging amongst the skyscrapers and subways of downtown 
Manhattan. 
Whilst this was not the UK, it was definitely 'public sector', it was definitely 
BPR, and it was definitely happening. Bratton had 'reengineered' a 'process' 
in order to tackle the fare-beaters, whereas his battle against graffiti took from 
1984 to 1990; a clear case of continuous - if not also relentless - 
improvement. 
The other, perhaps unintended but nonetheless quality-related result of 
Bratton's work - turning 'the transit police into an organization focused on the 
smallest infractions, on the details of life underground' (graffiti and fare- 
beaters; Gladwell: 145) - although it was yet to be articulated as such some 
years later by Rudolph Giuliani - was to introduce the concept of 'Zero 
Tolerance' (ZT), which in Crosby's (1980: 145) terms equates to 'Zero 
Defects', or 'ZD'. 
3.3.6 Context, Culture and Organisational 'Readiness' 
Gladwell goes on to talk about 'Fundamental Attribution Error' (FAE) when 
'interpreting other people's behaviour' and 'character' (ibid: 160/163), and that 
character is 'like a bundle of habits and tendencies and interests, loosely 
bound together and dependent, at certain times, on circumstances and 
context. ' Again, it takes no great leap of thinking to liken this 'character' of a 
person to the culture of an organisation, and what this is really suggesting is 
that it is this culture (or context), the underpinning 'environment', that is likely, 
if not to predicate, then to at least influence behaviour. 
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If that is the case, then there are definite shades of Herzberg's (19683) 
Motivation-Hygiene Theory with its comparison of 'Satisfiers and Dissatisfiers' 
as those 'loosely bound circumstances', and then of MacGregor's (1960) 'X' 
and 'Y' theories, where (loosely) the way we view people predicates the way 
we treat them, and the way we treat them brings about just that behaviour. 
Gladwell's point appears to be that, rather than viewing the 'person' as having 
a criminal 'personality' at the root of the backwards audit-trail from their 
behaviour (Theory X? ), it was more useful and constructive to consider the 
'context' in which those criminal acts were taking place - the underpinning 
environment, the 'satisfiers' and (or) 'dissatisfiers' (Herzberg? ) - as the 
background to the potential 'tipping point' for the rise (or fall) in the crime 
rates. So by tackling that 'context' in the subway and NYC - and removing 
the'broken windows' (Wilson & Kelling, 1982); the graffiti (slowly; TQM? ) and 
fare-beaters (quickly; BPR? ) - Bratton (and subsequently Giuliani) 'tipped' the 
NYC crime rate back in the opposite direction. 
They treated people differently - by radically changing the 'context' of the 
subway system, they showed the offenders that their previous behaviour was 
totally unacceptable and would no longer be tolerated - bringing about a 
reduction in criminal behaviour. 
There might be a possible suggestion here, therefore, that before taking up 
any judgmental position on anyone's behaviour within the range of 
McGregor's X-Y spectrum, it could be helpful, first, to consider the underlying 
'environment' within which those behaviours are taking place; the'context' (in 
NYC terms), or the organisational 'culture'? 
Johnson and Scholes (2001: 300-316) discuss this issue of organisational 
culture and its potential for being 'mapped' in the context of their'cultural web', 
in order to'provide and understanding of the barriers to change. ' However, 
3 First published in Herzberg, F., et al., (1959) The Motivation to Work, New York, John Wiley 
& Sons. 
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perhaps 'barriers', or'restraining forces', although widely used in work on 
change management ('Field Force Analysis'; Lewin, 1951), are the wrong 
words? Would an assessment of an organisation's 'readiness to change' be 
more appropriate than 'resistance'? 
Fig. 3.10: Lewin's Force Field Analysis 
Force Field 
Driving Forces (. ) I Restraining Forces (-) 
Source: http: //www pacepilot. com/images/forcefield1. ipg 
Johnson & Scholes (2001: 301) say that 'culture is often explained as that 
which is taken for granted in a society or Organisation'- the 'context', in 
Gladwell's terms - and also as 'the 'way we do things around here'. ' 
'Web-mapping' can then be used as a tool to conceive 'of what the culture 
would need to look like if a different strategy were being followed' (ibid: 311). 
One example of this could be the circle (just one of the seven in their'web') 
showing 'symbols' relating to a current and then a future, more desirable 
'culture', where, using Bratton's examples, the changed 'context' was 
envisioned in order to promote the action required to 'tip' the change in 
behaviours - i. e. the crime rate - downwards (overleaf): 
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Fig. 3.11: 'Before' and 'After' Symbols? 
Symbols 
Graffiti-covered 
subway cars 
Fare-beaters 
'Broken Windows'? 
Clean subway cars 
Fare-payers 
'Windows Replaced'? 
Adaptedfom. Jolmcoß G., Schule, K., (Ed's), (2001) Ex, k n2 Pllbhc 
Secas Strategy, Harlow, FT/Preitic e Haf. 301 
That this 'organisational readiness' (By, 2007; Jones, et al., 2005) might be a 
key issue could well be a factor in the empirical research to follow, but it has 
been clear for some time that (and how) an organisation's 'culture' affects its 
success, or otherwise, in the management, or leadership, of change. But this 
might also raise the question, is the 'leadership' a result of the context? or the 
'context' a result of the leadership? 
3.3.7 Culture and Behavioural Change 
Although, I believe, inconsistent with some of his later work, John Seddon 
(with Stephanie Jackson; 1990: 213), confirms the significance of this problem 
in the article, 'TQM and Culture Change, ' opening with the statement that, 'the 
two greatest difficulties in introducing TQM were achieving cultural change 
and changing management behaviour. ' They then add that, 'If we accept the 
view that culture is essentially the way people behave in an organisation, then 
these two are actually a single difficulty - that of achieving lasting change in 
the behaviour of everyone in the organisation' (their emboldening). 
They claim that this 'difficulty (was) not for the lack of recognition of the 
importance of culture to quality, ' and cite 'experts' such as Philip Crosby - 
and how he described 'fighting the unreceptive culture of his organisation' - 
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and W. Edwards Deming who, they imply, had it easier with the Japanese 
because, 'in part, ... their values and culture - their passions - were 
compatible, ' whereas, initially at least, the 'Americans, with a very different 
culture, were much less responsive. ' They weren't'ready'. 
Somewhat ironically, perhaps, Seddon and Jackson (1990: 213) see quality 
as a 'hard technology' whilst viewing culture change as 'soft', whereas 'quality' 
(or TQM, in their article), with its inherently cautious, incremental steps, could 
well be seen as the 'soft' option, when compared to the more risky and 
potentially organisationally bruising choice of BPR; and in emphasising the 
'difficulties' associated with cultural change, their point clearly is that it is'hard' 
to achieve. 
Seddon himself, in an earlier article entitled 'A Passion for Quality' (1989: 
153), states that Total Quality Management demands a clear focus on the 
customer and total commitment throughout the organisation, ' adding, 
'Achieving this state of TQM requires nothing less than a 'culture change' for 
most organisations. ' And whilst admitting to a number of 'generalisations' in 
some of his analysis, he still asserts that 'in virtually every study of quality 
programmes we find the TQM initiative up against the traditional culture of the 
organisation - and overcome by it more often than not. ' If soft TQM struggles, 
what chance the harder BPR? 
All this, however, hints at the potential for differences in this 'organisational 
readiness', and how those might influence the'tipping point' into the choice of 
a more'radical', but possibly more risky, BPR-based approach to change, 
over the incrementally gentler and inherently less risky TQM- or kaizen-based 
approaches? Clearly, sometime between 1984 and 1990, New York City 
'tipped', and became 'ready' for this more radical and risky 'ZT' approach. 
In considering public Sector Organisations (PSO) in the UK, therefore, one 
possible area on which to focus might be to seek to identify a range of 
indicators - contextual? behavioural? - that might suggest a state of 
'readiness', at which point the organisation (e. g. a Council? ) might be ready to 
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'tip' towards a more radical, BPR-type, approach to change? If this were the 
case, it might also be possible therefore to provide a means by which to 'rate' 
any local authority against those criteria, in order to inform their change- 
management decision-making processes. 
3.3.8 Peer Group Influence 
Another key and possibly therefore relevant aspect from Gladwell's research 
might be the contextual, or'readiness', effects of peer-group influence. He 
cites Judith Harris's (1998) book The Nurture Assumption, where she argues 
that the 'environmental influence that helps children [in this case] become who 
they are - that shapes their character and personality - is their peer group. ' 
And Gladwell, in his Conclusion, reaffirms that we 'are actually powerfully 
influenced by our surroundings, our immediate context, and the personalities 
of those around us. ' Seemingly in support of Gladwell's 'context' and Harris's 
'peer group' arguments, Seddon (1989: 155) says; 'It is difficult, then, for 
people to change culturally-determined behaviour unless the environment 
changes to support the new behaviour - and the behaviour of others around 
them also changes. ' And as Seddon (again) and Jackson (1990: 213) said at 
the beginning of their article, these 'others' - one of the 'two greatest 
difficulties' - are 'management'! 
3.3.9 Adoption Rates 
A further factor brought out by Gladwell (2000: 196-199), possibly also 
affecting this 'readiness', was the rate of 'tipping' - or'adoption' - exemplified 
in the case of the Ryan and Gross (1943) diffusion study of the 'spread of 
hybrid seed corn' in Greene County, Iowa, in the 1930s, which used the 
'language of diffusion research' to show the stages of adoption of the new 
seed corn (as seen in Fig. 3.12, overleaf). 
This 'adoption process' concept is widely used in marketing (e. g. Dibb, et al., 
2001: 459-463; Kotler, et al., 2002: 222-225), but again, perhaps it is possible 
that it could also be adapted to consider the range of characteristics that 
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might enable the identification of a Council's 'state of readiness' for the 
adoption of a more radical change technique? 
Fig. 3.12: Diffusion of Hybrid Seed Corn in Greene County, Iowa 
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Gladwell made the important point that innovations 'don't just slide effortlessly 
from one group to the next' (because) 'There is a yawning chasm between 
them' - the 'chasm of unreadiness', perhaps? -a 'chasm' between 'small and 
cautious steps' (Hammer, 1990: 105) and an 'all-or-nothing proposition with 
an uncertain result'? A chasm of context, and behaviours. 
Perhaps, if the BPR approach to change within PSOs in the UK is ever to 
become positively 'contagious', in Gladwell's terms, then some way needs to 
be found to more reliably enable (e. g. ) a Council to gauge its chances of 
success, were it to choose to adopt the more radical approach to change that 
BPR offers. Similarly, should a PSO/Council find itself at some crisis point 
and being forced to consider more radical change, it might be better placed to 
understand why. 
The chasm of unreadiness will need to be bridged, so that the readiness to 
attempt such an approach is not the sole prerogative of the 'Innovators' 
amongst PSOs, but the Early Adopters need to be brought into play, laying 
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the new 'cow path' (with apologies to Hammer) of radically redesigned and 
simplified processes for the Early and Late Majorities to follow? And possibly, 
as with Lessem and Baruch's (1999) 'Spectral Management Type Inventory 
(SMTI), there might also be an equivalent 'spectral inventory' for the range of 
PSOs at various stages of 'readiness' for BPR-type radical change? 
Fig. 3.13: BPR 'Adoption Spectrum' 
BPR 'Adoption' Spectrum 
Early Majority 
B 
P 
R 
Late Majority B 
P 
R 
Orange Red 
3.4 Bridging the Chasm 'always starts at the top'. 
Linking Gladwell (2000) back to the early 1990s and the 'Tipping Point' of 
BPR into the publicly accepted change-management arena, it could be 
posited that Hammer (subsequently with Champy) was the 'Paul Revere' (ibid: 
30) of BPR, whilst Davenport (initially with Short) was the 'William Dawes' 
(ibid: 33). Hammer and Champy were the 'Connectors', the 'Mavens' and the 
'Salesmen', rolled into one, and the resultant 'Stickiness' of BPR is possibly 
evident in its residual (albeit not universal) popularity a decade-and-a-half 
later. The importance of the 'Power of Context' - especially in the context of 
UK PSOs - might present the key to bridging this 'chasm of unreadiness', if 
the means to change the 'culture' (whether supported or predicated by 
management 'behaviour') can be found; or as Gladwell (2000: 257) states: 
'The theory of Tipping Points requires, however, that we reframe the way we 
think about the world. ' In the context of UK PSOs, but LGOs in particular, and 
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the Chief Executives and their management teams, their 'world' is their 
Council, and it is therefore most likely to be their'behaviours', first, that have 
to 'tip'. 
Gladwell concludes: 'What must underlie successful epidemics, in the end, is 
a bedrock belief that change is possible, that people can radically transform 
their behaviour or beliefs in the face of the right kind of impetus, ' and, 'In the 
end, Tipping Points are a reaffirmation of the potential for change and the 
power of intelligent action. ' 
Perhaps the 'impetus' for that 'intelligent action' lies, and remains, with LGO 
Chief Executives? As Eccles (1994: 42) states (his italics): 
'The fruitful impetus for change is thus likely to come from the top. Indeed, there are 
consultants and experienced managers who say that they have never seen major 
strategic impetus start from the middle or bottom; it always starts at the top. ' 
3.5 Chances of Success -'Organisational Readiness' 
Hammer and Stanton (1995: 86-88) provide the necessary 'organisational 
readiness' template here, with their 'The Self-Assessment Diagnostic, ' 
covering the three areas of 'Reengineering Leadership, ' 'Organizational 
Readiness' and 'Style of Implementation, ' in their chapter, 'Are You Ready For 
Reengineering? ' The second of these three diagnostics poses the following 
nine 'readiness' questions (ibid: 87, original numbering retained): 
7. The organization as a whole recognises the need for 
reengineering and fundamental change. 
Score: 
8. The organization understands the nature of reengineering, 
including the fact that it results in multidimensional change that impacts 
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processes, jobs, organizational structure, management responsibilities, 
etc. 
Score: 
9. The organization believes that the reengineering leader and the 
senior management team are truly committed to reengineering, and that 
this commitment will be long-lasting. 
Score: 
10. The organization has none of the complacency and arrogance 
that often follow a sustained period of success. 
Score: 
11. The organization is free of the scepticism, mistrust, and 
ambivalence that often follow a program of downsizing or restructuring. 
Score: 
12. The organization has the financial and human resources needed 
to 
implement reengineering. 
Score: 
13. Key staff organizations - human resources, finance, and 
information systems - are positive about the prospect of reengineering 
and capable of innovative response to its demands. 
Score: 
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14. The organization's experience with total quality management 
(TQM) has created an environment that is receptive to reengineering. 
Score: 
15. The organization places a high value on serving customers and 
has a solid understanding of customer needs. 
Score: 
Whilst the above is simply the 'Organizational Readiness' extract, the 
preceding and succeeding questions are equally important for the overall self- 
assessment, but the 'readiness' aspect is the contextual focus here. Hammer 
and Stanton state that you 'should ask yourself how true each statement is of 
your organization, ' and that the 'only right answer is the truth. ' Their scoring 
system is an answer scale that runs from 1 to 5, 'with 1 representing strong 
disagreement (i. e. the statement is not at all true of your organization) and 5 
representing strong agreement (i. e. the statement is very true of your 
organization). ' They (ibid: 89/90) give 'minimum scores' for each statement, 
each section, and the diagnostic as a whole, but emphasise also that the 
'minimum recommended section score is larger than the sum of the statement 
scores, ' and that this is because 'mere adequacy in each category is not 
enough to guarantee success; overall strength is what is needed. ' 
With minimum 'section scores' as follows: 
'Reengineering Leadership' - 24 out of a possible 30; 
'Organizational Readiness' - 28 out of a possible 45; 
'Style of Implementation'- 18 out of a possible 25; 
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... the 
bar for the 'tipping point' seems to be set quite high. But as they 
emphasise also, 'We never said it would be easy. The entrance requirements 
for reengineering are stiff (ibid: 90). This further suggests, therefore, that the 
leap to cross the 'chasm of unreadiness' requires a signal commitment from 
those 'at the top, ' the launch platform being the contextual shifts provided by 
the contemporary external drivers (e. g. Gershon? ). Hammer and Stanton 
provide guidance in this respect (ibid: 90-99) with a section on 'Improving 
Your Scores, ' but to repeat a point made earlier, in the context of UK 
PSO/LGO, the Chief Executives and their management teams, their 'world' is 
their Council, and it is therefore most likely to be their'behaviours', first, that 
will have to 'tip'. 
Whilst primarily focusing on 'Lean' improvement techniques, it is nonetheless 
somewhat surprising that Radnor et al. (2006) make no mention of Hammer 
and Stanton's (1 995a) work on 'Organizational Readiness' in their paper for 
the Scottish Government - published on 'The Scottish Government' website - 
on 'Evaluation of the Lean Approach to Business Management and its Use in 
the Public Sector', when Chapter 7 of the paper is specifically entitled, 
'Organisational Readiness for Improvement' and claims to outline 'a number of 
organisational factors that affect the ability of an organisation to implement an 
effective improvement programme'. The paper does not confine itself to 
'lean', as its references include papers on (e. g. ) TQM and Benchmarking, so 
that would imply they also, and perhaps BPR/SRD too, would qualify as 
'effective improvement programme(s)'. For comparison, therefore, Radnor et 
al's albeit more succinct 'factors' are rearranged overleaf alongside Hammer 
and Stanton's nine statements from section 2 of their 'Self-Diagnostic, on 
'Organisational Readiness' (Table 3.2, overleaf): 
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Table 3.2: 'Organisational Readiness' Comparisons 
Hammer & Stanton (1 995a) Radnor, et al. (2006)* 
7 The organisation as a whole recognises the need for reengineering Acceptance of the need to 
and fundamental change. change 
The organisation understands the nature of reengineering, including Lack of process-based view 6 
the fact that it results in multidimensional change that impacts 
processes, jobs, organisational structure, management 
responsibilities, etc. 
9 The organisation believes that the reengineering leader and the Unsupportive culture" 4 
senior management team are truly committed to reengineering, and 
that this commitment will be long-lasting. 
10 The organisation has none of the complacency and arrogance that Unsupportive culture" 4 1 
often follow a sustained period of success. 
11 The organisation is free of the scepticism, mistrust, and ambivalence Unsupportive culture** 4 
that often follow a program of downsizing or restructuring. 
12 The organisation has the financial and human resources needed to Capacity for improvement 2 
implement reengineering. 
13 Key staff organisations - human resources, finance, and information Team working 3 
systems - are positive about the prospect of reengineering and 
capable of innovative response to its demands. 
14 The organisation's experience with total quality management (TQM) Lack of improvement data 7 
has created an environment that is receptive to reengineering. 
15 The organisation places a high value on serving customers and has Lack of customer focus 5 
a solid understanding of customer needs. 
Order re-arranged to most suitable 'fit' alongside Hammer & Stanton's view. 
** Seen as similar. 
3.6 BPR in the 21st Century 
Since BPR 'tipped' - if we accept that premise - more than a decade ago, the 
level of writing on the subject has remained fairly consistent. It will, therefore, 
be most relevant to this review to consider some of the more recent 
arguments, especially when they present empirical evidence of success, or 
otherwise, in the public sector in the UK (where available), and especially 
LGOs, two of which are the specific focus of this research. 
For example, a recent study of the 'determinants for hospital BPR success' in 
the US (Caccia-Bava, et al., 2005) suggested that few 'organizations had 
reaped the benefits they expected, ' with an estimate that'one quarter of 300 
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reengineering projects were not meeting their goals, ' and speculation that the 
'figure might be closer to 70 percent' for the industry at large. This'figure' 
(and others similar) has been cited elsewhere - e. g. 'Our unscientific estimate 
is that as many as 50 to 70 percent of the organizations that undertake a 
reengineering effort do not achieve the dramatic results they intended' 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993: 200; 2001: 221); '70 per cent failure rate amongst 
UK firms' (Zairi & Sinclair, 1995); and, '80% of BPR efforts fail' (Seddon, 2003: 
159) - and so Caccia-Bava, et al. (2005) reasonably pose the question, With 
so many problems why are organizations still trying to implement BPR 
projects? ' 
One of the key possibilities here is the issue of organisations' - or perhaps, 
the leaders and people within them - inadequate 'understanding' of BPR, and 
the concept of 'organisational readiness' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995a), to 
which we will return again later. 
Whilst concluding that 'many hospitals have derived substantial benefits from 
BPR, ' but also that, 'many have not, ' Caccia-Bava, et al. (2005) also hint at 
this concept by suggesting that'BPR project managers have ignored some of 
the ('important') literature prescriptions for increasing the likelihood of success' 
in their projects; for example (ibid): 
" 'commitment to continuous improvement; 
. viewing technology not as a solution in itself but as an enabler to 
implement required business changes; 
9 performing a thorough process analysis to identify and eliminate 
process activities which add no value; and, 
" carefully planning for project details before implementation. ' 
Thus the 'many', that may have 'derived substantial benefits', might again 
reflect the point that BPR is itself only one approach on the spectrum of 
organisational change, and that 'failure' rates of, say, 50-80 percent, still 
indicate potential successes for the reciprocal 20-50 percent, which to some 
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might be quite acceptable, especially if those benefits truly are 'substantial'. 
(NB This also reiterates the view that BPR can comfortably sit alongside other 
'approaches'. ) 
Tennant and Wu (2005) also quote the '70 per cent' figure - citing in their 
case Hammer and Champy (1993, again) and Cafasso (1993*) - when 
claiming that the'main barriers to successful implementation [in 'UK-based 
companies'] were reported as tactical short-term solution-driven approaches. ' 
However, their assertion that because '71 per cent' of the companies 
surveyed expected an 'implementation time frame of less than two years, ' also 
suggested that BPR was 'being applied as a tactical tool to address short-term 
business imperatives, rather than to achieve strategic objectives, ' and seems 
to take little if any account of Hammer and Champy's (2001: 118) point that 
'implementation of the first field pilot site ... usually takes a year, 
' which in turn 
reinforces Hammer and Stanton's (1995: 30) Moral: 'You must reengineer 
quickly. ' However, why should a time frame of less than two years' not be a 
'strategic objective'? The fact that 'strategy' is about long-(or longer-)term 
thinking does not, surely, obviate the possibility of a more 'radical' component 
within its execution. For example, Hill and Collins (1998) found that'in 38 
(80.9 percent) of the 47 relevant cases (including two companies with past 
experience) BPR was identified as an important part of future strategy. ' 
Indeed, within the 21-page'Change Management Strategy' (2005) document 
of one of my two facilitating organisations, 'BPR' is mentioned no fewer than 
12 times. 
(* NB Whilst the Cafasso article is currently unavailable, it is not impossible that this 
ubiquitous '70%' could derive almost exclusively from Hammer and Champy, 1993. ) 
Tennant and Wu (2005) also commented on the 'important' role of IT in terms 
of 'solution implementation', reinforcing the 'enabling' role previously 
mentioned. They highlight this importance in their list of 'Implementation 
Difficulties' with [a] company having an 'IT infrastructure unable to support 
BPR, ' which agrees with Hammer's (1990) original point of not simply 
'automating' what exists -'paving the cow paths' - but redesigning (or 
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reengineering) first, then applying IT to the redesigned process(es). Redesign 
the system, then pull the IT (Seddon, 2007a). 
A possible example (cited also earlier) of the alternative was highlighted by 
Richard Fletcher in his article, 'Sainsbury's BASKET CASE' (Fletcher, 2004), 
with: 
'According to rival retailers, Sainsbury and the army of management consultants that 
were involved in the modernisation of its supply chain have quite simply over- 
automated the process. ' 
Sid Joynson had earlier put it more succinctly: 
'I've lost count of the number of times I've seen good money being poured into new 
technology before companies have cracked the question of how best the production 
flows should be organized' (Joynson & Forrester, 1995: 9). 
The 'BPR then IT' point, it could be suggested, has parallels with the 'BPR or 
TQM? ' debate, with, in both cases, BPR needing to come first. The reasons 
for choosing a BPR-type strategy are likely to be different from those for 
choosing TQM (or kaizen), because BPR is more likely to be embarked upon 
when, situationally and strategically, continuous improvement (CI) is found not 
to be enough. In fact, IT alone had been found not to be enough, in Koenig's 
(1993) 'Business Process Redesign and the Productivity Paradox' - but the 
very'quick and dirty' nature of BPR interventions almost predicates the 
adoption of a TQM-style approach to continuous improvement, or kaizen, for 
the immediate follow-up - continuously refining the newly redesigned 
processes? The word 'intervention' (Ongaro, 2004; Hayes, 2007) itself 
implies the level of one-off 'urgency' emphasised by Seddon (2003: 30) when 
'eradicating the causes of customers' problems, ' whereas 'continuous' 
alternatively implies thereafter maintaining the gains, whilst improving 
'continuously' upon them. 
Another of Tennant and Wu's 'difficulties' was 'understanding the needs of 
employees rather than focusing on downsizing. ' They make the point earlier 
65 
that the companies were not walking their talk, in that whilst they might have 
'reported a high level of recognition of the people issues, ' it was in fact 
'questionable whether this represents actual practice. ' In making this point, 
however, they also repeat their suggestion that BPR is 'often seen as a 
tactical tool for addressing short-term business problems ... rather than the 
strategic issues of [e. g. ]... empowerment of people. ' Once again this throws 
up the apparent disconnection between the initial (i. e. shorter-term) 
application of BPR, as part of a longer-term overall strategy, followed by a 
long-term commitment to continuous improvement, when BPR is possibly 
seen by some in this 'tactical' rather than strategic context. So, 'reengineer 
quickly', first, followed by, 'small and cautious steps' (Hammer, 1990: 105)? 
Champy (1996: 21) was not afraid to grasp this controversial nettle and admit 
to some overlap whilst aiming to avoid the confusion: 
'For some period, downsizing and outsourcing will be byproducts of reengineering, no 
doubt about it, but they are not by any means the thing itself, nor one of its purposes. ' 
He is merely reemphasizing Peter Drucker's 'bluntly' put point made earlier, 
'Every organization has to prepare for the abandonment of everything it does' 
(1995: 11). He clarifies again that it is not 'jobs' that 'we must be prepared to 
abandon, ' but the 'whole ideology, a whole way of thinking about power and 
the 'self-serving bureaucracy' of management itself (ibid: 21). 
If BPR and TQM are truly 'complementary' (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 49; 
2001: 239) and not'mutually exclusive or competing phenomena' (Gulden & 
Reck, 1992), then if also, as Tennant and Wu (2005) suggest, the 'main 
triggers' for the initial application of BPR were 'competitive pressures, cost 
reduction, and the management of acquisitions, ' the need for early (and 
possibly therefore 'radical') improvement, or turnaround, might be self-evident, 
with 'small and cautious steps' (Hammer, 1990: 105) being inappropriate at 
that juncture. 
The issue of 'empowerment' can - in fact possibly must - sit comfortably 
within the 'short-term', as part also of a longer-term cultural change strategy, 
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because once an organization commits to the 'empowerment of [its] people, ' 
the process that enables it would be concurrent with, and therefore an 
inherent part of the 'complexity' (Jeal, 2005) of other cultural change issues. 
Phipps (2001: 646), in a section headed, 'Listening to the Voice of the 
Process, ' also comments on this cultural nature of the change that its 
methodology necessarily brings about: 
'Continuous process improvement is not a technique so much as it is a method for 
developing a change in attitude about how work is accomplished efficiently and 
effectively. ' 
And whilst any discussion on 'efficiency' implies measurement, the way this is 
thought about is still the fundamental cultural issue, as Seddon (2002: 86) 
said, 'Any consideration of measurement as a means of process improvement 
requires a radical shift in thinking and attitude. ' Phipps (2001: 657) similarly 
concludes, 'Listening to the multiple voices of our customers, the staff, the 
Gemba processes, and the organization will be critical as new measures are 
developed. ' 
Jeal (2005), in discussing the 'ethos' behind the University of Salford's 
'CRISP' (Customer Resolution and Information Services Project) project, also 
hints at the attitudinal dangers of seeing BPR primarily as a cost-reduction 
exercise, citing Larsen and Myers' finding that such a 'cost-based' focus 'can 
result in "serious organisational problems over the longer term" (Larsen and 
Myers, 1999: 414). ' 
Jeal further emphasises the importance of recognising what she calls a 'sea of 
emotions' and of understanding that (in their case at least) the BPR initiative 
had to 'situate itself within [at least four different] cultures. ' She admits that, at 
Salford, they have 'experienced what could be called a culture shock in 
beginning BPR. ' 
Citing Kotter and Cohen (2002), she states that a 'factor in successful change 
is the overcoming of resistance by recognising people's feelings and the 
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organisational culture. The implication is then that cultures are changed by 
changing the emotions that drive them, not the other way around' (Jeal, 2005). 
In making this point, Jeal is clearly advocating the 'Knowledge-Attitude- 
Behaviour sequence (Blanchard, 1989), or a rational-linear approach to 
organisational change (Boddy & Buchanan, 1992), over the alternative of 
'Knowledge-Behaviour-Attitude. ' Pascale (1990: 264) apparently disagrees 
when advocating that it is 'easier to act ourselves into a better mode of 
thinking than to think ourselves into a better mode of acting' - clearly a 
'Knowledge-Behaviour-Attitude' approach. Davies (2001: 167), in discussing 
'Eddie' (actually Edward) Stobart's thinking in 'having his drivers so smart, ' 
cites Rev. Michael Smith (rector of Linch and Milland in West Sussex), who 
suggests that there is a case for both approaches: 
'Psychologists will say that you have to make people think the right way for them to 
make the right actions. But the reverse can happen. You can bring about the right 
actions, in this case making them dress smart and have clean lorries, and the result is 
that they think the right way. They become proud of their work, of the service they 
give. ' 
Perhaps this depends on the 'situation' (Blanchard, ibid)? 
This behavioural change is a recurring theme and was highlighted by 
Majchrzak and Wang (1996) when they reported on the 'disappointment' of 
some companies having 'endured the trauma of reengineering only to 
discover that their performance is no better - in some cases actually worse 
than before, ' and they raise this 'often overlooked' behavioural issue as the: 
'... tendency of managers and reengineering teams to underestimate the actions 
required to transform the way employees behave and work with one another. They 
assume that simply changing the organizational structures from functional units into 
process-complete departments will cause people to shed their functional mind-sets and 
will forge them instantly into a team intent on achieving common goals. ' 
Although based on US electronics manufacturers, they claim that their study 
'proved that this assumption [was] wrong, ' and that they found that'managers 
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overlook the importance of changing their organization's culture, ' and home in 
very clearly on the responsibility of management in this issue: 
'Many managers do away with functions but fail to change their own positions. They 
continue to act like functional chiefs even though the functions no longer formally 
exist... They fail to see that collective responsibility is an attitude, a value, a concern. 
It means taking an interest in one's colleagues and in improving the outcome of mutual 
(as opposed to individual) efforts. ' 
Majchrzak and Wang's (ibid) point of managers changing 'their own positions' 
reflects very clearly the need for customer-focused altruism made in Hammer 
and Champy's (1993: 76) original point that managers (also) have to change - 
'from supervisors to coaches': 
'Managers in a reengineered company need strong interpersonal skills and have to take 
pride in the accomplishment of others. Such a manager is a mentor, who is there to 
provide resources, to answer questions, and to look out for the long-term career 
development of the individual. This is a different role from the one most managers 
have traditionally played' (p. 77). 
And, as Joynson (1995: 21) says, 'it requires a determination to remove any 
managers who stand in the way. ' This may sound harsh, but it, or rather he, 
is simply making clear that there is no point in any organisation embarking 
upon a strategic, process-based, people-centred, potentially expensive and 
possibly radical (in terms of revised organisational culture, structure and 
management roles) improvement intervention, if a small number of resistant- 
to-change middle managers could ensure it foundered, primarily because they 
are unable to adjust. It would be better not to start - because, as Hammer 
and Stanton (1995a) might say, they are not'ready'. 
Albeit a study of administrative reform in the public sector in Italy, Ongaro 
(2004) effectively embraced the question of 'readiness' by 'analysing the 
factors that can facilitate the adoption of [process management, or BPR] in 
the public sector' and recognising the need to address questions such as: 
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1. 'Is process management always possible? 
2. What are enabling factors for process management in the public sector? 
3. And, in particular, how can it be related to public management reforms carried on at 
the central level? ' 
Ongaro also raises the issue of the possibility of there being'degrees of BPR', 
in noting that amongst earlier literature contributions to BPR in the public 
sector there was an emphasis on the 'necessity of adopting an incremental 
approach in reengineering interventions' as a peculiar feature of 'BPR in the 
public sector. ' His own work then considered how public administrations 
might be'ordinarily run' with increased focus on processes, possibly (although 
'not necessarily') following a reengineering intervention, and on how process 
management might be effectively employed in the increasingly partnership- 
oriented public sector: 
'... the issue of managing the increasingly complex set of relations among public entities 
and with private organisations, which determines an increased need of co-ordination. ' 
Using similar language to Ryan and Goss (1943) and Gladwell (2000), 
Ongaro discusses the relevance of the 'diffusion of an organisational culture 
oriented to processes, ' and that, 'in the absence of such a culture, 
performances may even worsen in a process-based organisation compared to 
a more traditional organisational frame. ' Ongaro found that the main feature 
of this 'diffusion' was that processes'are perceived by personnel as the 
"place" where organizational resources are activated and employed, ' and that 
(again) this 'diffusion' required the employment of a number of 'specific 
instruments' (Ongaro, 2004: Table 1): 
" 'the description and analysis of the main processes; 
" the development of process indicators (quality of the output, throughput time, costs); 
" the assignment of process performance targets; and, 
" the development of HRM systems based also on the evaluation and reward of the 
performance of the process team. ' 
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Part of this diffusion would also be the identification and establishment of 
process owners - the individuals who, in the case of radical redesign, would 
'usually lead the reengineering intervention. ' As Hammer and Champy (2001: 
112) pointed out, 'Most companies lack process owners, because in traditional 
organizations people do not tend to think in process terms, ' they think 
functionally, vertically and hierarchically. And whereas Ongaro talks of 
'delegation and team working' as the 'two other relevant levers for 
implementing process management, ' Hammer and Champy (ibid: 106) were 
very clear about the make-up of the overall 'Who will reengineer? ' for the 
success of BPR -'How companies select and organize the people who 
actually do the reengineering is key to the success of the endeavour' - and 
they identified a number of 'roles' that had emerged from the companies they 
had observed implementing reengineering (ibid): 
" Leader; 
" Process owner; 
" Reengineering team; 
" Steering committee; 
" Reengineering czar; 
... with 
'process owner' clearly featured. 
The appointment of a 'Reengineering czar' is very similar to Hall et al's (1993: 
128) recommendation to, 'Assign an additional senior executive to be 
responsible for implementation. ' 
3.6.1 'Success Factors' 
Al-Mashari and Zairi (1999), in their paper entitled, 'BPR implementation 
process: an analysis of key success and failure factors, ' provided probably the 
most comprehensive review of recent literature, and in their'Fig. 1' (p. 106) 
produced a'summary of key success/failure factors in BPR. ' The full 
'summary' is reproduced in Appendix 2, but they group their findings into five 
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'key' categories, each providing both 'Success Factors' (CSF) and 'Failure 
Factors' (CFF) - Table 3.3, below: 
Table 3.3: Al-Mashari & Zairi's 'Success' and 'Failure' Factors 
Success Factors Failure Factors 
Change of Management Systems and 
Culture Factors 
1 Change of Management Systems and 
Culture Factors 
Management Competence Factors 2 Management Support Factors 
Organisational Structure Factors 3 Organisational Structure Factors 
BPR Project Management Factors 4 BPR Project Management Factors 
IT Infrastructure Factors 5 IT Infrastructure Factors 
Source: Al-Mashari, M. & Zairi, M., (1999)'BPR implementation process: an analysis of key 
success and failure factors', Business Process Management Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 106, 
Fig. 1, 'A summary of key success/failure factors in BPR' 
Categories 2 and 3, for example, break down the 'success' v 'failure' issues as 
follows (Table 3.3a): 
Table 3.3a: Breakdown of categories 2&3 
Success Factors Failure Factors 
Management Competence Factors: Management Support Factors: 
Committed and Strong Leadership Problems related to commitment, support and 
leadership 
Championship and Sponsorship Problems related to championship and 
Management of Risk sponsorship 
Organisational Structure Factors: Organisational Structure Factors: 
Adequate Job Integration Approach Ineffective BPR teams 
Effective BPR Teams Problems related to integration mechanism, 
Appropriate Jobs, Definition and jobs' definition, and responsibilities allocation 
Responsibilities Allocation 
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On the 'corporate experience of re-engineering' front, Harvey (1995), in, 'Re- 
engineering: The Critical Success Factors, ' offered a report which it was 
claimed occupied 'a unique position in the growing canon of re-engineering 
literature by explaining the reasons why projects sometimes succeed in 
producing radical improvement, but more often fall far short of this goal' 
(Preface). The report presented considerable guidance on the successful 
implementation of BPR, underpinned by'in-depth case studies' of eight 
organisations - Baxi Partnership, BT, Lucas Industries, National Vulcan 
Engineering, Pilkington Optronics, Reuters, Western Provident Association, 
and Xerox - and in the Executive Summary's 'key messages' are the following 
'10 critical success factors, ' suffixed by the comment (or health warning? ) 'As 
rule, the larger the organisation, the more challenging the task': 
1. establishing strategic purpose 
2. ensuring top management direction and support 
3. setting stretching goals for performance improvement 
4. defining core processes 
5. focussing on customer needs 
6. redesigning and creating higher level processes 
7. effective change management 
8. establishing cross functional integration 
9. promoting stakeholder involvement and ownership 
10. putting effective planning and project management in place. 
Whilst the report (at an initial purchase cost of £445) was undoubtedly the 
result of a 'programme of up-to-date research' - circa early to mid-1990s - its 
ten CSFs cannot be found replicated within Al-Mashari and Zairi's (1999) 
'summary', although there are some similarities, vis Table 3.4 (overleaf): 
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Table 3.4: Similarities in CSFs 
Harvey (1995) AI-Mashari and Zairi (1999) 
1. Establishing strategic purpose 4.1. Alignment of BPR strategy with corporate 
strategy 
2. Ensuring top management direction 
and support 
2.2/3. Committed and strong leadership, 
championship and sponsorship 
3. Setting stretching goals for 
performance improvement 
4.3. Setting performance goals and measures 
4. Defining core processes 
5. Focussing on customer needs 
6. Redesigning and creating higher level 
processes 
4.9. Effective process redesign 
7. Effective change management 1.6. Creating an effective culture for 
organisational change 
8. Establishing cross functional integration 3.1. Adequate job integration approach 
9. Promoting stakeholder involvement and 
ownership 
10. Putting effective planning and project 
management in place 
4.2. Effective planning and use of project 
management techniques 
Is it not surprising, therefore, that AI-Mashari and Zairi's (1999) 'summary of 
key' factors makes no mention whatever of 'customers', other 'stakeholders', 
or of the need to establish which might be the 'core processes' requiring 
improvement, given that their paper is promoted as a 'holistic view', 'relating to 
the hard and soft factors that cause success and failure in BPR 
implementation'? 
Were Al-Mashari and Zairi saying there were no significant concerns raised, in 
all the 'relevant literature' reviewed in their own 25-page report, regarding the 
issues of adequate customer focus, core process identification, or stakeholder 
involvement and ownership? Is not this apparent misalignment even more 
surprising therefore, when a glance at just two of Al-Mashari and Zairi's own 
117 references - (e. g. ) Kettinger, et al's (1997) 25-page article, and Harvey's 
(1995) 300-page report - both do refer to these issues? 
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Despite these apparent inconsistencies, it is perhaps more important that 
there are abundant consistencies between the various CSF and CFF reviews. 
For example, the references above to 'effective change management' and 
'creating an effective culture for organisational change' - especially perhaps 
when seen in the context of 'urgency' that might be required within a BPR- 
style intervention - are redolent of Kotter's (1997: 21) 'Action Plan for 
Change': 
1. Establish a Sense of Urgency 
2. Create the Guiding Coalition 
3. Develop a Vision and Strategy 
4. Communicate the Change Vision 
5. Empower Broad-Based Action 
6. Generate Short-Term Wins 
7. Consolidate Gains and Produce More Change 
8. Anchor New Approaches in the Corporate Culture. 
(NB These '8' were reinforced in Kotter & Rathgeber's (2006) more populist revival of their 
basic change management principles in, Our Iceberg Is Melting: Changing and Succeeding 
Under Any Conditions, London, Macmillan. ) 
3.7 Summary 
In summary we can see that whilst the basic tenets of BPR might have been 
forming in people's minds, and within the activities of organizations, back in 
the 1980s, it was really only formulated into a recognizable concept in the 
early 1990s. Whilst Hammer (1990) might have been its progenitor, with 
subsequently Davenport and Short (1990), Hammer and Champy (1993) and 
Davenport (1993) being the most prominent, its progeny were sired by many 
other authors as BPR's potential practitioners sought further guidance. 
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Its rationale was different from TQM - it was'radical', not 'incremental' - and 
whilst it might have been made possible by advances in Information 
Technology (IT), it was also brought about largely because IT by itself had 
failed to deliver on its 'productivity' promise (Koenig, 1993). 
In what these days might be called the zeitgeist, 'reengineering' caught the 
spirit of the time. There was still a definite need for organizational change, 
with growing competitiveness reflecting the desire for continuously increasing 
living standards in the West and the 'Japanisation' of management and 
manufacturing techniques, coinciding with a perception that organizations 
themselves might have become complacent and 'fat' -a view still being 
reflected upon more than a decade later by Charlie Bell, boss of McDonald's: 
'Big companies get fat, dumb and happy. They take their eye off the ball and forget 
about customers' (Charlie Bell, boss of McDonald's, 'Fat, Dumb and Happy', The 
Sunday Times, Business Focus, September 26,2004: 5). 
Post-natal BPR was developing in various directions but with some common 
principles in that it was regarded as 'radical' and a means to effect 
'transformational' change. However, with these 'directions' came some 
contradictions regarding issues of application, the role of IT (as 'enabler' or 
'driver'), whether it was solely about 'processes' and had it 'forgotten' people 
(Davenport, 1995a), and did it contrast with or complement TQM and Kaizen? 
It is evident also that, at this time, the required changes in mindset (mainly 
that of leaders) were not fully appreciated, nor the differences in application 
between manufacturing and services recognized, and Seddon (2003,2008a, 
2008b) was to provide valuable contributions to these later. 
Further issues around 'leadership' will be covered more fully later, but by the 
mid-1990s BPR had 'tipped' into the mainstreams of change, improvement 
and quality management, and interest in and writing on the subject has been 
fairly constant since then, confirming its place in that spectrum of options. 
The potential conflict between (e. g. ) Kaizen and BPR was resolved with the 
acceptance of Gulden and Reck's earlier (1992) assertion that 'organizations 
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need both, ' and that TQM and BPR were seen as 'complementary' (Hammer 
& Champy, 2001). 
Gladwell's (2000) 'Tipping Point' illustrates this 'spectral issue', and that whilst 
BPR is not an 'either/or' decision, there is a point on that 'incremental to 
radical' spectrum, below which the 'thing' being attempted could not qualify as 
'reengineering', sowing the seeds for the possibility of 'degrees' of BPR? 
Reengineering's growth appeared to plateau by the late 1990s, with issues 
around context, culture and behavioural change (management thinking? ) 
emerging as critical to success, with the concept of 'organizational readiness' 
(Hammer & Stanton, 1995) offering opportunities for pre-BPR self-diagnosis. 
High 'failure rates' (although of questionable provenance) were being cited 
along with conflicts between short- and long-term thinking, plus reengineering 
still being seen by some as IT-driven. These, along with issues around 
organisations focusing on (e. g. ) 'downsizing' and 'cost reduction' showed a 
frequent lack of understanding of the true nature of BPR and its need to 
recognise the concerns of people, their emotions, plus the requirement for 
fundamental cultural and behavioural change. 'Degrees' of BPR is a 
continuing theme, along with the emerging recognition of the need for 
'process owners' if organisations are to make this cultural shift. Distilling from 
the above (and earlier) arguments was a broader recognition also of relevant 
'Critical Success (and Failure) Factors' (CSF & CFF). 
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Chapter 4: Key Themes emerging from the Literature 
From the above and earlier sections decisions were made regarding a 
number of key themes that began to dominate as relevant to BPR - currently 
and generally - and perhaps more specifically to the success or otherwise of 
planned BPR interventions within the context of this research and the two 
target organisations (LGOs): 
" 'Understanding' of BPR, including clarity of its Definition, Principles, 
Values and Practical Implementation 
" The concept of'Degrees' of BPR 
" Diagnosis of Organisational Capability and 'Readiness' based on 
emerging CSFs & CFFs 
The above would help organisations to 'locate' their planned interventions on 
a scale up to fully 'radical' BPR, whilst enabling clearer decision-making within 
strategic focus, and understanding elements of risk. From these also, other 
emerging themes were: 
" Change Management 
" Organisational 'Culture' 
" Reengineering Leadership and Communication 
" The Public Sector environment 
Dealing with these in turn does not preclude any overlap nor suggest order of 
importance or mutual exclusivity; it is simply a way of expanding more on 
some previous comments, but with further contributions from the more recent 
literature of others. All of these ultimately, however, have an impact upon the 
potential for any BPR-type intervention, strategic or not, to succeed or fail. 
They are not presented as the entirety of Critical Success/Failure Factors 
(CSF & CFF), but as a distillation of some of the key themes within literature 
to date that might impact more noticeably on the organisations being 
researched. 
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Dealing with those Key Themes 
4.1 The concept of BPR - its 'Understanding' and its Implementation 
'There was considerable uncertainty about where reengineering would lead'. 
(Burke, 2004) 
'Uncertainty' is a common word in radical or transformational change 
programmes, and that is understandable, because 'starting from scratch' 
implies the potential for travel in previously untrod directions. Whilst 
organisations' understanding of BPR had gained some common principles - 
the need for a process-based approach and potentially radical changes - 
differences remained over this basic understanding, giving rise to 
contradictions in its application. 
It is oft-cited that the bulk of domestic consumers never learn more than a 
fraction of the facilities available on the home VCR machines (and now DVD 
players? ). The general approach has seemed to be along the lines of plug it 
in, switch it on, play with the 'buttons' until you figure out the basics, and then 
live with that low level of competence until a point is reached when something 
can't be done, or something more complex is needed. Then, and only then, 
might the accompanying instruction booklet be read. (In BPR's case, 
however, its growth had spawned a range of so-called 'instructions' - see 
Appendix 4- some of which may have been incomplete whilst others raised 
contradictions. ) 
BPR could probably be viewed like that. Just as with the VCR in a shop, the 
concept or'solution' of BPR might be sold by a consultant, briefly 'explained', 
or even trained, and then the organisation's own managers start playing with 
the more popular or recognisable 'buttons' - cost-cutting, downsizing, 
restructuring, etc. (outcomes, not method) - but that way the clients/users are 
never likely to appreciate the full benefits that the technique might, just 
possibly, have to offer. 
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In the same way that if the VCR is to be fully utilised and benefits realised, the 
'instructions' (e. g. 'Reengineering the Corporation: a manifesto for business 
revolution', or'Process Innovation: Reengineering work through Information 
Technology'? ) might first be read, understood, and then practiced until 
competence and confidence are assured. Then, for the benefits of BPR to be 
fully realised - or at least given the chance - those same 'instructions' would 
need to be implemented fully and correctly. Yet Attaran (2000) claims that the 
'concept of reengineering is widely misunderstood, ' and adheres strongly to 
the early proponents - Hammer (1990), Davenport & Short (1990), Hammer & 
Champy (1993) in particular - with: 
'Those who label any organizational change as reengineering have victimized it. Many 
use reengineering as an excuse for lay-offs and plant closures. Others use 
reengineering to replace TQM or other initiatives. Reengineering is not downsizing, 
restructuring, automation or more of the same. It means starting from scratch in 
designing the core business process instead of analyzing the current one. It involves 
the radical redesign of business. Reengineering is not a quick-fix program and it is not 
cheap. Reengineering is a challenging process that will require lots of hard work by 
both management and employees. Lack of understanding of the concept and 
inappropriate application will all contribute to the organization's failure to appreciate the 
promise of reengineering. ' 
He therefore offers a 'six-stage reengineering guide' to implementation: 
1. Preparation 
2. Assessment 
3. Solution 
4. Benchmarking 
5. Development 
6. Transformation 
... and an examination of 
the individual 'stages' suggest that they are not 
dissimilar from other methodologies offered elsewhere (for example, Al- 
Mashari and Zairi, 2000: 26, Table I; see Appendix 3). Attaran's stage six 
places specific emphasis on the needs for committed leadership, the shift 
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towards process-orientation, plus training and resources; 'Top management 
support is critical, ' they must'maintain a strong commitment to the vision, 
break the barriers between the departments, and be flexible as the business 
environment changes, ' and that resources 'must also be committed to the 
training effort and support must be provided at all stages for those who are 
being trained. ' 
The number of 'must be' assertions are redolent of other authors, and the use 
of 'support' implies once more, at the very least, help for those at the front-line 
undergoing the change, if not actually the need for the empowerment of self- 
managed teams. 'Must' is an extremely important word -'expressing 
necessity or insistence' (Oxford 1998: 1221) - and implies things that cannot 
or should not be missed, or at the very least are 'logically very likely' (to be 
required) in BPR's case. 
The 'methodologies' from Al-Mashari and Zairi's (2000) table have been 
extracted in to Table 3.5 - see Appendix 4- in order to consider the 
similarities and differences of those 'eight', plus others have been added from 
other sources. 
Inconsistencies abound, however, as evinced in the first column by Morris and 
Brandon's (1994) 'Step 4', which in the text (p. 156) is, 'Identify business and 
work processes', whereas in 'Figure 7.2' (p. 157) is shown as, 'Analyse 
process baseline information. ' So which is it? 
Similarly, Balle (1995) starts by calling his 'Step 5', Walk through, talk 
through' (p. 7), but later it's shown as, 'Check and test, test and check' (p. 38), 
whereas later still they are both used (p. 81). 
It can be seen therefore that there is no shortage of 'guidance' on how to 
approach BPR. Varied though those examples may be, Blanchard's (1989) 
question (and answer) -'How many diets do you need to get slim? The one 
you stick to! ' - serves to succinctly make the point that it might not be 
particularly important which methodology an organisation chooses or prefers, 
81 
but what really is important is that, once it's chosen, they stick to it - what 
Blanchard (ibid) somewhat innovatively called 'Sticktoitiveness' - through all 
its various stages, otherwise there is no point 'blaming' the methodology if the 
BPR 'didn't work'. Caccia-Bava et al. (2005) made the same point with, 'BPR 
project managers have ignored some of the literature prescriptions for 
increasing the likelihood of success in their BPR projects. ' 
However, Maull et al. (2003) appears to support Attaran's case for'lots of hard 
work' with: 
'It follows from this that guidance for practicing managers implementing BPR 
programmes is that if they wish to progress towards full implementation maturity, and 
avoid the criticism of participating in yet another fad or fashion, they should put 
considerable effort early in the implementation into developing a strategically-aligned 
project. ' 
No pain, no gain, perhaps. 
Whilst he might hotly deny that his 'Lean Service' approach is 'BPR', Seddon 
(2007b: 2) includes an item from a 'reader' -a 'Six Sigma-trained person with 
10 years' experience' - pointing out similar misrepresentations of 'Lean': 
'In a similar fashion to Six Sigma, most 'lean' deployments I have seen do not follow the 
principles of Deming or Ohno. 'Lean' is viewed as the "clenched fist in the velvet glove" 
method of process improvement. In most people's eyes, 'lean' = waste reduction = 
redundancies, this is not the intended experience of continuous improvement, but is the 
real outcome of cynical 'lean' deployments whose operating model is'lean' it, centralise 
it, then offshore it. ' 
Walston, et al. (2000) suggest also that implementation of BPR is the issue, in 
that'the problems lie in the method of its application to business problems, ' 
and one could reasonably suggest that whilst-ever there are 'problems ... 
in 
the method of its application, ' then true 'BPR' is not being tested, something 
else is, and from that it might also be reasonable to question the so-called 
(e. g. ) '70%' failure rates. Failures of change initiatives, perhaps, but failure(s) 
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of BPR? - we cannot be quite so certain. To highlight this I would refer to the 
generic Problem-Solving Process (PSP) within Fig. 4.1 and Table 4.1 (both 
below): 
Fig. 4.1: Generic Problem-Solving Process 
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Meeting Customer Requirements (1988) Tools and Techniques 
Handbook for continuous improvement, London, British 
Telecommunications plc, Section 6, pp. 1.15, 'Problem Solving Process' 
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Table 4.1: 'Generic' PSP model and 'Generic BPR model' 
ActivitylStage: 'Generic' PSP model Generic BPR model` 
1 Identify Problem Develop Vision and Objectives 
(What's Going On? ) 
2 Gather Data Understand Existing Processes 
(What Do we Know? 
3 Analyse Data Identify Process for Redesign 
(What are the Root Causes? ) 
4 Generate Solutions Identify Change Levers 
(What Could we Do? ) 
5 Select The Solution Implement the New Process 
(What's the Best Thing to Do? ) 
6 Plan For Implementation Make the New Process 
How do we Go About It? Operational 
7 Implement and Test Evaluate the New Process 
(Have we Solved the Problem? ) 
8 Continue to Improve Ongoing Continuous 
(Can we Improve on What Webe Done? ) Improvement 
Source: Vakola, M., Rezgui, Y., Thompson, J. & Mitev, N., (1998), 'D3100 business process re-engineering 
strategy', CONDOR ESPRIT 23105 Deliverable 
Whilst not identical, the 'generic' nature of these two approaches can easily 
be seen, and below is the 'Generic BPR model' from which the RHS of the 
above table derives: 
Fig. 4.2: Generic BPR model 
A generic model for business process re-engineering: 
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Source: Vakola, M., Rezgui, Y., Thompson, J. & Mitev, N., (1998) 'D3100 
business process re-engineering strategy', CONDOR ESPRIT 23105 Deliverable 
On the rear of the handout normally distributed when that first generic PSP is 
taught within my own institution (see Appendix 5) - primarily during 
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discussions on (e. g. ) Quality and Continuous Improvement - there is a list of 
no fewer than 35 'Tools and Techniques' (T&T) that might be helpful within 
any of the eight stages of this process (PSP). The second of the T&T in this 
list is 'Brainstorming' and, as might be expected, this requirement for creative 
input features in seven of those eight stages. The only stage - and this might 
equally be expected - from which it is excluded, is stage VII, 'Implement and 
Test. ' The reason for this - and this is why the point is relevant to this 
discussion - is that the 'solution' being 'implemented' should be the one 
'selected', following the preceding six, logical steps of the P-S process, and 
not something else, otherwise it will not be that 'solution' that is being 'tested' 
and evaluated, but something totally different. The'Implement and Test' 
stage does not require the input of further creative thinking, when the decision 
on what to implement has been taken (see also Morris & Brandon, 1994, p. 
156; 'Step 8', 'Implement the selected alternative'). Testing something else, 
therefore, renders pointless the logic, structure and purpose of the six 
preceding stages of the process; and also wasteful, or muda in Japanese 
terms. 
And, it is suggested, the same applies to TQM, BPR, Six Sigma, 'Lean', JIT, 
etc.; whatever the improvement intervention decided upon, if it is not 
implemented in a manner which at the very least closely resembles that 
intended by its designers, authors, originators or trainers, then that is not what 
is being 'tested', or judged; something else is. 
This argument could be pursued one stage further, in that if the generic PSP* 
(Table 4.2) is considered in the same way as 'Stage-Activity (SA) framework' 
(see also Kettinger, et al., 1997), it could, possibly, be equally well applied to 
help decide upon the appropriate type of process improvement 'intervention'- 
perhaps even on a 'scale of radicalness', between Kaizen and BPR - that is 
required (overleaf): 
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Table 4.2: Generic PSP and 'Stage-Activity' Framework 
No. Stage Activity Details 
1 Identify What's Going On? How well is the process 
Problem working? 
2 Gather Data What Do We What is the feedback from 
Know? customers, suppliers, clients, 
etc? 
What have we seen, and what 
can't we 'see'? 
What questions should we be 
asking of them? -'Check' 
(Seddon, 2003). 
3 Analyse Data What Are the Root What is the scale of the issue; 
Causes? from minor, to serious? 
4 Generate What Could We What type of process 
Solutions Do interventions could be 
considered? 
5 Select the What's the Best Which intervention type should 
Solution Thing to Do? we use in this situation? 
6 Plan for How Do We Go What does this decision require 
Implementation About It? of the organisation and its 
leadership, in order to ensure 
successful implementation? 
7 Implement and Have We Solved Was it implemented correctly 
Test the Problem? and successfully? 
Has it worked? 
8 Continue to Can We Improve Was it the best choice? 
Improve on What We've What else needs to be done? 
Done? 
* Sources: Meeting Customer Requirements (1988) Tools and Techniques Handbook for 
continuous improvement, London, British Telecommunications plc, Section 6, pp. 1-15, 
'Problem Solving Process'; and Kettinger, et al., (1997: 58); adapted, Chamberlin 2007 
86 
The paramount importance of stage 1 of that generic process -'Identify the 
Problem' - was identified by Howe and O'Reilly (2004) in their report on 'BPR 
and project management' in Chesterfield Borough Council's Building Services 
Division, when under the question heading, 'Why did it work? ', the opening 
sentence simply states, 'Chesterfield Borough Council defined the problem 
first. ' Apparently they 'knew why they needed to change but were less clear 
on exactly what they needed to change and the best way to do it'; another 
example of the 'uncertainty' surrounding such major change projects. 
Note: By combining the original (generic) PSP with the 'BPR' version of 
Vakola, et al. (1998) - both above, pp. 83/84 -a further and potentially more 
useful 'homogeneous' process might also be considered: 
Fig. 4.3: Homogeneous BPR/TQM-PSP/Redesign Process 
Activity/Stage: Homogeneous BPR/TQM-PSPlRedesign Process? 
1 Identify Problem or Process 
(What's Going On? ) 
(What are the Users' Requirements? ) 
2 Gather Problem Data/Understand ('Map') Existing 
Process 
(What do we Know Happens Now? ) 
3 Analyse Data/Clarify Fundamental User-Requirements 
(What is the basic Purpose of the Process? ) 
(What are the Root Causes? ) 
4 Generate SolutionslPotential New Process(es) 
(What Could we Do? ) 
(How Could it Look? ) 
5 Select Solution or 'Map' the New Process 
(Which is the Best Solution/New Process? ) 
6 Plan For Implementation 
(How do we Go About It? ) 
7 Implement and Test - Pilot New Process 
(Have we Solved the Problem? ) 
(Does the New Process Work? ) 
8 Continue to Improve the New Process 
(Can we Improve on What Webe Done? ) 
(Shift from BPR to Kaizen. ) 
Hammer (2004) emphasised this 'uncertainty' aspect of embarking upon such 
a radical intervention with: 
'When envisioning new ways of working, it is impossible to get everything right from the 
outset... Companies must be prepared to roll with the punches and learn as they go'; 
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and: 
'Operational innovation is a step change: It moves a company to an entirely new level. ' 
And this 'uncertainty' is further alluded to by Stebbins, et al., in their study of Blue 
Shield of California, who conclude that, 'If anything, this study points to the complexity 
of the BPR change process and suggests that in complex organizations, few short cuts 
can be taken in process design' (1998: 230/231). 
As Bruss and Roos (1993: 57) stated, 'While the original intent of 
reengineering was to signify a fundamental change in the way business 
processes are accomplished, many so-called reengineering efforts are simply 
utilizing document imaging systems to automate existing processes' - what 
Hammer (1990) called 'paving the cow paths' - and while 'some benefits may 
be realized in reducing cycle times, the results are not likely to be dramatic. ' 
Aligning with Hammer, they then add that technology 'cannot fix a poorly 
conceived work process; nor can it create motivating jobs that bring out the 
best in employees' (ibid: 58). 
Collins (2004) provides a critique of Champy's more recent (2002)'X- 
engineering'- pronounced 'Cross-engineering' - and states that 'Hammer 
(1990)' offered 'what claimed to be a radically new and different approach to 
industrial engineering, ' except that, he didn't. Hammer (1990) makes no 
mention of either 'industrial' or 'engineering', although Davenport and Short 
(1990) did, but I think it pays to be accurate when critiquing, and especially 
since (later) he argues that'in 2002' BPR stands as 'much changed and 
somewhat tired and doubtful. ' He cites Bryant and Chan (1996) as stating 
that BPR, 'as described by Hammer and Champy, has little to offer 
practitioners, ' that it'lacks a reliable methodology, ' and that it'offers managers 
little detailed or practically useful advice on managing the problems of 
reengineering, ' which seems to suggest that those 'managers' - at senior and 
strategic levels - are incapable of reading a basic text and forming 'practical' 
ideas from it. Are these people that unintelligent? Bryant and Chan's article 
ends on the polemic note that BPR has a 'conceptual core that is both rotten 
and hollow. ' 
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And, like Champy's (2002) updating of the concept of reengineering, Hammer 
(2004) moves on to something called 'deep change' without once mentioning 
the word for which he is best known. Pungently redolent of Seddon's (2003) 
'how the work works' theme, Hammer talks of the 'invention and deployment 
of new ways of doing work, ' and defines 'deep change' as 'affecting the very 
essence of a company: how its work is done. ' 
That little else new is coming out of other more recent literature might be 
exemplified by a small example from Nwabueze (2000: 459) who starts his 
Introduction by quoting Hammer & Champy's (1993: 32) definition of BPR as 
'... the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business process to 
achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance such as cost, quality, service, and speed, ' and then within the 
next paragraph cites a 'definition' from Tapscott and Caston (1993) -'... a 
fundamental re-valuation/redesign of a company's business processes and 
organisational structures in order to achieve dramatic improvements in its 
critical success factors - quality, productivity, customer satisfaction and time 
to market, etc. ' - saying that this [definition] 'is similar to that of Hammer with 
the exception that it makes particular reference to "process". ' Yet this makes 
no sense, when H&C's definition specifically contains '... radical redesign of 
business processes... '. 
(NB In Nwabueze's article he uses the singular -'process'- in his citing of 
H&C's original definition, when it should have been plural -'processes'- 
which is identical to Tapscott and Caston's version. It seems there is little 
'fundamental' difference between Tapscott & Caston's definition, raising the 
question of what new has been added by rewording Hammer and Champy's 
original definition in this way? ) 
Attaran (2000) states that reengineering 'is not a fad and it is not going to go 
away soon, ' adding that: 
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'Reengineering is both challenging and rewarding. If implemented properly, 
reengineering could put your company ahead and possibly way ahead, of the 
competition, ' 
and to reinforce the issue of correct implementation: 
'Ignoring the pitfalls can be dangerous because it makes the reengineering effort just 
another short-lived improvement program. Reengineering is not continuous change. It 
should be done once and it should be done right. ' 
4.2 'Degrees' of BPR and Project'Radicalness' 
This perhaps highlights another key issue to merge within the understanding 
and implementation of BPR; the extent to which it necessarily requires 
'starting from scratch' (Attaran, 2001), or a 'clean slate' or'fresh look' 
approach (Hammer, 1990; Hammer & Champy, 1993; Linden, 1993), as 
opposed to there being differing levels or scopes of BPR interventions. Does 
doing it'properly', and 'once, ' necessarily mean doing it to the whole 
company, or organisation, or can it be 'done once and properly' to just one 
key process - across the company (or at least, end-to-end over that process), 
if not the whole company? Could there be 'degrees' of BPR? 
Cao, et al. (2001) state that'BPR offers a series of tools for identifying the 
necessary change and rebuilding the organisation in a new image', but 
Hammer and Champy (2001: 139) would probably argue with that, as they 
say, 'There are no ten-step procedures that will mechanically produce a 
radical new design process, ' and similarly, in their 1993 publication, that there 
are 'no seven- or ten-step procedures' (p. 134; although, whereas they might 
be right about the 'ten', they are not about the 'seven' - see Harrison & Pratt, 
1993). And Cao, et al. (2001) reinforce this point of 'understanding' by citing 
Hammer and Champy's concluding comment that, 'If reengineering fails, no 
matter what the proximate cause, the underlying reason can invariably be 
traced to senior managers' understanding or leadership of the reengineering 
effort' (1993: 213*); although they omit Hammer and Champy's next sentence, 
which is possibly even more telling: 'Reengineering is always born in the 
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executive suite. All too often, it dies there as well. ' (*Also in Hammer & 
Champy, 2001: 234. ) 
What'BPR' may or may not 'offer' was highlighted by Al-Mashari, et al. (2001) 
in their'survey of international experience'; 'BPR's promised business 
benefits, in most cases, remain very elusive and the problems it creates are a 
bigger distraction than it could have been anticipated. ' And they identified 
'some of these problems' - largely focused on understanding (or lack of) and 
implementation - with examples in, 'the following areas: 
0 BPR appeals to senior managers because it promises the quickest short cut to 
success and business excellence; 
The concept itself has a lot of appeal because it is simple to absorb and its rules are 
not too complex; 
0 BPR promises immediate benefits and major leaps in competitive performance. This 
is very compatible with a culture of "short termism" in the West; 
0 BPR is promoted as a better alternative to other modern management concepts such 
as total quality management (TQM), since it is supposed to be less costly to 
implement and guarantees real benefits much more quickly; 
" BPR in most cases refers to the implementation of hard solutions dealing with soft 
problems, thus suggesting that the use of IT for instance will go a long way to making 
businesses more effective and securing future competitiveness. ' 
Whether BPR's'rules are not too complex', however, might be strongly 
debated, as the implications, at least, from much of the literature, are that 
those same 'senior managers' fail to adequately understand the implications 
of undertaking fully a BPR-type intervention, in terms of their required 
involvement and commitment, that their roles and organisational structures 
might be challenged, and even their very existence? Their comment on BPR 
being 'very compatible with a culture of "short termism"' is very redolent of the 
short-termist approach of many UK LGO at times of CPA preparation, and 
one of my target organisations is no exception to this. 
However, Al-Mashari, et al. (2001) claim that their'study begins with a 
comprehensive review of relevant literature on BPR implementation, ' yet 
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whilst one could understand their omission of Hammer's own 'Reengineering 
Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate' (1990) as not being strictly to do with 
'implementation', it is perhaps more surprising that Hammer and Stanton's 
(1995a) 'The Reengineering Revolution' is excluded, given its sub-title, 'The 
Handbook', and that it includes an organisational 'self-assessment diagnostic' 
of which one part is 'Style of Implementation' (pp. 85-99), and a quarter of the 
whole text is focused on 'Making it Happen'. 
Nonetheless, Burke (2004: 115) found that: 
'Hammer and Champy became increasingly concerned, the longer they worked with 
organizations, about misuse and abuse of the term reengineering and the fact that 
many who used the term did not understand it. Almost any organizational change effort 
began to fall under this label. Process reengineering became associated with 
downsizing, restructuring, automation, more use of technology, delayering, flattering* 
the hierarchy, reorganizing and total quality management. While related to some of 
these terms, Hammer and Champy view process reengineering as different from them 
in critical ways. ' (One presumes Burke meant'flattening'. JC) 
Pruijt (1998), for example, called BPR 'big people reduction'. 
In Dobson's (2003) 5-year longitudinal study of an 'Australian public 
organization' whilst posing the question, What's in a name? ', he found that 
the staff 'initially accepted this BPR tag but over time they came to reject the 
term, as they felt it did not reflect what was actually happening. ' And 
according to the then IS Manager, 'the term BPR annoyed staff: 
Well, the staff simply refused to call it that. "Let's call a spade a spade - we won't call it 
BPR any more, " they said - "It's a false term. Let's not pretend. " After a while it 
became obvious what the agenda was and some of the directors who pushed BPR 
objected themselves to hiding outsourcing under the term BPR' (p. 227). 
As Hammer (2002) said, '... it's better to call things what they really are. ' 
In summary, there are clearly common principles to BPR as shown in the 
similarities between proffered 'methodologies' (including those similarities with 
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generic problem-solving processes), but equally again some contradictions 
(Brandon, 1994; BaIle, 1995). 'Generic' approaches to implementation 
abound equally, again displaying differences alongside potential for 
homogeneity, or common factors. 
What remains, though, is a 'fundamental' requirement for greater commonality 
of understanding in the areas of BPR's basic definition - what it is, and what it 
isn't - and its principles, values and practices when aligned with 
implementation issues. Some criticism of Hammer and Champy's original 
(1993) treatise has been its lack of prescription, where greater guidance 
would help practitioners, for example in the areas of expected outcomes and 
performance measures. 
4.2.1 'Degrees' of BPR 
'The scope for process redesign can range from restructuring the entire organisation, to the 
most local rethink of how you do your work' (Nwabueze, 2000: 459). 
More than a decade ago Zairi & Sinclair (1995) found considerable 'confusion' 
in the terminology associated with BPR, in that: 
'The literature includes many different terms relating to the management and 
improvement of processes, including business process improvement, business process 
redesign, core process redesign and business restructuring, as well as business 
process re-engineering. These concepts cover a continuum of activities ranging from 
the continuous improvement of processes to the complete restructuring of 
organizations. What all these terms have in common is the concept of processes, and 
the need to improve both their performance and design. The difference appears to be 
one largely of magnitude' (p. 3). 
It is this issue of 'difference' in order of 'magnitude' that yet again suggests the 
concept of 'degrees of BPR'; alluded to later with, 'In summary, therefore, 
BPR can be seen to represent a range of activities concerned with the 
improvement of processes' (ibid: 4). Shin and Jemella (2003) appear to 
concur with, 'Process improvements fall into three categories: quick hits (low 
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risk with fast payback), incremental improvement (small degrees of change 
but significant results) and re-engineering. ' 
Macintosh (2003) notes that the 'single biggest issue relates to the debate 
about radical or incremental change and can be traced back to the early 
positions adopted by Hammer (1990) and Davenport and Short (1990). 
Interestingly, Hammer and Champy have both admitted that BPR has not 
been implemented in the radical manner that they had originally intended 
(Champy, 1995; Hammer and Stanton, 1995), ' and later, MacIntosh (ibid) 
suggests that on the'issue of radical vs incremental change, the research 
presented here indicates evidence that BPR in the public sector can produce 
both. ' 
The'degrees of BPR' case is also pursued by Yung and Chan (2003) with a 
concept they call'flexible business process reengineering' (FBPR) -a 
potentially unfortunate abbreviation for anyone with an intense dislike of the 
original concept - which employs the 'three management tools' of positioning, 
continuous improvement and BPR, and which they abbreviate to'PIR'. They 
state that: 
'employing all three management tools to a sufficient degree could enhance the 
effectiveness of an improvement project compared to the conventional methodology. 
The changes could be slightly less "radical" than conventional BPR, but in exchange, it 
is a relatively less risky strategy and can facilitate continuous learning and 
improvement. ' 
However, their paper is based on a single case study and their 'Methodology' 
section appears to dwell less on their own research approach and more on a 
hierarchical 'performance benchmarking model' (ibid: Fig. 1) that they appear 
to be promoting. 
Also, in Bragato and Jacobs' (2003) study of 'care pathways in two 
orthopaedic units in Scotland, ' they concluded that it was 'evident that 
redesign at a micro-level, as illustrated by the care pathway, was both more 
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successful and more acceptable than the institutional BPR approach, ' but 
noting also that, 'whether these changes could be considered fundamental, 
remains to be seen. ' 
Obolensky (1994: 16/17) hints also at this 'degrees of BPR' concept -though 
perhaps unintentionally - when he states that, 'To succeed, a Business Re- 
engineering programme will typically need four variables to be right: 
" Pain of the status quo; 
" Gain of the future change; 
" Perceived need for change by leadership; 
" Impact across the organization. ' 
But it is the final 'variable' that, albeit reluctantly, suggests there are 
alternatives to'clean slate' or'all or nothing' approaches: 
'Business Re-engineering needs to have an impact across the organisation for it to yield 
the best results. Typically many organisations shy away from this, and just re-engineer 
one part of the organisation (often due to political problems of 'invading people's turf). 
This is not Business Re-engineering, it is more like process re-design using business 
process re-engineering (BPR) techniques. Business Re-engineering does not just re- 
engineer the processes - it re-engineers the minds' (1994: 17). 
This differentiation -'it is more like process redesign' - hints again at 
Kettinger et al's (1997) similar three-way split of 'Process Improvement', 
'Process Redesign', and 'Radical Reengineering'. 
The suggestion, however, that the original conception of 'reengineering' had 
no impact upon the 'thinking' or the 'mind'(s) of an organisation flies in the 
face of, for example, Hammer's statement that: 
'At the heart of re-engineering is the notion of discontinuous thinking - of recognizing 
and breaking away from the outdated rules and fundamental assumptions that underlie 
operations. ... 
Rather, we must challenge old assumptions and shed the old rules that 
made the business underperform in the first place' (1990: 107); 
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or Hammer and Champy's (1993) observations that: 
'[process redesign] ... 
demands imagination, inductive thinking, and a touch of 
craziness. In redesigning processes, the reengineering team abandons the familiar and 
seeks the outrageous. Redesign asks the team members, especially the insiders, to 
suspend their belief in the rules, procedures, and values that they've honored their 
whole working lives. Redesign is unnerving precisely because the team can do 
whatever it likes' (p. 134); 
and, albeit later, Hammer and Champy (2001): 
1. 'Only a process-oriented senior executive who is capable of thinking about the entire 
value-added chain - from product concept to sales and service - can lead a 
reengineering effort' (p. 230); and, 
2. 'It requires that people running companies and working in them change how they 
think as well as what they do. It requires that companies replace their old practices 
with entirely new ones' (p. 235). 
And when Champy (1996: xxii) posed the question, What comes first, 
changing the way managers think or changing what managers do? ' His 
response included: 
'Starting the reengineering process by changing the managerial work, therefore, is 
going to have greater benefits for the organization. ' 
Surely these comments suggest'reengineering of the mind'? 
But, returning to the 'degrees of BPR' issue, even Hammer and Champy 
(1993: 134/135) made it clear that the 'good news about redesign is that while 
it may require creativity, it's not necessary to start with an entirely blank slate, ' 
and also, this comment makes no distinction between the terms 
'reengineering' and 'redesign', which challenges that being put forward by 
Obolensky (1994: 17), above, though not Kettinger et al. (1997). 
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Chow-Chua and Goh (2000: 225) suggest quite firmly that'(In fact, ) BPR 
should complement TQM and is definitely not an alternative'; concluding their 
case with, 'BPR and Cl [continuous improvement] should be viewed as 
complementary approaches, albeit at two different extremes of the change 
continuum, ' and Al-Mashari & Zairi (2000: 31) say that 'BPR can be 
implemented at different scopes or levels, ' suggesting that this 'change 
continuum' represents a spectrum of initiatives that could range from Cl to 
BPR, and cover a number of 'different scopes or levels' in between. 
This issue of 'scopes or levels' of BPR interventions, therefore, could be a 
potentially fruitful line of enquiry, given that Heygate (1993: 79) suggested 
that; 'Determining where to peg any particular effort requires careful thought 
about its scope (single- or multiple-project focus) and the organization's 
expectations for performance yield (one-off quick hits or integrated, business- 
system-wide improvements). The basic question to be answered is how 
extensive - that is, how radical - the redesign should be, ' and offered a guide 
to 'Levels of Process Redesign'; below, Fig. 4.4: 
Fiq. 4.4: Levels of Process 
Levels of . orocess 
Increasing radicalism 
Single process Multiple Single major Multiple, integrated 
redesign process business model business model 
redesign change change 
Level of Quick hits Continuous Major investment Total 
ambition for incremental to be world class commitment to 
change improvement in one element of becoming a world 
business system leader 
Type of Project- Bottom-up Major process- Total 
program oriented initiatives specific commitment to 
needed improvement (e. g. TQM) investment permanent 
change 
Source: Heygate. R., (1993) 'Immoderate redesign', The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 1, p. 80 
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Venkatraman (1994; cited also in Hughes, et al., 2006, Fig. 1) also suggested 
alternative approaches to BPR based on the'degree of transformation' and 
the'range of potential benefits'; see Fig. 4.5 (below). In their research into the 
'evolution of e-government in Ireland' Hughes et al. (2006) commented that 
'BPR has been limited and as such this case provides evidence of the 
existence of the gap identified by Venkatraman (1994) between evolutionary 
and revolutionary means of business transformation, ' with a 'Low'-'High' scale 
on the Y-axis (above) showing, in effect, degrees of radicalness. 
Fig. 4.5: Alternative approaches to BPR 
High 
Business Scope Redefinition 
"ý Business Network Redesign 
Revolutionary 
Business Process Redesign Levels 
9 
I 
Internal Integration 
Evolutionary 
Localised Exploitation Levels 
Low 
Low Range of potential Benefits High 
Source: Venkatraman, V., (1994) 'IT-enabled business transformation: from automation to 
business scope redefinition', Sloan Management Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 73-87; also cited 
in Hughes, M., Scott, M. & Golden, W., (2006) 'The role of business process redesign in 
creating e-government in Ireland', Business Process Management Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 
78, Fig. 1 
4.2.2 Project'Radicalness' 
Kettinger et at. (1997: 71-73) proposed a 'Project Radicalness Planning 
Worksheet' as part of their discussion on 'Assessing project radicalness, ' 
implying very clearly that there are 'degrees' (at least) of 'radicalness, ' and 
thence, by definition, degrees of BPR, as an organisation might scan this 
'spectrum' for the most appropriate point at which to scope its change 
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intervention. They scale the extent (or degree) of 'radicalness' into three 
levels: 'Process Improvement, ' Process Redesign, ' and 'Radical 
Reengineering, ' and then suggest eleven 'contingency factors, ' against each 
of which they pose two questions designed to elicit a 'score' against their 
scale of'radicalness. ' Incorporated within this also is a similar judgement (a 
12th 'Factor') on the 'decision-makers' risk-taking propensity', and this is taken 
account of in the final scoring; see blank example below, Fig. 4.6: 
Fig. 4.6: 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' 
Factor Question Process Process Radical 
Improvement Redesign Reengineering 
Strategic Is the targeted 
2 3 45 
centrality 
process merely 
tangential (1) or Tangential Integral 
integral (5) to the 
firm's strategic goals 
and objectives? 
Feasibility of IT Does IT enable only 
2 3 45 incidental change (1) to change 
or fundamental Incidental 
Fundamental 
process process change (5)? 
Process Is the scope of the 
Z 3 45 
breadth process 
intra- Intra- Inter- 
functional (1) or functional organizational 
inter-organizational 
(5)? 
Senior Is the senior 
management 12 3 45 
management 
commitment 
visibility removed (1) Removed Involved 
or actively involved 
(5) in the BPR 
efforts? 
Performance Are the preferred 
performance 12 3 4s 
measurement 
criteria 
measurement Efficiency Effectiveness 
criteria efficiency- Based Based 
based (1) or 
effectiveness-based 
(5)? 
Process Is the process 
functioning 12 3 4--ý- 5 
functionality Higher Lower marginally (1) or is Functionality Functionality 
the process not 
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functioning well at all 
(5)? 
Project Are only minimal 
12 3 45 resources (1) resource 
available to support Scarce Abundant 
availability the process change 
or are resources 
abundant (5)? 
Structural Is the organizational 
12 3 45 
flexibility structure rigid 
(1) or 
i l i l 
is it flexibly 
Rig d ex F b e 
conducive (5) to 
change and 
learning? 
Cultural Does the culture 
12 3 45 
capacity for 
support the status 
quo (1) or actively Status Quo Adaptable 
change seek participatory 
change (5)? 
Management's Are only modest 
impacts on people 12 3 45 
willingness to tolerable (1) or is 
impact people management willing Modest Disruptive 
to deal with the 
consequences of 
disruptive impacts 
(5)? 
Value chain Is the BPR effort 12 3 45 
target 
targeted at an 
Support Core 
internal support 
process (1) or a core 
process (5)? 
Propensity for L! J Li Lil 
Risk 
Very Risk High Risk 
Averse Taking 
Source: Kettinger, W. J., Teng, J. T. C. & Guha, S., (1997) 'Business Process Change: A 
Study of Methodologies, Techniques, and Tools, MIS Quarterly, March, p. 72, Fig. 
However, as with Hammer and Stanton's (1995: 85-99) 'Organisational 
Readiness' self-diagnosis exercise, it has not been possible to find anyone 
who has actually used Kettinger et al's 'Project Radicalness Planning 
Worksheet' (PRPW), above. For example, whilst Zhang and Cao (2002) 
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mention Kettinger et al's (1997) article, and state, 'Indeed, much of the 
challenge in constructing a BPR program is to select the type of BPR 
approach that is best suited to a specific situation, taking into account the 
organization's objectives, capabilities, and competitive or economic 
environment (Kettinger et al., 1997), ' and, 'As BPR takes place in the context 
of people and the organization, the risk of failure would be great, if it proceeds 
without appropriate plans for organizational changes (Kettinger et al., 1997; 
Grover, 1995), ' they make no specific reference to the existence or use of the 
PRPW. 
They do, however, in their Fig. 1 (below) -'BPR vs Cl' - offer further evidence 
that both BPR and Continuous Improvement (CI) can live side-by-side: 
Fig. 4.7: BPR vs Continuous Improvement (CI) 
Improvement 
performance 
lime 
Source: Zhang, Q. & Cao, M., (2002) 'Business process reengineering for flexibility and 
innovation in manufacturing', Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 102, No. 3, Fig. 1, 
'BPR vs Cl' 
Whilst Meadows and Merali (2003: 180) also refer to the Kettinger et at. 
(1997) article, it is only to state, 'They comment that "methodologies may not 
be placing enough emphasis on the change ahead"' - although this is 
misquoted from the original, 'methodologies may not be placing enough 
emphasis on preparing the organization for the change ahead' (p. 75), which 
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changes its emphasis from the intended, 'organization, ' to the 'change' itself - 
but they still make no mention of the PRP Worksheet. ' 
In fact, in one search of 47 relevant papers which cite the Kettinger et at. 
(1997) article, it has not been possible to find one that mentions the PRPW, 
which clearly suggests that none of those other writers was proposing its use 
in assisting the decision on (or even, consideration of) the degree of 
'radicalness' that might be involved, prior to embarking upon a 'Process 
Improvement'-, 'Process Redesign'-, or'Radical Reengineering'-type of 
organisational change intervention. Communication with Professor Kettinger 
himself (Aug. 2008) has equally failed to elicit any tangible evidence of its use, 
although he did express interest in the outcomes of this study. 
It seems, therefore, that in the same way that Hammer and Stanton's (1995) 
self-diagnosis of 'Organisational Readiness' (for BPR) appears not to have 
been adopted - and therefore provides one relevant direction for this research 
- Kettinger et al's (1997) 'PRP Worksheet' provides a further similar 
opportunity, in considering the aspect of 'degrees of BPR' (or organisational 
'ambition') and how this might also link with, or impact upon, the issue of 
'organisational readiness'? 
To summarise; in essence this continues the argument for greater clarification 
for what is, and what isn't, 'reengineering', maintaining the arguments for 
understanding, but broadening that to embrace the concept of 'degrees' of 
BPR, where a 'scale' across the spectrum of change approaches would help. 
Kettinger et al. (1997) provide some insight to this with their scale of 'project 
radicalness', although there is scant (if any) evidence of the concept's use. 
Linked to the themes from A-Mashari and Zairi's (1999) 'key success and 
failure factors', this scale or range of organisational ambition would similarly 
help organisations position themselves for more (or less) radical change. 
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4.3 Organisational 'Readiness' - Critical Success and Failure Factors 
(CSF & CFF) 
(NB Not restricted to post-2000) 
'In public sector health care there is a paucity of in-depth case study research to determine 
key success factors for re-engineering in this sector. ' 
(McAdam & Corrigan, 2001) 
Whilst there are other'key success factors' in the public sector (health care, 
LGO, etc. ), the issue of 'organisational readiness' was perhaps first formally 
identified by Hammer and Stanton (1995: pp. 85-99), although evidence of its 
importance in considering elements of success or failure of BPR projects is 
also to be found elsewhere. 
Bruss and Roos (1993: 57) commented that, 'Too often, implementations fail 
because the readiness of employees for change, as well as the alignment of 
changes with the organization's culture, have been overlooked. ' In their 
article, 'Operations, Readiness and Culture: Don't Reengineer Without 
Considering Them, ' they emphasised that: 
'The Readiness of employees for change must be fostered so that the potential of both 
the technology and the human resources can be realized. Managing the natural 
resistance to change and helping to convert that resistance into commitment and 
enthusiasm is a planned process. This process requires an understanding of the 
following: 
how technological change has been perceived by employees in the past; 
the level of adaptability of users and managers; 
the degree to which employees have had (and will have during the implementation) 
opportunities for involvement and participation; 
the degree to which employees perceive the goals and outcome of the 
implementation to be congruent with their personal/professional goals' (ibid: 60). 
And whilst discussing reasons for success or failure, later in the article, they 
identify, 'Several key factors (underlying) the difference between [imaging] 
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projects that are successful and those that get stuck in a rut, ' and that, 'The 
most successful [imaging projects] have the following: 
9 Comprehensive Reengineering objectives to optimize human and technical systems; 
"A tightly integrated Strategic Triangle built on business objectives and forming the 
foundation for change management strategies; 
"A high level of employee involvement to build commitment to change; 
" Consistent senior-level involvement to support nontechnical improvements; 
" Dedicated resources to address the human and organizational issues; 
" Broad-based focus on training to support the change effort' (p. 64). 
Reis and Pena (2001), under the heading 'Why did reengineering fail? ', cite 
Davenport (1996*) as saying: 
'(In his words) "reengineering treated people inside company** as if they were just so 
many bits and bytes, interchangeable parts to be reengineered". Thus, the case 
against reengineering based on its lack of concern for people and its takeover by 
managers who wished to downsize and reduce their staff numbers was made explicit 
by an earlier proponent. ' 
Except, that does not present a 'case against reengineering. ' That is a case 
against those who - using Davenport's words -'forgot people' when they 
implemented reengineering, and that is not the same thing. 
(* Actually, '1995' -'The Fad that Forgot People'. ) 
(** Davenport said 'companies'. ) 
Reis and Pena continue in this vein with a 'carrot and stick' analogy, saying 
that the 'stick was very real: 
... 
the loss of jobs if the firm does not improve quality since it would be unable to 
compete. Continuing the analogy, could we not conclude that reengineering 
concentrated on sticks and forgot the carrots? Top-down decision making, ambiguous 
opportunities for personal development and learning, unstable work relationships and 
dissatisfaction of providing quality service to customers primarily reflects sticks, not 
carrots. Could it be, in effect, that reengineering has lacked respect for people? ' 
(2001). 
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Perhaps, but I suggest that is an assumption too far, because as Obolensky 
(1994: 16) says, 'In some ways Business Re-engineering is a paradox, 
because it has to be started as a top-down exercise, but relies very much on 
bottom-up support and involvement. ' Obolensky does not deny the 'pain and 
anguish' that the 'initial stages of implementation' can often cause, but he 
does say that, 'typically, ' business re-engineering can 'achieve startling 
results, ' and that it'also allows an organisation to become far more flexible, 
responsive and able to seize opportunities for change with relish. ' The latter 
words of that sentence sound quite positive - more carrot, than stick? - so 
perhaps it is more to do with the 'readiness' of an organisation's culture to 
facilitate that necessary 'support and involvement'? Caster and Squires 
(2003: 262) also hint at the criticality of this to BPR's chances of success: 
'If staff are not involved, BPR, even more than most quality processes, will be seen as a 
threat to jobs. Continued leadership and practical commitment (including project teams 
and 'product champions') are vital to success. ' 
Once again there is little that has not been said before. For example, Reis 
and Pena (2001) say that, 'One cannot force someone to be motivated. 
Conviction comes from within, ' showing clear shades of Herzberg, et al. 
(1959) and Herzberg (1968a & 1968b); e. g: 'KITA - the externally imposed 
attempt by management to "install a generator" in the employee - has been 
demonstrated to be a total failure ... 
The only way to motivate the employee is 
to give him challenging work in which he can assume responsibility' (1968a, p. 
53). These days, of course, that would say 'he/she', but otherwise there is 
nothing new. 
The reinforcement, though, does no harm, in that they note that, 'The greatest 
fear of change lies at the top. A Cranfield report on change shows that 90 
percent of change initiatives are sabotaged by the board before even taking 
off, due to their own fears (Conn, et at., 1996)'; confirming, perhaps, the state 
of executive 'unreadiness' at those levels? 
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Holland and Kumar (1995) state that, 'One comprehensive survey has 
revealed two frequent causes for the failure of reengineering programs: 
" Targeting wrong or meaningless processes; 
" Lack of balanced and sustained executive support' (p. 79). 
And, perhaps again alluding to the issues of understanding and readiness, 
they comment; 'Despite the apparent importance of leadership, however, 
many executives launch reengineering efforts without completing critical 
homework, ' inferring that these 'executives' are not 'ready'? This role of 
senior managers is a continually recurring theme, and no less so here: 
'Executive support is critical to the success of reengineering. It provides a vision of the 
future and the perspective to see the processes that need to be altered for that future to 
happen. Support also includes the courage and patience to supply time and the firm's 
best resources. 
Executive leadership may mean the difference between success and failure in 
reengineering. Only the top executives have the position to get past the significant 
obstacles, focusing on the next roadblocks that appear as soon as the first ones are put 
to rest' (ibid). 
Howe and O'Reilly's (2004) report on BPR success at Chesterfield Borough 
Council's Building Services Division confirmed much the same thing when 
they say that'senior managers were involved in the entire process, ensuring 
understanding and buy-in to the future vision, ' perhaps the three most key 
elements in one sentence from one example; 'involvement' at senior level, 
'understanding, ' and clarity in understanding the 'vision'? 
In their article, 'How to Make Reengineering Really Work', Hall, et al. (1993: 
119) identified two other'factors - breadth and depth - that are critical in 
translating short-term, narrow-focus process improvements into long-term 
profits. ' 
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Critical to success, they say, is that the 'the redesign must penetrate the 
company's core, fundamentally changing six crucial organizational elements, 
or depth levers: roles and responsibilities, measurements and incentives, 
organizational structure, information technology, shared values, and skills' 
(ibid). 
Discussing one of the'hard factors' (Al-Mashari & Zairi, 1999) that can affect 
the success of BPR - that of internal resistance - Hall, et al. (1993: 120) say 
that'opposition to the new design can be overcome if top-level managers 
approach reengineering as a painful but necessary disruption of the status 
quo. ' 
Joynson (1995: 21) put it a little more bluntly, 'It requires a determination to 
remove any managers who stand in the way. ' He then, however, sugars this 
pill with, 'But the good news is that, once we have this commitment, it is 
comparatively easy to make the change. ' 
Comparatively easy or not, Hall, et al. (ibid: 121) say also that 'redesign 
projects often aim at processes that are too narrow and change only one or 
two of the depth levers, ' and that, 'even with sufficient depth, efforts still focus 
on a process that is too narrowly defined and therefore has little discernible 
impact on overall performance. ' This begs the question - i. e. assumes 
implicitly - that focusing on a 'narrow' process may not be true BPR, whereas 
we can see elsewhere this is not a universal view. 
However, whereas Harvey (1995) said it was important to begin by'Defining 
core processes, ' Hall, et al. (ibid) extend this within the issue of 'Breadth', with, 
'Managers must first identify the activities to include in the process being 
redesigned that are critical for value creation in the overall business unit. A 
process can be as narrowly defined as a single activity in a single function or 
as broadly defined as the entire business system for the business unit, ' which 
appears in conflict with their comments above, but again infers the possible 
additional issue of 'degrees' of BPR. 
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In an LGO - which is more a collection of disparate services, and therefore 
processes - the consideration of 'breadth' may be less relevant, as it is 
difficult to find any one service process covering the 'entire business system', 
perhaps giving more weight again to the concept of 'degrees of BPR'? 
Further weight still is added as Hall, et at. (1993: 121), continue: 
'At one end of the spectrum were companies that redesigned the narrowest processes, 
usually a single activity within a single function, such as accounts-payable processes. 
Middle-of-the-road projects reengineered intrafunctional or cross-functional processes, 
such as new product development processes. And at the far end were companies that 
redesigned one or more processes that comprised most of the critical activities in the 
business unit. ' 
What this implies, of course, is that the lesser the 'degree' of BPR/redesign, 
the lesser the overall, bottom-line (in some cases) impact of the results. They 
may be 'dramatic' in terms of the individual process savings or improvements, 
but correspondingly diluted in organisational or company terms; e. g. if the 
process were 'too narrowly defined to have any significant impact on 
business-unit performance as a whole. ' Hall, et al. (1993: 122) then caution 
the opposite, however, in that, 'Still other reengineering efforts fail because of 
a too broad, indiscriminate approach. ' So, the breadth of a process, per se, 
may not be the critical issue, whereas defining it could be. 
Harking back to Hammer (1990) or Hammer and Champy (1993), they also 
say the 'effective transformation ... requires a clean-slate approach 
to process 
redesign. Only then can companies avoid the classic reengineering pitfall of 
fixing the status quo. ' 
But the potential for failure is forever lurking in the wings; 'Even with sufficient 
breadth and depth, a reengineering project will fail without the full commitment 
of senior executives' (ibid). Interestingly, perhaps, of the'nine cases' in their 
study, five 'achieved their projected impact, ' and in 'four of these five 
successes, new chief executives were brought in before or during the 
projects, ' with the authors commenting that, 'These Senior executives 
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understood how to lead an organization through a period of radical change. ' 
And Al-Mashari and Zairi's (1999) point regarding executive commitment to 
providing 'adequate resources' is also emphasised by Hall, et at. (ibid: 124); 
'In the most successful redesigns [in our study], managers made few 
compromises and were generous with resources. ' 
Critical also to the success of the reengineering projects was a hands-on 
approach by senior managers; 'In the six reengineering projects that had 
significant business-cost reductions, top executives spent between 20% and 
60% of their time on the project' (ibid). 
In contrast, 'a manager at a less successful company described the 
leadership of its process redesign as having "the nominal sponsorship of 
someone two layers down in the organization, but in actuality, it was driven by 
someone four layers down. "' This isn't, therefore, something that 'top 
executives' can devolve. Delegate, perhaps, but not devolve (a'Critical 
Failure Factor, perhaps? ). 
Hall, et al. (1993: 125) cite the case of the Banca di America e di Italia (BAI; 
owned by Deutsche Bank) where 'BAI's transformation started with the CEO's 
obsession to strengthen the bank's strategic position by creating a "paperless" 
bank based on just-in-time manufacturing principles, ' which, is exactly in line 
with Seddon's (2007; plus Seddon & Caulkin, 2007) current concept of 
transferring 'pull' principles from manufacturing (e. g. the Toyota Production 
System, TPS) into service organisations (private and public sector) within the 
UK, a system which is continuing to earn Toyota public plaudits: 
'Toyota didn't get where it is today by following whims or taking chances. It is, above 
all, a conservative company. Its fortunes were earned and are still based on hard work 
and absolute dedication to consistent processes. 
The Toyota Production System, which applies lean manufacturing [Krafcik, 1988; 
Womack, et al., 1990] and depends on precisely controlled just-in-time delivery, 
continuous improvement and building quality, is the world standard for manufacturing, 
imitated throughout the motor industry and applied in many others - Boeing, for 
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example, uses it to build aircraft' (Ray Hutton; 'Toyota's green drive to the top', The 
Sunday Times, Business, September 2"d, 2007, pp. 1& 8). 
(NB Hutton more accurately attributes 'Lean' to Krafcik (1988), rather than 
Womack, Jones & Roos (1990). ) 
Arnheiter and Malayeff (2005) define 'pull' as follows: 'The term pull is used to 
imply that nothing is made until it is needed by the downstream customer, and 
the application of a make-to-order (MTO) approach whenever possible. ' In a 
service (e. g. customer-facing) environment this can have significant impacts 
upon the need for levels of the appropriate expertise at the customer front- 
line, impacting therefore on the nature of leadership at that interface, and that 
it also will need to be based on a 'pull' system; for example, Situational 
Leadership Theory (SLT) (Blanchard 1989; Blanchard et al., 1994) can - if not 
should - be exercised in that way. 
Further support for this alignment from Hall, et al. (1993: 122) is gained with; 
'in the diagnostic phase, the company conducted a comprehensive study of 
customer needs and found that customers cared more about speedy 
[insurance] claims processing [as opposed to 'a broad portfolio of products 
and knowledgeable service representatives'], an area in which the company 
was underperforming, ' which also ties in with Seddon's 'Check' stage, as the 
start of the redesign process. And again (at AT&T); 'By interviewing 
employees and customers and following paper trails, the team reconstructed 
24 cases, which became the basis for the diagnostic' (Hall, et al., ibid: 126). 
A synopsis of their CSFs and CFFs are: 
'Five Keys to Successful Redesign' 
1. Set an aggressive reengineering performance target; 
2. Commit up to 20% to 50% of the chief executive's time to the project; 
3. Conduct a comprehensive review of customer [etc. ] needs; 
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4. Assign an additional senior executive to be responsible for 
implementation; 
5. Conduct a comprehensive pilot of the new design. 
'... And Four Ways to Fail' 
1. Assign average performers; 
2. Measure only the plan; 
3. Settle for the status quo; 
4. Overlook communication. 
Longbottom (2000, Table III) offers'Critical factors for best practice 
technology transfer' in benchmarking projects - see below, Fig. 4.8 - but 
these could equally well have been proposed as CSF/CFFs for BPR project 
success... 
Fig. 4.8: Critical Success/Failure Factors (CSF/CFF) for Benchmarking 
Projects 
Critical factors Projects fail Projects succeed 
Project Ad hoc/championing Clear link to strategic plan 
determination Focus on performance measures Focus on measures and methods 
Project emphasis Metrics Process 
Staff drawn from internal Cross-function, multi-skill teams, 
Project department/function sponsor, facilitator 
participants Little or no TQM TQM programme 
Objectives not clear Objectives clear 
Organization Lack of trust Trust 
culture Low training emphasis Emphasis on training 
Poor communication Good communication 
Internal focus on cost and External focus on adding value to 
performance measures customer 
Measurement 
criteria 
source: LunywL JI1I, I., <.. V1 ocncnmarKing in the UK: an empirical study of practitioners 
and academics', Benchmarking: An International Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Table III 
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... as the strategic 
links, focus on methods/process, cross-functional multi- 
skilled and facilitated (supported) teams, clear goals, trust, ample training, 
good and continuous communication, and the external focus on the customer 
could just as well have been proposed by Hammer and Champy in 1993, or 
Seddon a decade later, regardless of their other apparent differences. 
Attaran (2000) states that whilst reengineering is a 'top-down proposition', the 
'magnitude of implementing the reengineering process can be a great problem 
if there is not a major and absolute commitment made by management of the 
necessary time, money, and other resources needed to make required 
changes, ' and that one'fundamental source of difficulties' is that'process gets 
reengineered and infrastructure does not' - as Seddon (2007a) says, 
'structure is subordinate to process. ' And: 'It should be undertaken only when 
there is a clear business case and a strong motivation to change the way 
things are being done, ' and to 'achieve its particular end, reengineering 
methodology should focus on two strategic guidelines: empowering people 
and enabling technology, ' with company executives recognising the 'need for 
reengineering' and developing a 'consensus' - what Hammer and Champy 
(1993: 154) call their 'case for action' (see also Seddon, 2002: 130 - it is up to 
the 'leaders' to provide the 'framework for action'). 
This 'commitment made by management' was identified in Paper et al's (2001) 
'BPR case study at Honeywell' where in '1990 the entire plant was shut down 
and everyone taken to another location for an intensive six-hour session. 
During the session, the need for radical change was articulated. In addition, 
management explained what the broad changes would be and how the 
changes would impact the workers, ' showing another example of Hammer 
and Champy's 'case' and Seddon's 'framework' for action. 
Honeywell's shift from 'mass' (production) to 'lean' (manufacturing) can also 
be seen in the following extract: 'WCM* was created to provide resources and 
take a system-wide view of the plant. WCM supported a focused-factory 
environment that harnesses the potential of teams. Instead of workers being 
assigned to a specific area on the factory floor, teams of multi-skilled workers 
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were charged with building entire products or modules from start to finish. 
WCM provided resources to teams based on the process rather that 
piecemeal events or tasks' (ibid), giving further credence, should it still be 
necessary, of the need to create 'cross-functional, multi-skilled teams', 
resourced by a 'sponsor', and supported by a 'facilitator' (Longbottom, 2000), 
where that latter's role is to 'facilitate learning by discovery and inquiry, not by 
being told what to do' (Paper et al., 2001). 
('World-Class-Manufacturing'; a 3-year programme to'examine lagging performance 
results. ') 
Honeywell's example is little different from Joynson's (1995: 58-75) case 
study of Lambert Howarth -'A New Dawn at Rawtenstall' - where, equally, 
'teams of multi-skilled workers were charged with building entire products or 
modules from start to finish, ' in this case, slippers. The product is irrelevant; 
what Joynson did was reengineer these workers - in just two working days - 
from working in 'specific area[s] on the factory floor, ' into 'cells', thence 
reducing the end-to-end time from 3 weeks to 45 seconds. 'Dramatic' results, 
one might suggest. Equally, though, he also did it by'harness[ing] the 
potential of teams, ' and delegated to them total control of the 'redesign' - 
'involvement', 'trust', and 'empowerment'! 
Longbottom's (ibid) requirement for 'trust' and empowerment (Al-Mashari & 
Zairi, 1999) is emphasized by Paper et al. (2001) with, 'teams need to have 
control over things that impact their performance. When teams failed, the 
cause could almost always be attributed to lack of authority to make decisions 
where the work was actually being done. ' They state that (e. g. ) for'process 
mapping to work, decisions are pushed to the "process" level and employees 
are given the tools and training they need to excel, ' and they cite an example 
of "'out-of-the-box" thinking' using an illustration called 'Five blind men and an 
elephant' (see overleaf, Fig. 4.9), except that their'Figure 1' shows six'blind 
men' (oops): 
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Fig. 4.9: 'Five blind men and an elephant' 
Source: Paper, D. J., Rodger, J. A. & Pendharkar, P. C., (2001) 'A BPR case study at Honeywell', 
Business Process Management Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 89, Fig. 1, 'Five blind men and an 
elephant' 
Perhaps the sixth (bottom-centre, right) was the 'facilitator'? 
The 'criticality' of this as a success factor (CSF) is shown with evidence from 
Honeywell's results; 'In a little over three years, teams helped reduce defect 
rates by 70 percent, customer rejects by 57 percent, cycle time on parts by 72 
percent, inventory investment by 46 percent, and customer lead times by over 
70 percent, ' showing that examples of 'dramatic improvement' (Hammer & 
Champy, 2001: 35) can be found; and, perhaps, that BPR is 'alive and well' 
(ibid: 2) in organisations where 'Top management ('should', and do) make 
change management a top priority and communicate the change vision 
across the organization' (Paper, et al., 2001). 
AI-Mashari and Zairi (2000) concluded that, 'Recent research studies have 
shown that BPR is very much alive and well, ' and citing Sockalingam and 
Doswell's (1996) study of BPR in Scotland, that implementation levels were 
(e. g. ) 40% in Scotland, 69% in the USA, 75% in Europe and 27% in the UK. 
Sockalingam and Doswell themselves found that the 'results of [their] study 
indicate that BPR success rates are high, ' ranging from '67%' in Scotland to 
78%' in America (1996: 43, Fig. 13), and they continue: 
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'The table suggests that contrary to claims of extraordinarily high failure rates, almost 
three-quarters of BPR projects are successful in meeting most of their objectives' (ibid). 
They qualify these apparent success levels with a health warning that 
'evaluation is inherently subjective, and goals and targets set vary between 
organizations. ' But they go on the conclude that, 'Nevertheless, the results 
are promising, ' and that they'indicate that BPR is both recognized and 
practiced in Scotland' (ibid). 
Paper et al. (2001) 'developed a set of general lessons' which add further to 
the range of CSF (and CFF) available for guidance: 
" Lesson one: people are the key enablers of change; 
Lesson two: question everything; 
" Lesson three: people need a systematic methodology to map processes; 
Lesson four: create team ownership and a culture of dissatisfaction; 
" Lesson five: management attitude and behavior can squash projects; 
" Lesson six: bottom-up or empowered implementation; 
" Lesson seven: BPR must be business-driven and continuous; 
Lesson eight: IT is a necessary, but not a sufficient, enabler; 
... 'Lessons''six' and 
'seven' reminding us of Obolensky's (1994: 16) 
'paradox'? 
However, Paper et at. (ibid) criticize the existing (at that time) BPR literature 
for failing to'mention the importance of a systematic BPR methodology, ' when 
we have already seen ample versions of these (e. g. Davenport & Short, 1990; 
Furey, 1993; Guha, et at., 1993; Harrison & Pratt, 1993; Johansson, et at., 
1993; Barrett, 1994, Klein, 1994; Petrozzo & Stepper, 1994; Hammer & 
Stanton, 1995; McAdam & Corrigan, 2001; and others), but they do provide 
Honeywell's own'eight step' process to add to this range: 
1. Select process 
2. Identify boundaries 
3. Form teams 
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4. Develop "as is" map 
5. Identify cycle times 
6. Identify opportunities for improvement 
7. Develop "should be"* map 
8. Develop implementation plan 
(* NB In other' methodologies' this is often also known as the "to be" map. ) 
That the important, or'critical' to success, issue of 'bottom-up or empowered 
implementation' was not specifically articulated by Hammer and Champy 
(1993) is perhaps, on reflection, a reasonable criticism, but Paper et al. (2001) 
do emphasise this again with '(For) process thinking to work, employees must 
be empowered to do their jobs since they are the ones that actually do the 
work, ' echoing again Joynson and Forrester (1995) and Seddon (2003). 
Zucchi and Edwards (2000: 102) say that'Fully process-based organisations 
are still extremely uncommon. ' One example is BT, who Harvey (1995: 29- 
45) suggests is one organisation that has at least made significant progress in 
this direction, as extracts from his case study 'Summary' show: 
'5. Following the re-organisation, BT created a group-wide process 
management unit whose role was to help all business units 
continue to define their core and sub-processes, and to create a 
process management structure for the whole business. ' 
'9. In order to make the new integrated process vision of BT a reality, 
the company recognises that process management awareness 
must become part of every employee's job description, and in 
particular, provides whole hearted support by the senior 
management of the company' (Harvey, 1995: 29). 
However, the health warnings of factors critical to success are equally evident: 
116 
'6. ... the critical importance of setting appropriate performance 
measures, and deciding ownership of processes emerged as issues 
to be resolved. 
7. Although numerous improvements have already been implemented 
as a result of process redesign, re-engineering is still highly 
dependent on managers' interest and commitment for its success. 
The company-wide Breakout* project has given added senior level 
support and impetus to re-engineering. ' 
(* This author was directly involved in Project Breakout - and its subsequent'Genesis 
Integrated Pilot' - see also Chamberlin, 1998. ) 
Other such warnings (CSF/CFF) are to be found elsewhere in the report; 
citing Roger Cartwright, from BT's Group Process Management Unit in 1994: 
'Unless an organisation has compelling reasons to change, radical transformation is 
probably too painful to undergo' (p. 34); 
.. which echoes 
Hammer and Champy's (2001: 154) assertion that, 'It has to 
be a case for action -a dramatically persuasive argument, supported by 
evidence, that spells out the cost of doing anything short of reengineering, ' 
and Harvey continues: 
'Although process management has subsequently been given a high priority within BT, it 
will only be legitimised when it is recognised as a separate managerial role, or included in 
job descriptions' (p. 38); 
. 'Typically, the commitment to process management depends on the attitude of the 
process owner' (p. 39); 
'Ultimately, only strong senior management commitment can ensure that the full range of 
changes in structure, organisation and management responsibilities are pushed through' 
(p. 45). 
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Yet again the issue of 'strong' leadership emerges as a potentially major CSF, 
and this is considered again later. 
In summary; there is considerable advice on how to succeed or fail at BPR, 
for example: Bruss and Roos (1993), Hall, et al. (1993), Hammer and Stanton 
(1995), Harvey (1995), Holland and Kumar (1995), Al-Mashari and Zairi 
(1999), Attaran (2000), Paper, et al. (2000), Reis and Pena (2001), Gaster 
and Squires (2003), Howe and O'Reilly (2004) from this brief review alone. 
What the commonality of these critical success factors (CSF) display is the 
need for some effective diagnosis of an organisation's 'readiness' (Bruss & 
Roos, 1993; Hammer & Stanton, 1995) for this level of change, otherwise the 
balance of evidence from these empirical studies avers the potential to fail. 
Such early diagnosis would assist organisations to assess their organisational 
capability, and thence lead to strategies by which those CSFs would be 
strengthened, so increasing chances of success. 
118 
4.4 Change Management 
'In order to respond to [new] environmental conditions, organisations in the public sector 
would need to expand or redirect their efforts in relation to new needs or opportunities. Or 
they would need to review or revise their ways of working, i. e. by introducing new systems, 
reorganising, adopting new methods of working and so on. These situations involve the 
management of change. Managing change is, therefore, not only the preserve of the private 
sector, but integral to management in public and voluntary sectors' (White, 2000: 162). 
Managing change is a huge topic in its own right, but it is not the subject of 
this study. It is, however, and by definition, an integral part, and so 
alternatives to BPR-types of radical change will need briefly to be considered. 
The previous decades have seen a number of seminal texts and articles of 
the subjects of change management (Lewin, 1951; Kanter, 1985; Henry & 
Mayle, 1991; Buchanan & Boddy, 1992; Kotter, 1996), strategic change 
(Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993; Mintzberg, et al., 1998), organisational change 
(Senior, 1997; Buchanan & Badham, 1999), and learning organisations 
(Senge, et al., 1999), on the basis that 'learning' and 'change' are 
synonymous (Kolb, 1984). 
Synonymous also is 'employee involvement' (Grazier, 1993) with change 
programmes, and the first stage of Beer, et al's (1990: 161) 'Six Steps to 
Effective Change' shows: I. Mobilize commitment to change through joint 
diagnosis of business problems. ' Their remaining five 'Steps' were: 
2. Develop a shared vision of how to organize and manage for 
competitiveness; 
3. Foster consensus for the new vision, competence to enact it, and 
cohesion to move it along; 
4. Spread revitalization to all departments without pushing it from the top; 
5. Institutionalize revitalization through formal policies, systems, and 
structures; 
6. Monitor and adjust strategies in response to problems in the 
revitalization process. 
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Whilst not in any way identical, the contemporary similarities to Hammer's 
(1990) approach are there in words such as 'problems', 'vision', 'revitalization', 
'systems', and 'process'. 
Bruss and Roos (1993) confirm this need for involvement with, 'The secret of 
change management ... 
is for all employees to feel like masters of their fates 
rather than bystanders. Capturing their commitment, through participation 
and involvement, is the single most important effort in the change process, ' (p. 
57), and, 'To be effective, the reengineering effort must have strong employee 
involvement' (p. 60). 
White (2000: 78) acknowledges that, 'invariably' change models follow Lewin's 
'three-step process (Lewin, 1951) of unfreezing, change and refreezing, ' - 
below - and that whilst other'public sector organisations have adopted 
business process re-engineering. It is argued that progress using these 
processes can only be achieved with a transformation team which has been 
given the authority for change and has internal power or clout, and can 
effectively communicate with the whole organisation, ' alluding also perhaps to 
Hammer and Champy's (1993: 103) need for a 'reengineering cza, '. 
Fig. 4.10: Lewin's basic 'Change' model 
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Source: http: //knowledgeaforethought. blocis. com/knowledcie aforethoughtimages/ReFreeze2. gif 
This concept of 'unfreezing' was also metaphorically utilised in Kotter's more 
recent (2006) and much smaller book on change, 'Our Iceberg Is Melting: 
Changing and Succeeding Under Any Conditions, ' which re-emphasised in a 
more user-friendly way his original (1995,1996) 8-stage approach to change 
management: 
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1. Establish a Sense of Urgency 
2. Form a Powerful Guiding Coalition 
3. Create a Vision 
4. Communicate the Vision 
5. Empower Others to Act on the Vision 
6. Plan for and Create Short-Term Wins 
7. Consolidate Improvements and Produce Still More Change 
8. Institutionalize New Approaches 
Adapted from: Kotter, 1995 
There are strong allegiances between the first five of Kotter's stages, above, 
Hammer and Champy's (1993: 149) 'case for action' and 'vision statement', 
and Lewin's 'unfreeze' principle similarly epitomises the 'overcoming 
resistance' side of his other well established model, 'Force Field Analysis', 
shown previously (Fig. 3.10, p. 52). Similarly, as Schein (2004: 319) implies, 
the'fundamental assumptions underlying any change in a human system are 
derived originally from Kurt Lewin (1947), ' in the form of his 'basic model' - 
'Unfeeze-Change-Refeeze' - which when represented in the example above 
shows synergies also with the terminology of the 'fundamental' stages of BPR. 
White (ibid) also states that'an effective model for change should 
accommodate and encourage on-going interaction, i. e. it must be iterative and 
based on experimentation and learning, rather than being a static process, ' 
which could easily infer again a Kolb-like process of doing, reflecting, 
theorising and experimenting, on an repetitive basis, and again reflects the 
iterative nature of Beer et al's (1990: 161) 'Step 6'; 'Monitor and adjust 
strategies in response to problems in the revitalization process. ' 
This 'on-going interaction' requires the setting-up, or at least the permitting, of 
self-managed teams, 'where informal networks are self-organising systems, 
each follows its own rules and together constitute a system where people 
from personal networks acquire information to learn and so change the 
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system of which they are a part' (White, ibid), which is in tune with 
Schonberger's (1994) 'teamsmanship over leadership' ideas. He states that 
the 'substance' of reengineering is'to do with "organizing around outcomes, 
not tasks" (Hammer, 1990), ' and that - clearly echoing Joynson and Forrester 
(1995) - in the 'vanguard' of this approach are those 'manufacturing plants 
that have moved nearly every machine, plus operators and support resources, 
into cells or flow lines that produce complete units. ' 
Attaran (2000: 101), again alluding to this need for'on-going interaction', 
states that'feedback loops for employees to air their concerns, must be in 
place from day one, ' because 'resistance and cynicism are inevitable, ' and 
'getting people to buy into reengineering has proven to be difficult. ' Waddell 
and Sohal (1998), however, are not so cynical about the issue of resistance, 
and say that it can be a 'constructive tool for change management. ' Whereas 
it 'has been classically understood as a foundation cause of conflict that is 
undesirable and detrimental to organisational health' (ibid), Burdett (1998), 
agreeing, offers an alternative approach by, 'taking advantage of the tension 
derived from rejecting the status quo' - what he calls 'innovation drawn out of 
positive discord' - because (resistance) 'may not be an enemy of change' 
(Waddell and Sohal, ibid). It appears that resistance, as one of Lewin's 
(1951) 'forces', can be what you make it. 
Burke (2004) asks, 'Can reengineering improve an organization? ' and then 
answers, 'I believe so, but it takes a lot of thought, effort and coordination 
sustained over a long period of time. ' He continues: 
'Few organizations appear interested in evaluating and learning from their efforts. 
Managers often decide themselves on the success of their initiatives (Zbaracki, 1998). 
Decisions made on data are more likely to be valid and support organizational 
effectiveness. ... 
These findings are consistent with other writing on the difficulties in 
bringing about successful organizational change, specifically in the implementation of 
process reengineering. They highlight the importance of time and effort spent in 
communicating and gaining staff understanding and acceptance of new ways of doing 
business. These insights are not new; as conventional wisdom they have been part of 
your organizational change mantra for decades. Unfortunately, all too often they are 
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only given lip service. Until serious attention is paid to them, the implementation of 
process reengineering, along with other organizational transformation, will continue to 
have mixed success. ' 
So it appears that 'change' per se, is not the problem, but how an organisation 
goes about it, which suggests also that the CSF (and CFF) for change 
management are likely to be little different from those to do with 
reengineering. It's all in the doing, the implementation. 
As Burke (ibid) says, and it stands repeating: 
'These insights are not new; as conventional wisdom they have been part of your 
organizational change mantra for decades. Unfortunately, all too often they are only 
given lip service. Until serious attention is paid to them, the implementation of process 
reengineering, along with other organizational transformation, will continue to have 
mixed success. ' 
The only people who can give the issues surrounding change management 
'serious attention' are the organisation's management - or its leaders - and as 
Holland and Kumar (1995: 79) said, When shooting for change, concentrate 
on two key areas: Aim at the right processes, and get management behind it 
100 percent. ' 
Burke also highlights 'the importance of time and effort spent in 
communicating and gaining staff understanding and acceptance of new ways 
of doing business, ' and this is echoed (albeit earlier) by Hall, et al. (1993: 
127), 'The radically different job responsibilities and skill redesigns posed an 
immense human-resource challenge. The staff would need training and job 
support to understand their new roles and the new emphasis on customers 
and profits. ' 
Their own attempt at'the right process' follows the pattern: 
Diagnostic 
9 Clean-Slate Redesign 
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" Preparing for Change 
" Rollout 
And it is again at this 'Diagnostic' stage that the 'employee involvement' has to 
commence - that mobilisation of 'commitment to change through joint 
diagnosis of business problems' (Beer, et al., ibid) -White's (2000) 'on-going 
interaction. ' 
Paper et al. (2001) say that the 'major obstacle to change is the employee 
attitude that "things are OK", so why change. ' Why indeed? And as Peters 
(1992, p. 628) says, 'Change is painful and difficult to implement. "Change of 
even the simplest sort is hopelessly complex ... even making the case for 
change is close to impossible". ' 
And that 'case for change' takes us right back to Hammer and Champy's 
(1993: 149) 'case for action' - their 'compelling argument for change. ' After 
that case has been made, or as part of its making, employees need to know, 
'what to? ' Hammer and Champy (ibid) put it simply, perhaps too simply; they 
called it the 'vision statement'- 'what the company [or organisation] needs to 
become. ' They say that the vision acts as a 'flag around which to rally the 
troops, ' and a 'yardstick for measuring the progress' (ibid: 154), all of which 
suggests the need for an organisation-wide integration of the process(es) of 
change - whether incremental or radical, whether kaizen or reengineering, or 
wherever in-between - integration through management and employees as a 
whole. 
Cao, et al. (2001) add a further health warning on this very subject, 'This 
overall failure to integrate the approach throughout the organisation (Siegal et 
al., 1996), it is argued, frequently results in significant improvements in 
individual process but fails to produce bottom-line organisation-wide results 
(Hall, et al., 1993), ' and this has key parallels with Dexter et al's (2005,2006) 
report into the impact of a middle management leadership training programme 
on the 'bottom line' within one of the target organizations, where there was 
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ample evidence of 'individual' improvements in areas such as knowledge, 
skills and attributes, but it was far less easy to identify where this had 
impacted upon the organisation's 'bottom line' in a 'organisation-wide' manner. 
Cao, et at., continue that, 'Conversely, it is evident that a BPR programme can 
be a powerful change approach if it is integrated with a variety of change 
initiatives such as cultural and structural change (Stebbins, et al., 1998). ' 
Stebbins, et al., in their study of Blue Shield of California, confirm that BPR 
'can be a powerful change umbrella, ' but their health warning again is that 
'Top-level management involvement and commitment played a critical role 
throughout the change process' (1998: 230), and Cao, et al. further support 
the case for integration by stating that a 'holistic approach to the management 
of change is needed. ' My own previous organisation (BT) took that'holistic' 
approach to heart with an organisation-wide integration programme of their 
TQM initiative in the late 1980s; it was called 'Involving Everyone. ' It did. 
And it exemplified Obolensky's (1994: 16) 'paradox, ' because it'started as a 
top-down exercise, ' being management-lead, but subsequently 'relied very 
much on bottom-up support and involvement, ' as line-management carried out 
the bulk of the staff training, the essence of which was to engage the 
workforce in the tools and techniques of TQM/continuous quality 
improvement, whilst also seeking their ideas on what to improve, and how. 
Cao, et al. (2001) also say, somewhat controversially, that'BPR says little 
about problems of resistance, ' whereas Hammer and Champy (2001: 179) 
quite clearly state that, 'The fact is, there will always be resistance to change. 
But if you are determined to make the changes work, it is no longer an 
insurmountable issue, ' and again (p. 183), '... success requires leaders to be 
persistent, stubborn, and consistent - leaders who will not back down in the 
face of resistance or difficulty. Clear communication throughout the 
organization is a prerequisite for progress in a reengineering effort. ' And for 
'throughout the organization', read 'integration. ' 
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Cao, et al. (2001) cite Flood (1996), whose'four key dimensions of 
organisation (process, design, culture and politics)' were the inspiration for 
their own 'classification of four types of organizational change': 
" Processual change - Changes in organisational process and controls over process 
" Structural change - Changes in organisational functions, their organisation, co- 
ordination and control; usually involving a consideration of horizontal and vertical 
structures, the decision systems, and human resource management 
0 Cultural change - Changes in values, beliefs and human behaviour in terms of 
relationships to social rules and practices 
0 Political change - Changes in power distribution and the way organizational issues 
are influenced. 
Later, they state that organisational change 'can be seen as a dynamic 
process, ' in that: 
'... change in any one dimension will probably result in compensatory change in other 
dimensions (Leavitt, 1964; Nadler, 1988): so, for example, "shifts in the large culture 
influence individuals, who influence organisational culture, which in turn reflects 
organisational structure" (DeLisi, 1990). Consequently, any attempt to carry out change 
through isolated single efforts is likely to fail (Kanter, et al., 1992). This being the case, 
it implies that to manage organisational change requires diversity of both theories and 
methodologies: since the four types of organisational change identified are interrelated 
and interdependent, no one theoretical or methodological position will be able to deal 
with all aspects of change. ' 
And again, if 'isolated efforts [are] likely to fail, ' then integration is required, 
which seems like a complicated way of saying what goes round comes round, 
or, perhaps more structurally and culturally, that all aspects of (e. g. ) Johnson 
and Scholes' (2002) 'Cultural Web' should be considered and included in any 
attempt at large(r)-scale organisational change - Fig. 4.11 Cultural Web 
(overleaf): 
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Fig. 4.11: Cultural Web 
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Source: Johnson, G. & Scholes, K., (2002) Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text & Cases, 6 `h 
edition, Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd, FT/Prentice Hall, p. 230, Exhibit 5.11 
But'twas ever thus, surely, that any more forced or'coercive' (Dunphy & 
Stace, 1993) 'approach(s) to dealing with organisational change' (Cao, et al., 
2001) - e. g. BPR - would, by the very nature of the 'design' of the concept, 
bring about a new 'structure', which would both necessitate and cause a 
change/shift in the 'culture', resulting from new forms of 'power distribution' 
and 'influence', or 'politics'. Blanchard (1989) put it differently in that there 
were basically two, three-stage approaches to change: 
Knowledge - Attitude - Behaviour (KAB) 
or 
Knowledge - Behaviour - Attitude (KBA) 
The first - to gain people's buy-in through the supply of information 
(Knowledge), followed by adequate persuasion -a 'case for action' and a 
'vision statement'? - which then causes a change of mind-set (Attitude) 
resulting in the new, desired actions (required Behaviour) - would of course 
be the most preferable. 
127 
However, occasionally, if not frequently, this approach either does not 
succeed, or the obtaining situation or circumstances do not allow time for the 
'persuasion' to work, or at least not with everyone, so the alternative 'KBA' has 
to be applied; in which the 'knowledge' is still given - in Hammer and 
Champy's (2001: 154) case this would be still the same 'case for action' and 
'vision statement' - followed by a more, albeit perhaps gently, 'coercive' 
persuasion being applied to require the change in behaviour, on the basis that 
the change in attitudes would follow, once the advantages of the new state 
were realized (or the alternative had been avoided). Or, to repeat the words 
of Pascale (1990: 264), 'it is easier to act ourselves into a better mode of 
thinking than to think ourselves into a better mode of acting. ' Beer et al. 
(1990: 159) confirmed this with; 'The most effective way to change behaviour, 
therefore, is to put people into a new organizational context, which imposes 
new roles, responsibilities, and relationships on them, ' reminding us again of 
Champy's (1996) comment: 
'Starting the reengineering process by changing the managerial work, therefore, is 
going to have greater benefits for the organization. ' 
Pascale et al (1997) called this 'revitalization'; meaning a 'permanent 
rekindling of individual creativity and responsibility, a lasting transformation of 
the company's internal and external relationships, an honest-to-God change in 
human behavior on the job. ' 
That this 'thinking' or'change in human behavior' might be an emotionally- 
driven journey through changing attitudes was highlighted by Kübler-Ross 
(1969), and Scott and Jaffe (1994), and, in CSF terms, Jeal's (2005) view 
was similarly that: 
'A factor in successful change is the overcoming of resistance by recognising people's 
feelings and the organisational culture. The implication is then that cultures are 
changed by changing the emotions that drive them, not the other way round. ' 
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It might still be the case, however, that changing people's behaviour first in 
Pascale's terms might be the more expedient, if not also successful approach 
(see also Davies, 2001: 167)? 
A recent example from China highlights this occasional need for forcing 
change in organisations that, previously, have shown little willingness to be 
persuaded by other means. In a (The) Sunday Times article (August 26th, 
2007) entitled, 'China pays a high price for America's T-shirts, ' Jane Spencer 
reported that The crackdown on [company name] was part of an increasingly 
aggressive campaign by China's central government to curb the 
environmental damage wrought by decades of industrial expansion'; where 
language such as 'crackdown, ' 'increasingly aggressive, ' and 'curb, ' suggest 
very clearly that a KAB-type of attitudinal persuasion approach had not been 
successful, and it was time for a KBA-type of behavioural intervention - 
forcing the company concerned to 'act, ' as Pascale said, 'into a better mode of 
thinking. ' 
Doyle (2001) highlights the issue of tensions between empowerment of (e. g. ) 
teams, and stresses: 
'For instance, we have seen that whilst an empowering culture is leading to greater 
dispersal of change agency, the extent to which the organisation can or would want to 
exercise control and the mechanisms becomes a strategic issue. Too much coercive, 
bureaucratic control risks creating frustration and de-motivation amongst managers and 
employees stifling innovation. Too little control and there is a risk of initiative anarchy, 
overload and fatigue. ' 
In a later article, Doyle (2002) raised the issue of the 'theoretical and practical 
implications facing those who have responsibility for "managing the change 
managers", ' and concluded that a 'more explicit organisational focus to 
develop change agents from novices to experts should be included in future 
HR strategies. ' A decade earlier this expertise was the central thrust of 
Buchanan and Boddy's (1992) The Expertise of the Change Agent, ' where 
they opened with the statement that the'management of change is now 
commonly viewed as a complex and difficult area, worthy of special attention 
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and study, from both theoretical academic and practical management 
viewpoints' (p. 1) 
Such 'tensions' were reflected in a quotation from Gus Crosetto (Vice 
President of Training and Development at FannieMae; 'the world's largest 
diversified financial company and the US's largest source of home mortgage 
funds'*), cited in Paper, et al. (2003), but it also highlights the imperative for 
combining that training and 'expertise' with integration and employee 
involvement: 'We are really managing chaos. Controls are minimal as 
compared to an autocracy. The time and effort we put into developing the 
people system is daunting, but the benefits are amazing. ' 
(* NB Not only was Crosetto Vice President, Corporate Learning at Fannie Mae, he was also 
Sr. Director of Learning & Leadership Development at Freddie Mac. Now, however, some 
five years on and with both of those organisations effectively nationalised, the words 'chaos', 
'minimal controls'. 'daunting' and 'amazing' might have a different resonance. ) 
Tom Peters had earlier taken a positive view of this 'daunting' issue in his 
(1988) treatise 'Thriving on Chaos', in which he gave 'Prescriptions for a 
World Turned Upside Down' (pp. 1-45), giving yet another example of that 
pyramidal inversion with Nordstrom's organization chart, shown in Fig. 4.12, 
below: 
Fig. 4.12: Nordstrom Organization Chart 
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Source: Peters, T. J., (1988) Thriving on Chaos, London, Macmillan, p. 370, fig. 16 
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Peters urged that, 'First-line management's role is to support the front-line 
people. Middle management's role is to act largely as facilitator, greasing the 
skids and speeding up actions, especially those actions (most) requiring 
cross-functional, multi-unit co-operation. ' Nordstrom called this concept their 
'helping hand' aimed 'upward' (ibid: 369). 
The involvement of HR in aspects of BPR implementation (at Leicester Royal 
Infirmary; LRI) - this 'helping hand' - was highlighted by Ashton (2002: 5), 
where the emphasis of the reengineering effort was refocused 'on working 
more closely with clinical teams to help them to develop and redesign their 
own services, ' and Ashton's report states that, 'The results from this approach 
were astonishing. ' In an'overview of the HR contribution, ' Ashton reports that 
the change programme at the LRI 'resulted in many improvements in quality, 
capacity, cost and patient care, ' and that with the 'help of skilled HR 
practitioners [it] leveraged more intangible benefits in organizational culture, ' 
giving examples such as: 
" 'team-based performance management and problem-solving; 
" improved teaching and research opportunities; 
" more collaborative working relationships across the patient process; 
" more effective skills and career development; 
" heightened management focus on clinical issues; 
" more timely senior-management decision taking; and 
"a focussed and more committed workforce' (ibid: 6). 
There are other approaches to organisational change, and as we have seen 
these can range from incremental to radical approaches, using such concepts 
as TQM, Kaizen, Benchmarking, Six Sigma, EFQM, Investors in People, 
Reengineering, and Change Management per se. 
McAdam (2003) reported that, 'Over the last decade there has been a 
continuous development of Reengineering and Benchmarking theory and 
practice in an attempt to meet the demands of large-scale change and 
increased globalization and competitiveness in organisations. Benchmarking 
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is the external (in the present context external to the organisation) comparison 
of any organisational feature against "best in class" or "world class" practice. ' 
The criticism of benchmarking has been that by'aspiring only to be as good 
as the best in its industry, the team sets a cap on its own ambitions' (Hammer 
& Champy, 1993: 132), or that it is simply 'playing catch-up' (Obolensky, 
1994) whereas the protagonists would argue that'there is much published 
research, which is generally supportive of benchmarking' (Longbottom, 2000). 
On the subject of 'quality' per se, Kim and Ramkaran (2004), citing Pirsig 
(1974) invite the reader to 'Consider then this definition: "Quality is neither 
mind nor matter, but a third entity independent of the two... even though it 
cannot be defined, you know what it is". ' 
The same could perhaps be said of Change Management; we 'know what it 
is, ' but getting it right is a different matter. It's the implementation. 
To summarise in line with the study's objectives, this has broadened the 
context into the wider issues of change management. What this reinforces is 
that need for a cultural readiness within organisations, or the need for them to 
assess their capability for such fundamental changes if they are not sure - to 
'evaluate and learn from their efforts' (Burke, 2004). Quintessentially BPR is a 
'clean slate' approach (Hall, et al., 1993), so as Obolensky's 'top-down'/ 
'bottom-up' 'paradox' implies it will require that'clear communication 
throughout the organization' (Hammer & Champy, 2001). According to Burke 
(ibid) it will take 'a lot of thought, effort and coordination over a long period' 
and 'isolated efforts [are] likely to fail' (Kanter, et al., 1992), and whether 
Kotter's (1996/2006) 8-stage model is the chosen approach, its generic sense 
is reinforced. Organisation-wide change is unlikely not to involve a parallel or 
foundational cultural shift, and organisations will need to know if they are 
'ready' and capable for such fundamental changes, or to gain that knowledge 
through pre-assessment. 
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4.5 Organisational 'Culture' 
'Reengineering entails as great a shift in the culture of an organization as in its structural 
configuration. Reengineering demands that employees deeply believe that they work for their 
customers, not for their bosses' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 79). 
The above seems a relatively simple statement, but in fact it infers, or rather 
'demands, ' a paradigmal shift, if not a pyramidal inversion, of the culture and 
structure of organisations attempting BPR. 
What Blanchard (1989: Tape 1/Side 2) calls 'Turning the Pyramid Upside- 
Down, ' Joynson and Forrester (1995: 21) show as the structural, and 
therefore cultural, contrasts between the 'Traditional Factory' and the 'New 
Improved Factory'; below, Fig. 4.13: 
Fig. 4.13: Johnson & Forrester's 'Inverted Pyramid' 
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Source: Joynson, S. & Forrester, A., (1995) Sid's Heroes: Uplifting Business Performance 
and the Human Spirit, London, BBC Books, p. 21 
Whilst this in itself does not specifically imply a process-orientated culture, 
Joynson and Forrester continue, 'The key is to lead the workforce to change 
its perception of itself and the company through convincing them that they are 
the real experts and that they can deliver immense improvements more or 
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less immediately,... They must be given ownership of the process and be 
supported in the changes they want to make' (ibid). 
Hammer (2004) in his article, 'Why don't we know more about knowledge? ', 
acknowledges this same point of worker-level expertise and introduces the 
terms 'deep smarts' to describe people who 'draw on a huge store of tacit 
knowledge, built through years of experience. ' He says they'are also able to 
take a systems view of a complex product, an organization or an 
environment. ' Hammer says that 'process' is about 'positioning all individual 
activities in the larger context in which they are performed, ' and Seddon 
(2003: 29) reinforces the same point; 'In the longer term what is required is to 
change the whole system. Roles and measures have to change from 
managing through the hierarchy to managing flow, managing the work end-to- 
end. ' 
Hammer (ibid) emphasises that to 'really understand work practice requires 
detailed observation and accepting that there are usually good reasons why 
workers do their jobs in a particular way, ' which clearly represents that same 
cultural shift, alluding to a more focused approach to GOYA and MBWA; what 
Imai (1997: 35) calls going to 'Gemba'. 
Spanyi (2004) suggests that 'traditional organizations are more likely to have 
the leadership team abdicate its responsibilities, ' and offers a framework to 
help in 'assessing the extent to which there may be a problem': 
Performance 
Dimension 
Question 
Mindset Have you defined an enterprise-level model of your major 
business processes on one or two pages? 
Strategy Is there a shared understanding of which business processes 
need to be improved, and by how much, to deliver on strategic 
direction? 
Execution Have senior executives taken accountability for the 
performance of the enterprise-level business processes? 
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Has there been management training on business process 
improvement and management with a specific focus on the 
improvements needed to deliver on strategic goals? 
Is there a clear review mechanism to assess progress on a 
monthly and quarterly basis? 
Rewards Is some part of senior management's performance bonus 
based on business process performance? 
Structure Are there regular conversations about fine-tuning structure, 
measures and rewards to optimize customer-touching business 
process performance? 
Culture Is there a groundswell to move customer impacting decisions 
progressively closer to the point of contact? 
Leadership Are there more cross-departmental meetings to talk about 
delighting customers? 
Do department heads promote the enterprise view of 
performance in department meetings? 
Technology Are there lively cross-functional discussions on where (in 
which enterprise business processes) IT dollars should be invested? 
Is there leadership consensus on which IT capabilities need to 
be deployed on a company-wide basis? 
Source: Spanyi, A., (2004) 'BPM - The Enemy', Article - Business Process management 
Group, Spanyi International Inc., pp. 5/6 
Ongaro (2004) states that'in the absence of such a [process-oriented] culture, 
performances may even worsen in a process-based organisation compared to 
a more traditional organisational frame, ' and in the context of LGOs, 
continues: 
'Public administrations, still characterised by a very limited orientation to end-users (a 
pre-requisite for the development of a process culture), will meet many difficulties in 
implementing process management, even though the broader cultural setting has 
evolved. ' 
These 'difficulties' were possibly why Al-Mashari and Zairi (1999) identified 
'Change of Management Systems and Culture (Factors)' as the first of their 
'analysis of key success and failure factors. ' 
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Hammer (2004) offers some encouragement in this regard, with, 
'Furthermore, because every proposed major change in operating procedures 
is invariably greeted with a chorus of "it will never work, " a lengthy 
implementation period gives opponents and extended opportunity to 
campaign against it. ' ... 'Companies would also be wise not to try to 
implement an innovation all at once. Breaking a large-scale implementation 
into a series of limited releases creates momentum, dispels scepticism and 
anxiety, and delivers a powerful rejoinder to carping critics, ' thus reminding us 
of the continuous nature of cultural change. As Burke (2004: 115) says, 'The 
process of change is as important as the nature of the change. ' 
Willmott (1994: 44) comments that, 'BPR is likely to encounter difficulties of 
implementation even where employees overtly espouse its objectives... It 
also poses an immediate or deferred threat to job security and conditions of 
work' - but so, perhaps, does going out of business. 
The issue of culture, or at least 'people', is identified by Bruss and Roos 
(1993: 57) in: 
'... many reengineering projects focus exclusively on technology, thereby failing to 
address human and organizational aspects of reengineering. In these instances, 
organizations fail to explore nontechnical solutions to improving business processes, 
such as training, or changes to structure, procedures, and management practices. ' 
In a pilot with West Lancashire District Council, Vaughan (2005a: 2/6; 2005b: 
2/11) reported that designing their own 'conceptual model to fit the operating 
context of smaller Local Authorities [required] an understanding of prevailing 
culture, ' or, citing Deal and Kennedy (1982), the 'corporate tribe. ' As Jeal 
(2005) found when they reengineered Customer Services at the University of 
Salford, We have experienced what could be called a culture shock in 
beginning BPR. ' 
Cao, et al. (2001) comment that'a cultural view sees change in terms of 
people's relationship to social rules and practices, ' and they cite Flood (1996) 
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as finding that 'organisational culture means, "... there are people who share a 
common history in some way, have a common sense of belonging, and are 
therefore readily able to engage with other people who share these feelings". ' 
But of course 'feelings' of 'belonging' might easily be replaced by feelings of 
'soon-not-to-be-belonging', if BPR is seen as a serious threat to the status quo 
(which, of course, it is), and Nwabueze also highlights these 'anxiety' aspects 
with, 'the constant threat of job loss cannot inspire innovation and creativity in 
employees' loyalty and team working are never fertilised in a field of fear... - 
Therefore it can be argued that Hammer and Champy (1993) completely 
missed the most vital elements that are the substance of any change process' 
(Nwabueze, 2000). And this same issue of a 'serious threat to the status quo' 
was reported by Bragato and Jacobs (2003); 'Understandably, these changes 
were resisted by doctors, who saw them as a threat to their power and 
autonomy. ' 
And under'Climate', Nwabueze (ibid) says that'BPR is characterised by 
downsizing, rightsizing and delayering, ' whereas Hammer (1990) makes it 
clear that We cannot achieve breakthroughs by cutting fat and automating 
existing processes, ' stating that, '(Rather, ) we must challenge old 
assumptions and shed the old rules that made the business underperform in 
the first place' (p. 107), which could suggest that Hammer, at least, hadn't 
actually 'missed' the point? 
Surprisingly, Cao, et al. (2001) state that BPR'ignores structural, [and] 
cultural ... dimensions, 
' when, as we have already seen, quite clearly Hammer 
and Champy (2001: 79) state that 'Reengineering entails as great a shift in the 
culture of an organization as in its structural configuration, ' so perhaps it is 
they (Cao, et al., 2001), rather than the original authors, who have 'missed' 
these'most vital elements'. 
On the issues of motivation versus stress (in the workplace) Nwabueze (2000) 
argues that 'job characteristics theory' (Hackman & Lawler, 1971) states that 
'the worker would be self-motivated to perform well' ... 
'if four core job 
characteristics' ... 
'are present in a job', namely: 
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1. skill variety, 
2. job identity, 
3. autonomy, and 
4. feedback. 
However, this was two decades before BPR had been formally articulated, yet 
those same four 'characteristics' could be said to be present within the 
effective, supportive and entrepreneurial leadership of process redesign. For 
example: 
1. skill variety - BPR clearly implies new jobs, roles and responsibilities; 
2. job identity - as above, the inherent 'uncertainty' of BPR, along with the 
'people' themselves being involved in job redesign, infers some 'control' 
over those new identities; 
3. autonomy - empowerment or the workforce is a key component or 
BPR; and, 
4. feedback - the 'quick and dirty' philosophy of experimentation within 
service redesign similarly implies - requires? - continual and effective 
feedback from leaders and customers on the effectiveness of those 
new processes. 
These issues of 'autonomy' and 'empowerment' were studied by Jarrar and 
Zairi (2002) who concluded that the 'whole concept of "employee 
empowerment" is still an infant in terms of practical implementation. Although 
various benefits stand to be gained, organisations are still not willing to hand 
down power to employees and the "control" mentality is still abundant. ' 
Belmiro et at. (2000) comment that the 'culture of departmentalisation has 
created in people's minds a kind of "ethical boundary" which needs to be 
challenged and confronted' - challenging, as Hammer (1990) said, those 'old 
assumptions. ' 
Commenting on structural aspects, Zucchi and Edwards (2000) say the 
'typical re-engineered organisation is likely to have adopted a matrix structure, 
138 
with a reduced number of organisational levels' - and -'employees' career 
paths in the re-engineered organisation now tend to be more a function of the 
skills acquired through training, and experience gained in different activities 
within the organisation, than occupational seniority, ' the past tense inferring 
successfully 're-engineered organisation(s), ' and therefore a successful 
cultural shift. 
Mingers (2000: 734) is clearly talking of culture when he reflects on his own 
'scientific' background when commenting on his'rude awakening' as he'soon 
discovered that real-world organizations were not easily and tidily fitted into 
mathematical models - they had social and political dimensions which were 
not touched by the OR [Operational Research] techniques I had learned, ' and 
that there was 'the embarrassment of relying on data that turned out to be 
patchy, often impossible to measure, and as much a reflection of its own 
processes of production as a reflection of "objective" reality. ' But the following 
passage perhaps highlights the cultural resistance aspects more poignantly: 
'Most importantly (and shockingly) I discovered the politics of organizations: the projects 
that never got started because certain people refused cooperation or information; the 
projects that were eagerly welcomed because they could be used by one department 
against another; the antagonism towards us, and indeed attempts at sabotage, when 
our studies threatened the power or position of particular groups. These "extraneous 
factors, " that were never mentioned in OR books or courses, seemed to have more 
influence over the success or otherwise of my work than anything I might do with OR 
techniques' (Mingers, 2000: 734). 
Whilst not exactly refusing 'cooperation', or displaying 'antagonism, ' Thong et 
al. (2000: 248-252) state that because 'public organizations rely more on 
appropriations and less on market exposure, there is less incentive to reduce 
cost and improve operating efficiency. This results in increased reluctance to 
adopt the massive changes that come naturally with BPR'; furthermore, 'public 
officials are often characterized as being less innovative and exercising 
greater cautiousness and rigidity in their actions, presenting a barrier to 
achieving the breakthrough in thinking required for BPR'; and then in 
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summary, 'adoption of BPR is likely to be slower in the public sector. ' Cultural 
drag? 
They caution (ibid: 248) to 'expect the differences between private and public 
organizations to have an impact on BPR, ' and have identified a series of 
'issues that are relevant to BPR in the public sector. ' They are replicated here 
in Table 4.3, below and overleaf, and pay particular attention to the areas of 
'(1) deciding to adopt BPR; (2) setting objectives of BPR; and (3) 
implementing BPR, ' with the 'potential implications on BPR' summarized in the 
last column: 
Table 4.3: 'Salient Characteristics of Public Organizations and their 
Implications for BPR' 
Topic Proposition Implications for BPR 
Environmental Factors 
1.1 Degree of market exposure 1.1. a. Less market exposure results in Increased reluctance to adopt 
(reliance on appropriations) less incentive for cost reduction, operating massive changes required for BPR. 
efficiency, effective performance. 
1.1. b. Less market exposure results in Slower adoption of BPR. 
lower allocational efficiency (reflection of 
consumer preferences, proportioning 
supply to demand, etc. ). 
1.1. c. Less market exposure means lower Increased difficulties In setting BPR 
availability of market indicators and objectives and benchmarking. 
information (prices, profits, etc. ). 
1.2 Legal, formal constraints 1.2. a. More constraints on procedures, Increased difficulties in redesigning 
(courts, legislature, hierarchy) spheres of operations (less autonomy of procedures to support redesigned 
managers in making such choices). processes. 
1.2. b. Greater tendency towards Longer time required for 
proliferation of formal specifications and specification and approval of 
controls. redesigned procedures. 
Increased difficulties in obtaining 
1.2. c. More external sources of formal approval for reengineering project 
1.3 Political influences influence, and greater fragmentation of and redesigned processes. 
those sources. Increased difficulties in BPR 
1.3. a. Greater diversity and intensity of prioritization and setting objectives 
external informal influences on decisions of BPR 
(bargaining, public opinion, interest group 
reactions). Increased difficulties in obtaining 
1.3. b. Greater need for support of approval for reengineering project 
"constituencies" - client groups, and redesigned processes. 
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authorities, etc. 
Organization- 
Environment 
Transactions 
2.1 Coerciveness ("coercive, " 
"monopolistic, " unavoidable 
nature of many government 
activities) 
2.2 Breadth of impact 
2.3 Public scrutiny 
2.4 Unique public expectations 
2.1. a. More likely that participation in 
consumption and financing of services will 
be unavoidable and mandatory 
(Government has unique sanctions and 
coercive powers. ) 
2.2. a. Broader impact, greater symbolic 
significance of actions of public 
administrators. (Wider scope of concern, 
such as "public interest. ") 
2.3. a. Greater public scrutiny of public 
officials and their actions. 
2.4. a. Greater public expectations that 
public officials will act with more farness, 
responsiveness, accountability, and 
honesty. 
Lower incentives to reengineer 
services. 
Increased difficulties in evaluating 
impact and benefits of BPR. 
Increased hesitance in adopting 
BPR. 
Increased difficulties in setting BPR 
objectives, designing process 
alternatives, and selection of 
redesign alternatives. 
al Structures and 
Processes 
3.1 Complexity of objectives 
3.2 Authority relations and the 
role of the administrator 
3.3 Organizational 
performance 
3.1. a. Greater multiplicity and diversity of 
objectives and criteria. 
3.1. b. Greater vagueness and intangibility 
of objectives and criteria. 
3.1. c. Greater tendency of goals to be 
conflicting (more tradeoffs). 
3.2. a Less decision-making autonomy and 
flexibility on the part of public 
administrators. 
3.2. b. Weaker, more fragmented authority 
over subordinates and lower levels. (1. 
Subordinates can bypass, appeal to 
alternative authorities. 2. Merit system 
constraints. ) 
3.2. c. Greater reluctance to delegate, 
more levels of review, and greater use of 
formal regulations. (Due to difficulties in 
supervision and delegation, resulting from 
3.1. b. ) 
3.2. d. More political, expository role of top 
managers. 
3.3. a. Greater cautiousness, rigidity 
3.3. b. More frequent turnover of top 
leaders due to elections and political 
appointments results in greater disruption 
Increased difficulties in setting BPR 
objectives, designing process 
alternatives, and selection of 
redesign alternatives. 
Reduced autonomy to drive a BPR 
project, which could lead to lower 
success or failure. 
Increased difficulties in redesigning 
the human resource system to 
support the redesigned processes. 
Insufficient level of empowerment 
given to staff to support the 
redesigned processes. 
Insufficient devotion of top 
management time and effort to 
BPR project. 
Greater barrier to achieving 
breakthrough in thinking required 
for BPR. 
Increased difficulties in sustaining a 
BPR effort. 
Increased difficulties in redesigning 
141 
3.4 Incentives and incentive of implementation of plans. 
structures 3.4. a. Greater difficulty in devising 
incentives for effective and efficient 
performance. 
3.5 Personal characteristics of 3.4. b. Lower valuation of pecuniary 
employees incentives by employees. 
3.5. a. Variations in personality traits and 
needs, such as higher dominance and 
flexibility, higher need for achievement, on 
part of government managers. 
3.5. b. Lower work satisfaction and lower 
organizational commitment. 
the human resource system to 
support the redesigned processes. 
Source: Thong, Y. L., Yap, C. S. & Seah, K. L., (2000)'Business Process Reengineering in 
the public sector: The case of the housing development board in Singapore', Journal of 
Management Information Systems, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, pp. 249-251, Table 1 
These 'differences between private and public organizations [having] an 
impact on BPR' might have been what Hammer and Stanton (1995b) had in 
mind when they stated, 'New people in new jobs also need to be managed 
and measured in new ways. ' 
Joynson and Forrester (1995: 21) are almost unrealistically dismissive when 
they state, 'Most business textbooks tell you that culture change can take up 
to five years to achieve. Unfortunately, by this time the business may no 
longer exist - there are world-class companies waiting to grab your 
customers. In fact a major change can be carried through in just two days, 
and the whole process should be completed in less than nine months! ', yet 
they are simply reinforcing the urgency of the necessity for this shift. They 
achieve this culture change'in just two days' by engaging cross-functional 
teams from the existing workforce to 'redesign' their working layout to improve 
flow and reduce inventory, etc., normally into some form of U-shaped 'cell' 
structure, and whilst they never use the term 'reengineering', this approach is 
clearly echoed by Caputo and Pelagagge (2003) with; 'Reengineering 
activities are especially aimed towards layout optimization mainly by resorting 
to a U-shaped cell-based architecture, ' which they describe as 'an unusual 
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type of cellular manufacturing, especially adopted in just-in-time (JIT) 
production systems, ' as (e. g. ) in Toyota's TPS. 
But it was never going to be easy, as Laurie Fineman, then a senior process 
manager in BT's Network and Services division (cited in Harvey, 1995: 42) 
observed, 'To some extent, the lag in creating a process management culture 
is a consequence of what Fineman tags the phenomenon of glacial 
movements in big companies. ' And even though LGOs are not 'companies' 
per se, they are mostly 'big', so perhaps the newly heated environment 
resulting from (e. g. ) Sir Peter Gershon's (2004) 'Independent Review of 
Public Sector Efficiency' might already be accelerating a 'glacial' retreat, 
revealing, ripe for erosion, the morainic deposits of outdated public sector 
cultures? 
The geological analogy continues with Seddon's (2003: 16) statement that 
such changes require 'a seismic shift in the organisation's culture. ' 
Summing up, and accepting the considerable overlap with the previous 
section; analogous to Hammer's (2004) 'deep smarts' an organisation's 
culture could be described as its 'deep roots', or its 'huge store of tacit 
behaviour'. Spanyi's (2004) framework for'assessing the extent to which 
there may be a problem' simply reinforces even further the criticality to 
success of organisational capability for change, or its 'readiness'. Issues of 
'politics' and 'empowerment' stay in the frame, and although non-UK, Thong et 
al's (2000) study highlights some 'salient characteristics' of the potential for 
cultural drag in public sector organisations. 
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4.6 Reengineering Leadership and Communication 
When they arrived at the Red Sea, Moses said, "Here's the plan. We're going to march into 
the sea, the Lord will part the waters, and we'll walk through on dry land. " His followers 
looked at the Red Sea and said to him, "You first. " He went, they followed. Being out front 
when the risk presents itself is part of leadership. (This story also demonstrates the value of 
having your boss on your side, as Moses certainly did. )' (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 105). 
One of the five categories of Al-Mashari and Zairi's 'key success factors' (p. 
106) is that of 'Management Competence Factors, ' the first of which is 
'Committed and Strong Leadership. ' The third is 'Management of Risk. ' 
Hammer and Champy emphasise this issue of risk and, although not using 
precisely the same language, if 'failure' is to be avoided, the need for 
'Championship and Sponsorship, ' the second of Al-Mashari and Zairi's 
'Management Competence Factors': 
'Most reengineering failures stem from breakdowns in leadership. Without strong, 
aggressive, committed, and knowledgeable leadership, there will be no one to 
persuade the barons running functional silos within the company to subordinate the 
interests of their functional areas to those of the processes that cross their boundaries. 
No one will be able to force changes in compensation and measurement systems, no 
one will be able to compel the human resources organization to redefine its job-rating 
system. There will be no one to convince the people affected by reengineering that no 
alternative exists and that the results will be worth the agony of the process' (p. 107). 
This combination of championship, committed leadership and risk is evinced 
in Hall, et al. (1993: 131) who cite an example from AT&T's Pat Russo, who: 
'... brought her senior managers together and made sure that they understood that 
implementation would proceed immediately. While at times privately fearful that the 
plan might not work, she publicly gave her unequivocal support for the new approach, 
and she made successful implementation a key measurement for her field managers. 
The radical changes of the reengineering project were initially met with resistance by 
the managers and employees who would have to make the changes work. The clear 
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commitment of the leadership team was central to developing the necessary depth of 
commitment throughout all levels of the organization' (p. 131). 
In the same paper, but another organisation (BAI - Banca di America e di 
Italia), Hall et al. cite the bank's CEO's clarity in understanding this 
requirement for'committed, and knowledgeable leadership': 
'In addition, he had a well-formed idea of the process: "My role was to act as a 
defender, so that daily urgencies didn't get in the way of the team's work. At the same 
time, I kept the tension up by calling frequently and by wandering around. "' (p. 130). 
This short, final phrase represents a nonetheless powerful concept -'MBWA', 
Managing By Wandering Around' - first brought to light by Peters and Austin 
(1986, p. 6; 1988, p. 6), but originally coined in the Hewlett Packard 
organisation (Packard, 1996: 155) as 'Managing By Walking Around, ' and 
more than hinted at with Davenport's comment that, 'To really understand 
work practice requires detailed observation and accepting that there are 
usually good reasons why workers do their jobs in a particular way' 
(Davenport, in Hammer, et al., 2004). 
Yet it requires a commitment to 'wander', as Hall et al. emphasise, 'Even with 
sufficient breadth and depth, a reengineering project will fail without the full 
commitment of senior executives' (p. 124), and Hammer (2004) reinforces this 
with, 'Thus, it [operational innovation] will never get off the ground without 
executive leadership. ' 
Ongaro (2004) suggests that it is 'the process owner [who] usually leads the 
reengineering intervention, ' and Hammer and Champy's (1993: 149) 'case for 
action' and 'vision statement' are their two 'essential messages' that comprise 
their'selling job' (p. 148) that senior managers'must communicate to the 
people who work in their organizations. ' But Holland & Kumar (1995) imply 
also the requirement for thorough preparation prior to embarking upon this 
company-wide articulation, 'Despite the apparent importance of leadership, 
however, many executives launch reengineering efforts without completing 
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critical homework. ... Such fundamental change needs major doses of vision 
and perspective as well as time and energy. ' They have to understand. 
Hammer (2004a), in his article entitled 'Deep Change, ' states that, 'Many top 
managers are ignorant about operations and uninterested in learning more. ' 
Perhaps they'wander' insufficiently? He talks about the need 'to find a leader 
who can grasp what they have in mind and then spearhead the innovation 
effort, ' and under the heading, 'Making it Work, ' Hammer offers four 
suggestions: 
1. Look for role models outside your industry; 
2. Identify and defy a constraining assumption; 
3. Make the special case into the norm; 
4. Rethink critical dimensions of work. 
Holt and Rowe (2000) talk of 'critical leadership, ' and define it as the 'capacity 
to envisage how effective activity is governed by both technical challenges 
(the provision of expert advice, knowledge and systems), and the more 
nebulous, but equally crucial, value perspectives..., ' adding that such 
'leadership is attitudinal, rather than control oriented' (Seddon, 2003), and that 
such leaders'are critical because they are problem solving. ' This reinforces 
the point made by Walker and Black (2000) on the importance of a process- 
based structure that is 'consistent with cross-functional efforts': '... critical 
leaders use both adaptive and disruptive techniques of analysis and 
speculation to shift perspectives, encourage innovation and erode obstructive 
fiefdoms' (Holt & Rowe, 2000). 
And the erosion of 'obstructive fiefdoms' appears not to be a recent issue, as 
Argyris (1962) said, 'Managers love empowerment in theory, but the 
command-and-control model is what they trust and know best. ' 
However, whilst hardly any of the available literature denies importance of the 
role of top-level, corporate or senior management leadership, sponsorship, 
championship, or commitment to change, etc., this neither always nor 
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necessarily implies a top-down approach. Beer et al. (1990) promote this 
message very clearly with, 'Effective corporate renewal starts at the bottom, ' - 
Obolenksy's (1994) 'paradox, ' again? - and state that many companies are: 
'reducing reliance on managerial authority, formal rules and procedures, and narrow 
divisions of work. And they are creating teams, sharing information, and delegating 
responsibility and accountability far down the hierarchy' (p. 158). 
Under'The Role of Top Management, ' they continue this theme: 
'The best senior manager leaders we studied held their subordinates responsible for 
starting a change process without specifying a particular approach' (p. 165). 
Paper et al. (2001) say that, 'Top management has to live the new paradigm 
by being active participants in the change process. Top management 
endorsement is not enough. They have to interact with teams and 
management to let their people know that change is a priority and that they 
understand what is being done at the process level to make change happen. ' 
They continue: 
'The biggest obstacle to execution was within the middle management ranks. Members 
of middle management were too used to being experts in a specific area. ' ... 
'Behavioral change is the most difficult type of change. It takes time and patience. 
Execution of a major change program therefore requires a lot of time to reap desired 
benefits. ' ... 
'If managerial attitude remains that of "command and control" and/or their 
behavior does not change, transformation will most likely fail. ' 
In his article on 'Deep Change, ' Hammer (2004a) stated that the leadership 
'(executive) must have both the imagination and the charisma needed to drive 
major operational change' -'transformational leadership' (Bass & Avolio, 
1994) of change, perhaps. 
Kotter (1995) was very clear about 'Why Transformation Efforts Fail, ' and his 
first 'error' in this context was that of failing to establish a 'Great Enough 
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Sense of Urgency, ' (p. 60), and one way to do this was by making the 'status 
quo seem more dangerous than launching into the unknown. ' Pascale et al. 
(1997) repeated these same messages with an example from Sears, 'To 
generate a sense of urgency, (Sears' CEO) set difficult goals' (p. 134), and 
the need to create 'relentless discomfort with the status quo' (p. 139). 
Moran and Avergun (1997: 147) stated that the 'job of the change leader is to 
challenge people to test, re-calibrate, and improve their attitudes, 
assumptions, relationships, processes and outcomes. ' But they make the 
point that'this type of critical questioning can take place only in a safe 
environment and change leaders must help create this safe environment. ' A 
difficult 'challenge' itself, perhaps, and the change leaders themselves might 
need help or support from elsewhere. 
In a report on 'HR's role in re-engineering at Leicester Royal Infirmary, ' Ashton 
(2002) confirmed that, 'Clinical and executive management leadership at the 
hospital were crucial to initiate, sustain and achieve process re-engineering. 
The key here was visible and tacit support of different power groups, in 
addition to leaders explaining to staff why the changes were being undertaken 
and how they improved patient care in practice. ' 
These relatively few examples from the leadership of (and) change literature 
all agree that leadership itself, in its many forms, is critical to success, and 
whatever the views of various writers on BPR itself, per se, none appear to 
claim that leadership is not critical to its success. What will be interesting, and 
perhaps more especially in the light of Hammer and Stanton's (1995: 85-99) 
'Self-Assessment Diagnostic, ' and Kettinger et al's (1997: 71-73) 'Project 
Radicalness Planning Worksheet, ' is the degree to which the 'leadership' (or 
lack of it) within the two collaborating LGOs will have affected the outcomes of 
their respective reengineering efforts. 
In summary, and as previously stated -'BPR in the Early 1990s'- committed 
leadership, and effective and continuous communication, are critical to the 
success of BPR initiatives. Al-Mashari and Zairi (1999) talk of 'committed and 
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strong leadership' and 'championship and sponsorship', alongside 'effective 
communication' and 'People involvement, training and education'. The 
messages are quite simple, and they align with Kotter's (1996/2006) steps 3, 
4 and 5: 
3. Create a Vision 
4. Communicate the Vision 
5. Empower Others to Act on the Vision 
Hammer's (2004a) accusation of 'ignorant' and 'uninterested' top managers, 
and Paper et al's (2001) 'biggest obstacle' being 'middle management', only 
reinforce Holt and Rowe's (2000) need for that'critical leadership' at all levels. 
Allied with the repeated need for a 'sense of urgency' (Kotter, 1995; Pascale, 
et al., 1997), leadership and communication remain 'crucial' (Ashton, 2002) to 
successful change. 
4.7 Public Sector Context 
'In response to a relentless pace of change, many in the public sector are looking to business 
improvement/transformation philosophies and approaches developed in the private sector to 
see if they can be applied within the public sector. Such an approach is business process 
reengineering (BPR). ' 
(McAdam & Mitchell, 1998) 
Five years on, this 'relentless pace of change' is reflected also in the following 
passage from Zeppou and Sotirakou (2003): 
'Managers in the public sector are under constant pressure to improve the performance 
within their organisations. They are expected to satisfy the various stakeholders, to 
increase efficiency, effectiveness and quality, to achieve organisational goals and 
results and to establish a culture of continuous improvement, change and distinct 
service orientation. To fulfil these difficult and complex roles, public managers turn to 
specific approaches practiced in the private sector, such as total quality management 
(TOM), business process reengineering (BPR), strategic management, benchmarking 
etc. ' 
149 
It is one of these 'specific approaches, ' BPR, to which the two collaborating 
LGOs have turned as part of their change management strategies and that is 
also at the core of this study. Its purpose is reinforced by Zeppou and 
Sotirakou (2004), who also claim that: 
'The amount of research devoted to strategic management, TQM, BPR, etc. in the 
public sector, continues to lag significantly behind comparable studies of the private 
sector and is characterised by definitional inconsistencies, which demonstrate that the 
maturity and acceptance of these practices is far greater in the private sector. ' 
And later, citing a range of authors, Sotirakou and Zeppou reflect on a: 
'... public sector metamorphosis from a rigid and congested bureaucracy to a modern 
and flexible organization [that] defines the agenda of Modernization and administrative 
reforms... '; 
continuing: 
'In the past decade governments around the world have enthusiastically adopted the 
idea of reinventing government, which implies a shift away from the traditional 
bureaucratic management of public service towards a more entrepreneurial one, 
dubbed new public management (NPM). ' 
They state that this 'modernization is tantamount to creating a "learning public 
administration", ' but whether their study of a 'Greek public organization' is 
generalisable to the UK is open to question. Either way, it is this 'lag' in the 
public sector, against the greater 'maturity and acceptance' in the private 
sector that is more pertinent to the question of whether BPR is 'alive and well' 
in these specific LGOs under investigation. 
A number of themes are already apparent here: 
. the 'relentless pace of change'; 
'constant pressure to improve (the) performance'; 
'increased efficiency, effectiveness and quality'; 
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"a culture of 'continuous improvement'; 
"a 'lag' in the rate of 'acceptance'; 
"a 'metamorphosis' to a 'modern and flexible organization'; 
" 'reinventing government'; 
" the emergence of 'new public management' (NPM); 
" and of course, business process reengineering (BPR). 
In the opening chapter of their book, 'Reinventing Government, ' Osborne and 
Gaebler (1993: 2) cited the American people as demanding the same things - 
'in election after election and on issue after issue, more performance for less 
money' - applying that'constant pressure to improve (the) performance. ' And 
then they talk of a sign of 'hope': 
'Slowly, quietly, far from the public spotlight, new kinds of public institutions are 
emerging. They are lean, decentralized, and innovative. They are flexible, adaptable, 
quick to learn new ways when conditions change. They use competition, customer 
choice, and other nonbureaucratic mechanisms to get things done as creatively and 
effectively as possible. And they are our future. ' 
And although 'lean' in this context is different from that discussed elsewhere, 
they could equally have been writing about the UK, as in 1998 Keen and 
Scase also wrote: 
'Local government has experienced an unprecedented rate of change during the 1980s 
and 1990s, which has been precipitated mainly, but not exclusively, by the policies of 
successive Conservative governments' (p. 1). 
'Not exclusively', because in the decade since 1997 the government has been 
Labour, or at least, 'New Labour, ' and it was by this government, under then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, that Sir Peter Gershon, CBE, was asked in August 
2003 to undertake a 'Review of Public Sector Efficiency, ' which he presented 
in July 2004. 
Among his findings, he reported that: 'auditable and transparent efficiency 
gains of over £20 billion in 2007-08 across the public sector [had] been 
151 
identified and agreed. Over 60 per cent of these are directly cash releasing' 
(£12 billion), and that, 'a gross reduction of over 84,000 posts in the Civil 
Service and military personnel in administrative and support roles' would 
result. However, we are now past the fiscal year when we should be able to 
see, and judge, whether any of those'auditable and transparent efficiency 
gains' have been made within the two collaborating LGOs. 
Albeit a study in Italy, Ongaro (2004) also raises other relevant questions in 
the area of process management in the public sector: 
1. Is process management always possible? 
2. What are the enabling factors for process management in the public sector? 
3. And, in particular, how can it be related to public sector management reforms carried 
on at central level? 
Ongaro (ibid) comments that: 
'The wave of managerial reforms in the public sector since the beginning of the 1980s 
has, to a large extent, produced the overcoming of the "traditional" self-orientation of 
bureaucratic systems. The re-orientation of public administrations to end-users 
conceived as customers (customer-orientation) is seen as a crucial component of the 
"legitimation" of the public sector in society. ' 
and observes also: 
'Process management does not entail the absence of traditional hierarchical relations 
(an evolution that might be, in many respects, impossible in the public sector)' (ibid). 
As we have seen and discussed elsewhere, it is not the 'absence' of a 
'traditional hierarchy' that is the issue, but more its cultural 'reorientation', or 
even inversion. 
Nearer to home, and more recently, Pederson and Hartley (2008) refer 
specifically to 'reengineering' in their article on the 'changing context of public 
sector leadership and management': 
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'Both in Denmark and in the UK, the focus on results and outputs has paved the way for 
a number of management and steering technologies such as quality management, the 
balanced scorecard and other elements of performance-based management. Central 
government and local organizations in the two countries have introduced and promoted 
tools and techniques such as business process re-engineering, process mapping, lean 
thinking, six sigma processes and benchmarking. ' 
'Lean thinking' in this context is that implied previously (e. g. Krafcik, 1988) in 
terms of systems thinking. In discussing the links between ('soft') systems 
thinking and the'world of public affairs, ' Mingers (2000: 750) comments that, 
We still have, in the United Kingdom, major problems of poverty, inequality, 
health, and education, and the current government recognizes how vital 
systems thinking is with its slogan of "joined-up government", ' - what Pollift 
(2003: 67) refers to as'JUG' - although Seddon (2008: 133) argues that the 
extent of that joined-upedness and UK plc's commitment to, or even 
understanding of, systems thinking, is 'failing those who need care': 
'The impact of the reform regime has had on social care is nothing short of shocking. ' 
He said they ('as consultants'): 
'... were struck by the enormity of the regulations burdening the service... The controls 
imposed by the regime are, as with other services, driving enormous waste into the 
system. Care is poor and costs are high. ' 
(NB The term joined-up government' was actually called 'effective joint 
working' in 'The Victoria Cimbie Inquiry' (Laming, 2003: Rec. 14, p. 373). 
'Joined-up' was also coined in a BBC News report -'Joined-up drive to help 
children' - later that same year (10th July): 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/education/3055363. stm) 
And, although strictly a 'health care' study, McAdam and Corrigan's (2001) 
investigation identified: 
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'... a number of unique characteristics of public health organisations which have a 
bearing on the application of BPR in a public sector organisation. It was found that the 
application of BPR in a professionalized organisation, such as the one examined, 
presents special issues for the introduction of a management technique which proposes 
to bring about radical change. Professional autonomy and established hierarchies may 
be at stake. Consequently, considerable political expediency can take place. 
Furthermore the empowerment of staff to bring about such changes is important. ' 
LGOs have traditionally been founded on these professionals, though they 
have been naturally organised vertically into functional hierarchies, as 
opposed to horizontally into process 'streams. ' 
In a study of the'public sector' in the US, Gulledge and Sommer (2002) echo 
the problem this point creates with, '(However) process management does not 
work very well when overlaid on a hierarchical command and control 
management structure, ' and they cite Champy (1995/96) in that, 'the shift to 
process management requires a restructuring (i. e. a reengineering) of 
management, ' all of which continues to emphasise the need for attitudinal and 
behavioural changes within the senior echelons of the public sector - those 
'established hierarchies. ' 
More positively, perhaps, Macintosh's (2003) article -'BPR: alive and well in 
the public sector' - almost by itself confirms the prime mover of this research 
proposal, and whilst he concludes that'public sector BPR projects can face 
greater restrictions in terms of providing resources for improvements, even in 
circumstances where there is evidence that an investment would be justified, ' 
he nonetheless observes that, 'the concept of BPR appears to appeal to 
public sector organisations. ' This 'appeal', however, is unlikely to be 
sufficient. Understanding 'appears' to be what is required (initially, at least; 
i. e. pre-reengineering), along with determination and real commitment from 
those senior echelons of the hierarchy. 
He concludes by stating that 'BPR projects can succeed in the public sector 
and that while academic interest in BPR is fading, the public sector's interest 
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may persist for some time to come. ' That'public sector interest' is clearly 
evident, and not'fading', within the UK. 
In a study of the UK police force Greasley (2004) states that in public sector 
organisations 'such as the police there will be a need to reconcile the multiple 
objectives of stakeholders such as the government, employees and victims of 
crime, ' and whereas Attaran and Attaran (2004) claim that Hammer and 
Champy (2001) have sought to 'reinvigorate the topic for the new millennium, ' 
and that their'clear revision of their famous book ... once again 
brings 
process improvement to the forefront of business management 
consciousness, ' Greasley (ibid) assists by offering a 'scoring system 
developed to prioritise [such] processes for improvement, ' based on their 
'impact' on critical success factors (CSF) and the 'extent of change required' 
to the process; see Fig's 4.14, below, and 4.15, overleaf: 
Fig. 4.14: Greasley's (2004) 'Impact (external perspective) marking guide' 
Mark Impact (external perspective) marking guide 
0 This individual process has minimal or no effect on the individual CSF 
1 This individual process is dependant on another process, in order for it to have an 
effect on this CSF 
2 This individual process has a marked influence on this CSF 
3 The individual process has substantial impact on whether another process can 
maximise its beneficial effects on this CSF 
4 The individual process has substantial influence on this CSF 
5 The individual process is a critical part of being able to achieve the individual CSF 
Source: Greasley, A., (2004) 'Process improvement within a HR division at a UK police force', 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 230-240, 
Table II 
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Fig. 4.15: Greasley's (2004) 'Innovation (internal perspective) marking guide' 
Mark Innovation (internal perspective) marking guide 
0 This process cannot be improved for this CSF 
I This process achieves its objective but could be improved even further 
2 This process achieves its objective but could be improved by review of both 
automation and process improvement 
3 This process does not effectively achieve all its objectives and could be improved by 
review of both automation and process improvement 
4 The process exists and functions but need substantial alteration to meet its objectives 
5 The process either does not exist or only partially exists and fails to meet any 
objectives 
Source: Greasley, A., (2004) 'Process improvement within a HR division at a UK police force', 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 230-240, 
Table III 
With possibly no, or only modest modification, this could potentially be useful 
to LGOs. Equally, however, so perhaps more critically, its two 'perspectives' 
could just as effectively be covered by Kettinger et al's (1997) 'Factors' no. 1, 
3, and 6 (see Fig. 4.6), with its similar '1 to 5' rating scale. 
Hughes et al. (2006: 86), in researching e-government in Ireland, concluded 
that 'initiatives that fit within the evolutionary classification [see also'Degrees' 
of BPR and 'project Radicalness', 4.2, p. 90,,,, ] can be achieved in a timely 
and successful manner. ' Their case also illustrates that, 'more revolutionary 
initiatives are achievable but that the development of these initiatives beyond 
basic services requires sophisticated business network[s] and BPR. ' 
They end by saying that: 
'... an important area for further research is to investigate the unique nature of 
processes within the public sector so that IS platforms can be developed that 
accommodate less efficient processes rather than platforms that require unobtainable 
process redesign. ' 
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This somewhat downbeat steer to future researchers appears to imply that 
because (e. g. ) LGOs are'less efficient, ' one should set the bar lower for BPR/ 
Process Redesign initiatives, a suggestion Sir Peter Gershon might disagree 
with. That certainly does not appear to have been the case with the London 
Borough Council (LBC) visited. Perhaps the 'process' should be 'redesigned' 
before the 'platforms' are 'developed'? Then 'pull' the IT (Seddon, 2007a)? 
Becker et al. (2006), investigating 'e-government-indicated business process 
reengineering (BPR) projects in public administrations, ' mention the need for 
the 'introduction of a process manager' in the same way that Hammer and 
Champy (1993: 102) mentioned the 'process owner', and (p. 103) the 
'reengineering czar'. This was underpinned by the 'concept of total specialist 
processing, already very familiar in business circles, ' the aim being to 
'eliminate the functional division of processing activities, and to facilitate 
processing a transaction through to completion, ' what Seddon (2008: 35) calls 
to 'study the flow of work: how everything works from end-to-end from [e. g. ] 
the claimant's point of view. ' Whilst this echoes Gulledge and Sommer's 
(2002) concern that'process management does not work very well when 
overlaid on a hierarchical command and control management structure, ' a 
current example of this 'business circle' familiarity was to be found in BT 
(BTtoday, 2007: 23) where their 'Trouble-to-resolve (T2R)' process is defined 
in this same 'end-to-end' way, as: 
'... from problem identification to resolution. This begins when a customer has told BT 
they are not happy with a product or service, or when BT has proactively spotted a 
problem. It ends when that problem has been resolved and the customer is satisfied' 
(p. 23). 
However, even though this organisation's heritage was firmly in the 'public 
sector' - The GPO/Post Office Telephones; Post Office Telecommunications 
- until the early 1980s, British Telecommunications plc (British Telecom; BT) 
has been very firmly 'private sector' since November 1984*, hinting again that 
this might have been the means by which it began to overcome any'lag' in the 
rate of 'acceptance' of its 're-orientation'? 
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(* http: //www. btplc. com/Theqroup/BTsHistory/Privatisationinfosheetissue2 pdf). 
Whatever the reason, it was the election of the Thatcher administration in 
1979 that brought with it the 'firm commitment to reduce waste and 
bureaucracy in order to improve efficiency' (ibid) - precufsoring the Gershon 
initiative by 25 years - and resulting subsequently in the Telecommunications 
Act 1984 and a new organisation that ultimately provided the impetus towards 
BT's process-based 're-orientation' throughout the first half of the 1990s. 
LGOs, whilst not being 'privatised' as such, have nonetheless had to similarly 
're-orientate' themselves and 'look for ways to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their management and service delivery systems' (Keen & 
Scase, 1998: 4), and traditional management systems 'based on hierarchical, 
and relatively centralized, control systems, are seen as giving way to 'arm's 
length' negotiated relationships between groups of managers' (ibid: 7). For 
example, one such arm's-length management organisation (ALMO) was 
created within the collaborating LGO, CityC, when (what I will call) 'City 
Homes' was created from the then Housing Division of the City Council. It is 
this change in 'relationships' that Osborne and Gaebler (1993: 166) - the 
same year as the publication of Hammer and Champy's original text - called 
'Customer-Driven Government: Meeting the Needs of the Customer, Not the 
Bureaucracy, ' and introduced the concept of 'Listening to the Voice of the 
Customer' (ibid: 177). Whilst never specifically mentioning 'processes, ' 
'redesign' or 'reengineering, ' they nonetheless conclude with: 
'Our governments are in deep trouble today. In government after government and 
public system after public system, reinvention is the only option left' (p. 331). 
'Only option' or not, and 'alive and well' or not, it is still very much on the 
agenda. 
'Reinvention' was not the 'only option' being put forward by Gaster (1995; 
cited again in Caster & Squires, 2003), who developed a 'model for service 
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quality' (below, Fig. 4.16) in order to 'provide a tool for systematic analysis of 
what is actually happening in any one organization or service. ' 
Fig. 4.16: A model for service quality 
Deaewn to mibate 
quality policy 
Statement of 
organizational values 
Evaluate 
achievements, decide Decide strategic 
next areas for organizational 
improvement objectives 
Citizens 
Monitor and 
Consumers Dehne desired 
measure quality 
Front-line staff service quality Policy makers 
° Other interests 
ö 
Q. 
Negotiate detailed Diagnose present 
quality standards service quality 
Decide how to 
improve quality 
(operational 
objectives) 
Action and Form quality 
monitoring teams 
Timetable Problem-solving 
and targets techniques 
Priorities for 
action 
Source Garter & Squires (1003), D 40. Fig 31 
This was in response to what they saw as various 'exhortations ... since the 
early 1990s' for the public sector to 'adopt particular quality systems' (Gaster 
& Squires, 2003: 3). The debate, however, appears to be moving away from 
'systematic analysis' based on a 'classic 'policy-implementation' cycle' (ibid: 
41), and towards 'systemic analysis' (Jackson, et al., 2007; Seddon, 2008) 
where public (and private) sector organisations are viewed end-to-end as 
'systems'. 
Gaster and Squires (2003: 16) set the context for this drive for improved 
service quality - calling it the 'modernization agenda'* - as driven by central 
government, although for'different political reasons', with: 
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'The Conservative governments of the 1980s and early 1990s, motivated by the desire 
to'roll back the state', mainly used methods to change the structure of the public sector 
and spend less on it. These methods included the introduction of the contract culture" 
(Compulsory Competitive Tendering, or'CCT', in local government), some privatization 
(prisons"), some devolution (schools) and the'internal market' (health). Since 1997 
and the election of a Labour government for the first time since 1979, the focus on the 
public sector has intensified, with a much greater concern for'quality' and 'results' and 
with some 'extra' spending on health and education. Labour has apparently been more 
interested in the process of service delivery, introducing policies of'Best Value' and 
neighbourhood management in local government, and emphasizing the need for more 
consumer choice and 'joined-up' services. Taken together, these measures were 
advertised as being part of the Labour Government's 'modernization' agenda. ' 
(* See also Berlaymont, 2007: 'Tony Blair arrived strong and with a 
modernising agenda that seemed to put Europe at the heart of Britain as 
much as the other way round'; and Maer, 2005: 'The Modernisation 
Committee was established in May 1997 with a remit to "consider how the 
practices and procedures of the House should be modernised". ) 
(** This 'contract culture' was also a keystone of BT's'privatization ' in 1984, by 
the same Conservative government. ) 
Seddon firmly challenges Gaster and Squires' observation that we should use 
'methods to change the structure of the public sector' in order to 'spend less 
on it. ' He argues (2007a) that'structure is subordinate to process, ' and that 
more 'money' would be 'saved' if 'the process of service delivery' were viewed 
that way. 
If ('New') Labour were 'interested in the process of service delivery' (Gaster & 
Squires' emphasis in both cases), their record for translating that interest into 
real and 'cashable' improvement is coming under greater scrutiny - perhaps 
culminating in the 'massive 17.6% swing from Labour'*** in the Crewe and 
Nantwich by-election on May 22nd 2008 - from the academic world and the 
press (Seddon, 2008; Caulkin, 2008; Davis, 2008, overleaf), for both its 
'joined-upedness' and the success of its 'Best Value' and other policies. 
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(*** Source: http: //uk. news. yahoo. com/oressass/20080523/tuk-cameron-hails-end-of-new- 
labour-6323e80. html - accessed 23 May, 2008) 
These are indications that this research is possibly more relevant now, in late 
2008, than it was when it was first proposed four years ago in October 2004, 
and was perhaps most clearly evinced by comments from Evan Davis, the 
BBC's economics editor, when reporting on his own interview with Sir Peter 
Gershon on the Radio 4 'Today' programme (Davis, 2008), when he said (to 
Carolyn Quinn): 
You might remember the National Audit Office said, We don't really think the numbers 
that are being attached to all the savings that are made, are, necessarily terribly 
accurate... ' I think the jury's out, and the National Audit Office I think sometimes found 
that things that looked like savings, you know we're cutting aircraft carriers or cutting 
things from the Ministry of Defence for example were, were really just about, cutting 
things rather than savings or making things more efficient, and one of the things Sir 
Peter was saying was really that, this is the, just the beginning. Over the next, three 
years the, the targets are far more ambitious, they want cashable savings, efficiency 
savings, and they need them because the public finances are in a, pretty messy state, 
and if they're going to achieve all that over the next few years well they, they're going to 
have to do a lot more radical surgery to public sector activities. They're going to have 
to reengineer things, they're going to have to think about whole processes, and so 
really the, the message of the last three Gershon years is, it's only just begun and this 
is going to be a huge theme in the public sector. ' 
(BBC/Radio 4 'Today', 1 9th March, 2008,07.50) 
To ensure this point is not lost, the key phrases reinforcing this ongoing need 
within the public sector and local government were: 
'Sir Peter was saying ... really that, this is ... 
just the beginning. ' 
. 'Over the next, three years* the, the targets are far more ambitious, they want 
cashable savings, efficiency savings'; 
. 'public finances are in a, pretty messy state'; 
'over the next few years well they, they're going to have to do a lot more radical 
surgery to public sector activities'; 
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" 'They're going to have to reengineer things, they're going to have to think about whole 
processes. ' 
(* 2008-2011) 
His comment -'radical surgery to public sector activities' - is interesting in 
that he chose the word 'activities', rather than 'services' (since 'surgery' still 
implies'cutting things'), and also because it suggests the point in his final 
sentence on thinking 'about whole processes' implies just that. It's what 
Seddon (2007) calls this 'thinking thing', and the 'thinking' will need to be 
about those'savings, or making things more efficient. ' As Davis said: 
'.. it's only just begun and this is going to be a huge theme in the public sector. ' 
The 'hugeness' of this 'theme', and possibly also its urgency, is reinforced by 
Seddon's opening paragraph in his 2008 book - Systems Thinking in the 
Public Sector the failure of the reform regime... and a manifesto for a better 
way - as he states: 
'The purpose of this book is to illustrate how'bureaucracy and red tape' have driven 
public services in the wrong direction. The cost is not just the cost of the bureaucracy 
itself; there is an additional cost because the changes being mandated by that 
bureaucracy are the wrong things to do. The bureaucracy has made services worse, 
and public sector morale has been sapped' (Seddon, 2008b: iv). 
This 'theme', as we have seen from the literature, is what Deming (1986: 153) 
suggested could take 'ten years' to effectively implement (e. g. in that instance 
his '14 points for quality'). Deming was possibly sowing the seeds for its own 
failure when more rapid solutions were required by those senior managers 
carrying corporate responsibility for major improvements, and apparently this 
is equally relevant in the public sector today. In terms of BPR, specifically, 
Hammer and Stanton again brought this speed issue clearly to the fore with: 
, you must reengineer quickly. If you can't show some tangible results within a year, 
you will lose the support and momentum necessary to make the effort successful.... 
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Stay focused and narrow the scope if necessary in order to get results fast' (Hammer & 
Stanton, 1995: 30). 
These rapid improvements are clearly what Davis (above), and Gershon 
(presumably) was saying were needed, but another 'Davis' (1993: 51; citing 
Larry Skinner of Texas Instruments) differed slightly with his claim that 
'Reengineering projects often take a year or more in the formulation phase 
and another 12 to 24 months to implement' - implying a 1- to 3-year overall 
timescale. This suggests that Hammer and Champy's 'year' might be too 
short, whilst Deming's 'ten years' could be unnecessarily (or at least 
undesirably) long. Sirkin and Stalk (1990: 26-31) referred to this short- 
termism, in that'many managers itch to short-circuit the process, ' resulting in 
'unsatisfactory results ... because the organization 
does not truly understand 
its problems or the processes needed to resolve them. ' However, Sir Peter 
Gershon, in that same interview (above), aligned himself with Deming: 
'I've always taken the view that really, to have sustained improvement in public sector 
efficiency you need something like a 10-year programme. ' 
Kane's (1986: 32) point that 'success is long-term' hints at those same 
tensions inherent within the problem - those of timescale - when most senior 
management careers are rarely 'long-term' in many organizations, although in 
the UK public sector this might not be the case. Albitz (2006) hinted at this 
urgency issue with, 'as you know, we Americans need something new each 
month, ' what Gaster and Squires perhaps refer to as 'management fashions' 
that 'come and go, ' yet this need for managers to 'espouse' these new 
'fashions' in the interests of 'efficiency and economy' can be in conflict with 
'other values, such as sensitivity, flexibility and responsiveness' (ibid: 49). 
And they emphasise: 
'Managers and professionals are extremely important - vital - to the successful 
introduction of policies to improve service quality. If they are not on board, acting as 
change leaders and change agents, it is likely that the policies will make no progress 
and have no impact. ' 
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These'change leaders and change agents are what Becker et al. (2006) 
called the 'process manager', and Hammer and Champy (1993: 102) called 
their 'reengineering czar'. 
When Davis questioned Gershon on the issue of his name having now 
become a 'verb' in the English language (at least within the public sector), he 
modestly responded that it was a, 'rational management exercise/thing, ' yet 
that same 'rational management', normally a key 'driving force' for change 
(Lewin, 1951), might not be sufficient to bring about the necessary and 
parallel 'cultural change. ' 
Pollift (2003: 70/71) provides a health warning against JUG's potential for 
throwing 'the baby out with the bath water, ' as he says there are benefits 
'associated with the more traditional approaches to organizing by 
organizational 'silo": 
'Membership of, and loyalty to, a single organization and its activities has often provided 
a powerful focus for adhesion among public servants at all levels. Strong personal 
identification with more abstract cross-cutting objectives, or with a temporary multi- 
organizational team, may be more difficult to cultivate. ' 
Pollitt himself might be a victim of his own resistance to cultural change 
because, 'difficult' or not, it is the 'adhesion' to those 'silos' that could be the 
first to go if the public sector is to successfully move towards organisations 
based on processes and systems. Perhaps more importantly, though, in a 
reengineered systems-based organisation, it might not even need the 'bath'. 
More recently Seddon (2008b) has focused on public sector reform and 
specifically on a 'systems thinking' approach, having moved away from 'lean* 
thinking' because of its - in his view - primary relevance to manufacturing 
(e. g. Toyota's TPS). 
(* Arnheiter and Maleyeff (2005) explain that'Lean production was derived from the need to 
increase product flow velocity through the elimination of all non-value-added activities. ') 
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It is also worth noting that, as a concept, 'Lean' does not receive universal 
acclaim. In his article 'The Darker Side of Lean', Mehri (2006: 24) challenges 
the Womack, Jones and Roos (1990: 225) view that: 
'Lean production is a superior way for humans to make things. It provides better 
products in wider variety at lower cost. Equally important, it provides more challenging 
and fulfilling work for employees at every level, from the factory to headquarters. ' 
He states that the 'Japanese work system had an entirely different effect than 
the idyllic life portrayed in The Machine that Changed the World, ' that Parker 
and Slaughter (1988) defined lean work as "management by stress, " and that 
'more recent scholars claim that "lean work" is a regression to the old 
practices of Taylorism' (Mehri, ibid). 
Mehri's work is not easy to dismiss, as his earlier book (2005), he states, was 
based on his 'years as a covert participant observer, ' and he claims that there 
is a different 'theory of work' at Toyota, one that 'holds that a "culture of rules" 
determines what goes on in the Japanese workplace, ' and he criticises 
Womack et al's book (and others like it) for just looking 'at the numbers 
without any regard to the human costs of lean work implementation, ' stating 
that there was 'not a single quote from the people who work within the system: 
the employees who dedicate their lives to hard work on the line and in the 
office. ' He concludes later that the TPS is 'certainly lean, but it is also 
unhealthy and dangerous. ' 
Fishman (2007), however, in his article about Toyota's Georgetown 
(Kentucky) factory, appears to counter this indictment with observations such 
as, 'Continuous improvement is not some add-on to the real work, ' ... 
'It is 
what he [Howard Artrip, an assembly area manager] comes to the factory for 
every day thinking about. It isn't exhausting, it's exhilarating. ' Fishman makes 
an allusion to Seddon's 'a better way to make the work work' approach with, 'It 
[Toyota] is always looking to improve the process by which it improves all 
other processes, ' and he cites former Toyota manufacturing employee John 
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Shook; "Once you realize that it's the process itself - that you're not seeking a 
plateau - you can relax. Doing the task and doing the task better become 
one and the same thing. This is what it means to come to work" - countering 
Mehri's 'unhealthy and dangerous, ' perhaps? 
However, Seddon was initially a staunch advocate of 'Lean, ' especially in its 
emerging applicability to service organisations, particularly LGOs, and his 
approach is to think of the organisation as a 'system, ' and to start with 
Deming's 'Check' in order to understand the system's 'purpose'; Fig. 4.17: 
Fig. 4.17: Seddon's model for 'Check' 
The place to start is check: 
Check 
Do4 Plan 
Source: Seddon, 2007a 
And Nwabueze's (2002) comment on 'BPR in the NHS, ' that, 'Data should be 
captured only once at their source, ' is totally in line with Seddon's (2003: 61) 
view that front-line people should 'obtain clean information. ' He says that the 
'starting place with the systems approach is to look outside-in, to know how 
your organisation is perceived by your customers, ' and to ask what are the 
'types and frequency of demands that customers place on the system? ' This, 
he continues, leads on to 'Purpose, ' the reason why the 'system' (or process) 
exists at all - the customer's 'purpose. ' As Hammer and Stanton (1995) said, 
'Those who think the purpose of their work is to please the boss, or to perform 
the same task over and over again, have little in common with those whose 
first concern is creating value for the customer and taking responsibility for the 
performance of an entire process. ' 
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Champy (1996: 121 & 123) says that we must 'not just ask the usual 
questions about how we can do this operation better, but whether we should 
be doing it at all' because occasionally there is the need to 'rethink our 
purpose. ' 
Seddon's (2003) second book was called 'Freedom from Command & 
Control', and Champy (1996: 10) echoes this with, 'the whole tool kit of 
command-and-control management techniques no longer work, ' and Attaran 
(2000) also says that the 'old ways of managing the organization, the vertical 
organization, and command-and-control techniques no longer work. ' The 
waste that could be incurred if this cultural managerial shift is not made and 
maintained is exemplified by Paper et al's (2001) experience with Honeywell, 
where they observed that an 'unlimited training budget would still be wasted if 
trainees return to a work environment of "command and control". ' 
Whilst Champy (ibid) said that'change will go deeper than technique, ' and 
Hammer (2004) also wrote of 'Deep Change, ' (White, 2000) stated that 
'complex problems require complex solutions - often stated as Ashby's (1965) 
law of requisite variety that only variety can deal with variety' -'all the 
stakeholders and institutions, i. e. the "whole system" affected by uncertainty, 
need to be involved in the change process. ' This again links to Seddon (2002: 
22) with, 'it is the whole system that needs to change if real advances in 
service and quality are to be made, ' and (2003: 19) - on the subject of 'variety' 
(or variation in demand) -'Ohno's solution to the variety problem was to put 
variety in the line. ' The 'deep' theme (or'Big'; Fineman, cited in Harvey, 1996: 
42), along with 'Lean' thinking, is continued with Belmiro, et al. (2000: 1187) 
in, 'However, a big change occurred within the company [company D] when 
they began to make-to-order instead of making-to stock' with links to'Lean' 
(Krafcik, 1988, Womack, et al., 1991). As Champy (1996: 9) emphasised, 'we 
must create change - big change - and fast. ' 
Paper et al. (2001) provide further evidence of a shift to'lean, ' this time within 
Honeywell, with, '(The) flow scheme was designed to facilitate a "pull" system 
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that is triggered by customer orders, ' in line with Toyota's TPS, and they say 
that it is 'important for employees to understand that optimization of the whole 
system is the goal, not individual departments or subsystems. ' 
In addition to ('freedom from') command and control (C&C), White (2000) 
considers also issues of structure and leadership with: 
'The authority wanted to control change in a top-down fashion through fear of losing 
control to the public. A top-down approach to change is usually effective when 
operating in a stable environment. But in a turbulent environment the change is so 
widespread that it routes round any autonomy. Only bottom-up change was seen to be 
effective for the authority in the case study. By managing bottom-up, there is an 
acknowledgement of the variety that exists in the system. ' 
And this is not new, as Emery and Trist (1965: 28/29) pointed out, 'turbulent 
fields demand some overall form of organization that is essentially different 
from the hierarchical structured forms to which we are accustomed. ' Champy 
(1996: 113) again: 'It's crucial that we move much of management's 
command-and-control function to the front lines when we redesign and 
reassemble tasks. ' 
On the issue of 'fundamental rethinking, ' Belmiro et al. (2000: 1197) say that, 
'Many have asked what exactly Hammer and his followers meant by, for 
example, the expression 'starting from scratch. " And Seddon (2007a) 
recommends that we ask customers - and continue to re-ask, through 'Check' 
- what a successful outcome of their visit or transaction would 
'look like, ' and 
continuously refine or redesign processes (through 'Plan' and 'Do'*) to suit 
that consensus. The first time you do this is likely to result in BPR-like 
transformation of 'method' (ibid), but thereafter it's kaizen, or somewhere in 
between. 
(* NB These derive from Deming's 'Plan - Do - Check - Act' cycle, itself 
derived from Shewhart's (1939: 45) 'cycle', articulated in Deming's (1986: 88) 
, out of the Crisis' as 'Plan - Carry out - Observe - Study', Fig. 5. Although 
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popularised as the 'Deming Cycle', Deming always referred to it as the 
'Shewhart Cycle'. ) 
Other similarities show Belmiro, et al. (ibid) claiming that the 're-engineering 
flag is all about revolutionising the way the work is done, beginning with 
migration from a functional to a business process structure' - what Seddon 
(2003) refers to as 'the way the work works. ' 
Zucchi and Edwards (2000: 214) say that: 
'... managers in the re-engineered organisation believe that their role has changed. In 
particular, they feel they now have to focus more on process performance-related 
measurements and meeting assigned targets, and that they now tend to be more 
accountable, visible and responsible. The managers believe they have to delegate 
more, and are most likely to perceive their role as that of a facilitator, rather than, for 
example, "command and control" one. ' 
Whilst this is clearly in line with Seddon's view in terms of roles and the 
'Command & Control' issue, there could also be an implication that, prior to 
being 're-engineered, ' these managers might have been unaccountable, not 
particularly 'visible, ' and not 'responsible' for any'targets', none of which are 
exclusively reengineering issues. 
Seddon is also vocal on the currently controversial issue (at least in the public 
sector) of target-setting - which he generally opposes - and individual 
'measures. ' For example, he states (2003: 61/62) that instead of 'measures 
being used to command and control, the purpose of measures is to develop 
knowledge through action on the system' (or process), and that the 'test of a 
good measure [is]: does this help in understanding and improving 
performance? ' He - as was Deming (1986)* - against measures targeting 
'people', and goes on: 'Measures derived from the command and control 
philosophy do not pass this test. Systems measures do. ' Whereas, in 
apparent opposition, Johnston et al's (2001) article, 'Target setting for 
evolutionary and revolutionary process change, ' says quite clearly that, 
'radical change strategies emphasise individual performance so the 
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performance measurement system "should measure the location of specific 
results and individual employee performance", ' (citing Hall, et al., 1993: 129). 
However, they also conclude that, 'the benefits of adopting a particular 
change strategy are being constrained. Many managers adopting radical 
change strategies are adopting targets based on past performance and this 
may make it more difficult for them to achieve the desired revolutionary step- 
change in performance, ' suggesting alignment with Seddon's view that targets 
are more constraining than 'liberating'. 
(* See also: http: //maaw. info/DeminqsRedbeads. htm, and Neave, 1990: pp. 101-108, 'The 
Experiment on Red Beads', and Deming (1986/1991, pp. 346 & 459. ) 
So whilst Seddon is by no means an advocate nor (by his own assertion) a 
practitioner of BPR, as can also be seen elsewhere, his basic philosophies 
and approach - save his emphasis on the process of 'Check' and the 'variety' 
in demand - are basically in line with quintessential BPR principles with his 
focus on: customers' desired outcomes; understanding what comes in to a 
'system' (process) at the front end, in the form of Type' and 'Frequency' (T & 
F) of 'Demand'; and in working primarily on the 'system' (process) itself, and 
not on the people within it. 
(NB Further discussion of 'John Seddon & BPR' is continued in Appendix 6) 
4.8 Public Sector Summary and Overall Research Focus 
The dearth of, and therefore need for, further research into BPR's application 
within the UK public sector, and specifically local government organisations 
(LGOs), is only reinforced by the above; for example Zeppou and Sotirakou 
(2004) and Hughes et al. (2006: 86), respectively: 
'The amount of research devoted to strategic management, TQM, BPR, etc. in the 
public sector, continues to lag significantly behind comparable studies of the private 
sector. ' 
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'... an important area for further research is to investigate the unique nature of 
processes within the public sector. ' 
Also, in line with the remaining (and increasing; Davis, 2008) need for LGOs 
to deliver on the Gershon (2004) requirements are the observations of others 
on the need for continuing public sector reform, e. g: 
0 the'shift away from the traditional bureaucratic management of public service' 
(Zeppou and Sotirakou, 2004). 
" '... new kinds of public institutions are emerging. They are lean, decentralized, and 
innovative' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993: 2). 
0 're-orientation of public administrations to end-users conceived as customers' 
(Ongaro, 2004). 
Ongaro (2004) also strengthens the need for this specific research when he 
poses the questions: 
1. Is process management always possible? 
2. What are the enabling factors for process management in the public sector? 
However, McAdam and Corrigan (2001) offer one health warning on the risks 
associated with attempting such radical change in organisations used to 
operating in hierarchical and functional 'silos': 
'Professional autonomy and established hierarchies may be at stake. Consequently, 
considerable political expediency can take place. Furthermore the empowerment of 
staff to bring about such changes is important; ' 
... whilst 
Gulledge and Sommer (2002) pose another: 
(... process management does not work very well when overlaid on a hierarchical 
command and control management structure. ' 
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All this reinforces the need for attitudinal and behavioural changes within the 
senior echelons of the public sector, but begging the question again whether 
those 'senior echelons' are 'ready' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995) for such 
'radical' (Kettinger, et al., 1997) change? 
The 'appeal' of BPR clearly remains (Macintosh, 2003), but whether this 
'appeal' is likely to be sufficient is doubtful. A much greater degree of pre- 
reengineering understanding by and within senior management is also 
required, along with a tangible organisational 'readiness', combined also with 
determination and real commitment from those same 'senior echelons' of the 
hierarchy, and a willingness to effect its 'reorientation'. 
This clear need to propagate process-based thinking and organisations, 
requiring a definite shift from 'command and control' structures, is again 
reinforced by a range of writers from Argyris (1962), via Champy (1996), 
through to Attaran (2000), Zucchi and Edwards (2000), Paper et al. (2001), 
Gulledge and Sommer (2002), and more recently Seddon (2003,2007,2008). 
At the beginning of this review one of the stated aims was to lead the 
researcher towards any gaps in current knowledge in order to clarify the 
ultimate focus of this research. However, as Field Marshal Helmuth von 
Moltke (1800-1891) said, 'No battle plan ever survives contact with the 
enemy, ' and this 'plan' was no exception. Whilst McAdam and Corrigan's 
(2001) comment on the 'paucity of in-depth case study research to determine 
key success factors for re-engineering in this sector, ' was aimed primarily at 
public health care, the evidence from this review is that the same can be said 
regarding research into BPR within local government organisations in the UK. 
By the very nature of the process of reading and 'researching' in parallel, 
some themes emerged along the route. Rather than change the raison d'etre 
for the study, it has reinforced it and sharpened the focus, providing a means 
by which to boost the robustness (and focus the contribution) of the research. 
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The first of these was the discovery of Hammer and Stanton's (1995) 'Self- 
Assessment Diagnostic, ' and this, allied with their concept of 'Readiness, ' was 
at a time prior to the commencement of the main period of field research, and 
so was used to enable some structure to be added to those key interviews. 
The second was Kettinger et al's (1997) 'Project Radicalness Planning 
Worksheet, ' which complemented the previous item in the second round of 
interviews, whilst seeking evidence of project outcomes. This was also able 
to give a stronger foundation to the emerging - from the literature - concept of 
'Degrees of BPR', e. g. Zairi and Sinclair (1995), Bragato and Jacobs (2003), 
Macintosh (2003), Shin and Jemella (2003), and Yung and Chan (2003). 
The aim was to not be trammelled by previous writings, but released from 
them. Issues of Change Management, Leadership, Structures, BPR per se, 
and IT, are already well covered. The foundations of BPR are there, buried 
under the edifice, but they are not what people ultimately will look at, so the 
focus has remained on those'Two Local Authorities, ' with the ultimate aim to 
make that contribution to 'knowledge and understanding of BPR 
implementation within the public sector, ' but specifically LGOs. However, if 
that contribution was to be meaningful, in terms of changing 'knowledge and 
understanding' to the extent that LGOs are better enabled to embark upon 
such BPR-type interventions - or to understand when to choose not to - the 
research had, ultimately, to be accessible to and consumed by those policy- 
makers and practitioners. 
hope that, as Jackson (1996: 587) said, I have succeeded in making that: 
'... concerted effort to reach practitioners and compellingly engage them with rhetorical 
critiques that are informed by all that is good about the academic tradition, ' 
and that we have found some way to: 
'... more reliably enable (e. g. ) a Council to gauge its chances of success, were it to 
choose to adopt the more radical approach to change that BPR offers. ' 
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The key areas that have emerged, and upon which therefore to focus in terms 
of factors critical to the successful implementation of reengineering within 
these LGOs, are: 
" the concept of 'degrees' of BPR, or'project radicalness'; 
" the state of 'organisational readiness' prior to embarking upon BPR; 
" change management, specifically in the public sector context; 
" issues around a public sector (LGO) 'culture', and; 
" senior management's leadership, commitment and communication. 
These themes represent the primary gaps in that local authority context upon 
which to base the primary research, whilst accepting also that other themes 
might emerge - and have emerged - during that study process. 
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Part Three: Research Methodology 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction & Context 
This chapter will set out the methodology of the research. It begins by 
introducing the structure of the chapter and the approach taken. From taking 
a relatively basic concept, it uses this to understand the necessary width and 
depth of the issues involved. From the basic blocks of introduction, context, 
objectives and philosophy, the foundations are laid for the remainder of the 
chapter. It is also somewhat reflexive, as this has been the nature of arriving 
at my understanding of each stage, or layer, that is passed through. 
The starting point structurally was to consider the revised version of Saunders 
et al's (2000: 85) research 'onion' (revised in 2007: 102/132) - see below, Fig. 
5.1 - as it provided an acceptable initial structure for considerations of 
philosophies, approaches, strategies, etc., with its metaphorical 
representation of the 'layers' that 'need to be peeled away' before getting to 
those more 'central' issues of data collection, analysis and presentation. 
Fig. 5.1: Saunders et al's (2000: 85) research 'onion' 
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Holden and Lynch (2004: 397) pose the question, Why research? ', and 
Bryman and Bell (2003: 5; citing Tranfield & Starkey, 1998) comment on this, 
arguing that: 
'... much management research has lost touch with the concerns and interests of 
practitioners and that management and business researchers must relearn how to be 
responsive to them in order for their research to retain value and purpose. ' 
Bryman and Bell (ibid: Box 1.1), citing Gummesson (2000: 9) refer to this 
balance 'between theory and practice' in the context of the differing purpose of 
consultants and academic researchers: 
'Backed by bits and pieces of theory, the consultant contributes to practice, whereas 
the scholar contributes to theory supported by fragments of practice. ' 
This is an important point, reflected in this research's third objective (5.2, p. 
178). 
5.1.1 Pre-understanding 
I came to this study with a degree of 'preunderstanding' (Gummesson, 2000: 
57, cited in Bryman & Bell, 2003: 304; Coghlan, 2001: 51); an initial 
standpoint based on prior 'knowledge, insights and experience' (Gummesson, 
ibid), and so I commenced with a basic understanding of BPR (Business 
Process Reengineering). The'reengineering' I believed I understood was that 
propounded by Hammer (1990), Hammer and Champy (1993), and Hammer 
and Stanton (1995), and which has already been defined as, 'the fundamental 
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic 
improvement in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as 
cost, quality, service, and speed' (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 32), or, more 
succinctly, 'the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to bring about dramatic improvements in performance' (Hammer & 
Stanton, 1995: 3). 
176 
From this followed the structured review of relevant literature based on the 
research objectives (overleaf) and primary areas (keywords) such as: BPR; 
Reengineering; Process Reengineering/Redesign; Public Sector; Local 
Government; Change Management; and Quality and TQM; as previously 
stated. Emergent from this were the issues of 'Organisational Readiness' 
(Hammer & Stanton, 1995) , 
leadership, understanding, the possibility of 
'degrees of BPR', and critical success factors (CSF) - primarily from Al- 
Mashari & Zairi (1999) - which further directed the secondary research. 
The key'gaps' in the literature were perceived to be around the'paucity' of 
research into the use and application of such 'radical' change management 
processes as BPR (or Service Redesign, SRD) within the public sector, 
specifically LGOs within the UK, and more relevantly (then and now) against 
the backdrop of Sir Peter Gershon's 'Spending Review 2004: Efficiency 
Review - Releasing Resources for the Frontline: Independent 
Review of 
Public Sector Efficiency' (2004), the first results of which were planned to be 
delivered by LGO within the 2007-2008 fiscal year. 
Whilst much of the literature gave suggestions of generic reasons for the 
'failure' of BPR, none were specifically focused on the public sector or LGOs 
within the UK, although Al-Mashari & Zairi (1999: 106, Fig. 1) distilled a broad 
base of the key, or'critical', issues down to five headings: 
Change of Management Systems and Culture; 
" Management Competence Factors; 
Organisational Structure Factors; 
BPR Project Management Factors (and); 
IT Infrastructure Factors. 
A full breakdown of these is shown in Appendix 2. 
The key gaps therefore appeared to be gathering around the Hammer and 
Stanton (1995) question of 'organisational readiness'; the possibility of 
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whether - despite the uncompromising hardness of Hammer et al's original 
definition(s) - there were in fact 'degrees' of application of BPR in evidence, 
thus influencing the level of 'readiness' required, especially perhaps, when set 
against the background of a public sector/LGO culture; and of leadership. 
Leadership itself is a widely debated subject in its own right, but the impact of 
its presence, or absence, was no less relevant, if not more so, in this context. 
5.2 Objectives 
The primary research objectives were to: 
" To identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR 
with particular emphasis on practice in the public sector; 
" To investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change 
management practices in two selected local authorities; 
" To make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners 
regarding the adoption of BPR as a change management technique 
within the public sector; 
" To contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation 
within the public sector. 
Combined with the suggested 'gaps', these directed an approach to the 
research methodology with a primary focus on the issue of BPR (or its 
equivalent) within a possible range of change management practices, as 
situated specifically in the public sector, but, more narrowly, within local 
government organisations (LGOs). 
The potential contribution from the research was initially identified as located 
in three key areas: 
1. The richness of the body of data gathered via the two main case 
studies; 
2. Addressing the gaps in the literature as far as: 
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2.1 the variation in 'definitions' of BPR, and the possible range, or 
'degrees of, BPR currently being practised; 
2.2 providing stronger links to the critical success factors (CSF) 
for the implementation of BPR within a public sector/LGO 
environment, and specifically a possible 'measurement scale' for 
the concept of organisational 'readiness'. 
As additional clarification, and in line with the third and fourth objectives listed 
above, the research would provide further insight for other LGOs who, in the 
prevailing climate, might be considering whether or not to embark upon 
'radical'/' transformational' change programmes and - supplementing the 
potential use of Hammer & Stanton's (1995) 'Organisational Readiness' 
criteria - an understanding of the concept of 'degrees of BPR'. 
Set within that context, this chapter will describe the approach taken to 
research design, using as an initial guide the 'onion' structure mentioned 
above; 
" Philosophies 
" Approaches 
Strategies 
" Choice of method(s) 
Time horizon and Sample 
Research access 
Data collection and analysis 
Data interpretation and presentation 
The first issue for me to consider therefore was my'philosophy': 
'... the rational investigation of the truths and principles of being, knowledge, or 
conduct; 
'... the critical study of the basic principles and concepts of a particular branch of 
knowledge, esp. with a view to improving or reconstituting them' (Webster, 1989: 
1082). 
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5.3 Philosophy 
The previous 'onion' analogy also hints - via Ibsen's play, Peer Gynt - at the 
reflexivity problem, as Freud (cited by Gill, 2008) said: 
When Gynt peels the onion to try and find its central core, that which makes it an 
onion, he discovers that the layers don't hide the truth. They are the truth. ' 
And if this research is to reveal any 'truth', it will be from that whole process, 
and not any single 'layer', but, as researchers, this is underpinned by the way 
we view the world. Saunders et al. (2007: 107) suggest that: 'The challenge 
here is to enter the social world of our research subjects and understand their 
world from their point of view, ' what Patton (2002: 11) describes as 
'observations and interviews out in the real world. ' 
5.3.1 Epistemology 
This issue of 'truth', or what is true, equates to what it is that 'constitutes 
acceptable knowledge in a field of study' (Saunders, et al., 2007: 102), or in a 
'discipline' (Bryman & Bell, 2003: 13) - the question of epistemology. Earlier 
versions of this concept (e. g. Saunders, et al., 2000: 85) showed this outer 
'Research Philosophy' layer as ranging between the two extremes of 
Positivism and Phenomenology, with no suggested gradations in between. 
The later version, shown above, having replaced 'Phenomenology' with 
'Radical Structuralist', has now filled this void with a range of alternative 
'positions' between those two extremes of the spectrum. Holden and Lynch 
(2004: 398) consider these two extremes (or'polar opposites') as objectivist 
and subjectivist, and accept that these have been 'labelled variously in the 
literature' (ibid: 399), e. g: 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) - positivism and phenomenology; 
Hughes and Sharrock (1997) - positivism and interpretive alternative. 
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They show these 'labels' arranged under each of the'polar opposites' as 
follows: 
Fig. 5.2: Alternative Philosophical Paradigm Names 
Objectivist Subjectivist 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Positivist Phenomenological 
Scientific Humanistic 
Experimentalist Interpretivist 
Traditionalist 
Functionalist 
Source: Holden & Lynch, 2004, Fig. 1, p. 399 
Easterby-Smith, et al. (1994: 27) referred to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 
'polarities' on this positivist-non-positivist divide whilst creating a 'useful 
classification of the key features of positivist and phenomenological 
paradigms' (Remenyi, et al., 1998: 103), as shown in table 5.1, below: 
Table 5.1: Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Basic beliefs: world is external and objective world is socially constructed and 
subjective 
observer is independent observer is part of what is observed 
science is value-free science is driven by human interest 
Researchers should: focus on facts focus on meanings 
look for causality and try to understand what is 
fundamental laws happening 
reduce phenomena to simplest look at totality of each situation 
elements 
formulate and test hypotheses develop ideas through induction 
from evidence 
Preferred methods: operationalise concepts so they small samples investigated in depth 
can be measured or over time 
take large samples 
use multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena 
Source: Remenyi, et al., 1998: 104, Table 6.1 
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Patton (ibid: 95) avoided 'labels such as logical positivism, postpositivism, 
logical empiricism, realism, transcendental realism, and objectivism [as] 
jargon-ish, ' and because they, 'have disputed definitions, and carry negative 
connotations for many, so they come with lots of baggage, ' and used the term 
'reality-oriented qualitative inquiry' to describe this perspective. In the context 
of this 'real world research' Robson (2002: 40) contends that whatever forms 
the focus of that research cannot be 'hermetically sealed from external 
influences, ' and, in beginning to discuss pragmatism, says that it is time to 
'stop the talking and get on with one's own thing [and] use whatever 
philosophical or methodological approach works best for a particular research 
problem at issue' (p. 43). Bryman and Bell (2003: 14), though, define 
'positivism' as: 
'an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality and beyond. ' 
The 'and beyond' point is important, because they suggest five 'principles' 
also entailed within positivism, two of which are: 
3. Knowledge is arrived at through the gathering of facts that provide the basis for laws, 
and; 
4. Science must (and presumably can) be conducted in a way that is value free (that is, 
objective). 
'Facts' might be what we search for, but they are likely to be subject to the 
'world view' of the participants in the process, and whilst being as objective as 
possible might be a clear aim, no-one is ever'value free': 
'Crucial to the interpretivist epistemology is that the researcher has to adopt an 
empathetic stance. The challenge here is to enter the social world of our research 
subjects and understand their world from their point of view' (ibid: 107). 
Bryman and Bell clarify this confusion by stating that Interpretivism is a 
'contrasting epistemology to positivism' (p. 5), and, citing Taylor and Bogdan 
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(1975: 13/14), that the 'phenomenologist attempts to 'see things from that 
person's point of view' (p. 17). They point out that'since the 1960s there has 
been a drift away from viewing [i. e. scientific practice] in positivist terms' (p. 
14). If this research is to investigate and critically evaluate the empirical 
research evidence on the adoption of BPR within these two local authorities, 
then a interpretive, 'empathetic stance' is likely to be the most appropriate. 
5.3.2 Ontology 
Saunders, et al. (ibid: 108) state that ontology is 'concerned with the nature of 
reality, ' whereas for Bryman and Bell (ibid: 19), it is 'concerned with the nature 
of social entities' and whether or not these have: 
'... a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and should be considered 
social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors. ' 
Commenting on these 'constructions', Patton (2002: 97) highlights the 
possible confusion (mentioned above) between (e. g. ) interpretivism and 
interpretivist, with his view on the distinction (citing Crotty, 1998) between 
'Constructivism' and 'Construction ism': 
'It remains to be seen whether this distinction will gain widespread use since the two 
terms are so difficult to distinguish and easy to confuse. ' 
Whether reality is 'external' or internal (socially constructed) provokes strong 
debate and Patton (ibid: 101) says that external-reality-oriented researchers 
are'skeptical of the subjective knowledge of constructivism. ' He gives some 
'sense of [this] gulf by quoting Levitt (1998: 34) from an article entitled, Why 
Professors Believe Weird Things': 
'Scientific evidence - which is to say the only meaningful evidence - cannot be 
neutralized by'subjective knowledge, ' which is to say bullshit. ' 
And Patton goes on to cite Levitt (ibid: 35) as commenting on constructivism 
in terms of a 'particular manifestation of postmodernism': 
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'... a particular technique for getting drunk on one's own words. ' 
This is highly redolent of Disraeli's (1804-1881) famous quote (on William 
Gladstone) that he was, 'Inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity'; 
though Patton, however, also cites Schwandt (1997: 134) as providing a 'more 
conciliatory tone' when guarding against taking the 'rhetoric of constructivism' 
too literally: 
'... many qualitative inquirers have a common sense realist ontology, that is, they take 
seriously the existence of things, events, structures, people, meanings, and so forth in 
the environment as independent in some way from their experience with them. And 
they regard society, institutions, feelings, intelligence, poverty, disability, and so on as 
being just as "real" as the toes on their feet and the sun in the sky. ' 
The phrase 'common sense realist' implies - as the derivation supports, that 
'sense' which is 'common' to all - and one might give an item of fruit, an 
apple, or an orange, as an example. All would agree that the (e. g. ) apple is 
round in shape, that it is 75mm in diameter, and that is weighs 50gms; a 
'reality-oriented' positivist or objectivist, 'common to all' perspective, perhaps. 
Differences, sensory ones, occur however, once the apple is eaten. One 
person's 'sharp' flavour will be just as real as another's 'sweet'. We will 
perceive its smell differently, and could easily be divided over views as to its 
colour, or texture; the 'subjective knowledge of constructivism', perhaps? 
In clarifying constructionism, Bryman and Bell (ibid: 20) state that: 
'In recent years, the term has come to include the notion that researchers' own 
accounts of the social world are constructions. In other words, the researcher always 
presents a specific version of social reality, rather than one that can be regarded as 
definitive. ' 
That specific version', and this 'researcher's own accounts', would be gained 
only after one had entered, however temporarily, the 'social world of [these 
specific] research subjects, ' to 'discover' and reveal their'truth'. 
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In summary, the epistemological and ontological implications for this specific 
research - i. e. one that would apply here but not be generalisable to a 
different 'social reality'- would best be positioned as subjectivist and social 
constructionist. 
Saunders et al. (2007: 110) reinforce this emphasis on the research itself with 
their definition of 'Pragmatism', which argues that: 
'... the most important determinant of the research philosophy adopted is the research 
question - one approach may be 'better' than the other for answering particular 
questions. ' 
Patton (ibid: 69) offers: 
'a pragmatic strategy of matching concrete methods to specific questions, including the 
option of tactically mixing methods as needed and appropriate. ' 
And later, he defines this 'pragmatism' as: 
'judging the quality of a study by its intended purposes, available resources, procedures 
followed, and results obtained, all within a particular context and for a specific 
audience. ' 
Fearn (2005: 154), reflecting on a conversation with American pragmatist 
Richard Rorty, articulated it thus: 
'I wondered what the difference was between saying that the hard concrete floor 
beneath my window is real and saying that I will always hurt myself if I jump out. If you 
can get law-likeness then why do we not thereby have Reality? Rorty said: 
The only difference is that if you put it the first way then some philosopher will say 'Let 
us think about the nature of reality', whereas if you put it the second way then maybe 
you can avoid that. I don't want to encourage them. There are lots of choices you can 
make that will result in disasters, and if you want to call that the impact of reality, then 
fine. ' 
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Patton sums up this 'great paradigm debate' rather humorously, perhaps even 
pragmatically... 
1'Oun`, lad%, the court doesn't need to hear an} 
more about difficulties aith validity d reliability in 
qualitati'. e research methods. discrepancies between 
different postmodern epistemologies. or this "Great 
Paradie. rn I)eh: rte' Please just tell us what you saw. 
"II- 
rtý, 
Li M 
Source: Patton. MQ. (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3`d edition, 
London, Sage, p. 103 
In conclusion therefore this study aligns with an interpretive philosophy. 
5.4 Approaches 
Returning to Holden and Lynch's (2004) subjectivist and objectivist 
perspectives, they show a useful table to depict the 'major research 
implications arising from each perspective' in terms of research approaches, 
entitled, 'Choosing the Appropriate Methodology' (p. 403, Fig. 5): 
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Table 5.2: Choosing the Appropriate Methodology 
Positivist Perspective Subjectivist Perspective 
Independence The observer is independent of what The observer interacts with Interaction 
is being observed. subject being observed. 
Value-freedom The choice of what to study, and Inherent biasness in the Value-laden 
how to study it, can be determined choice of what to study, and 
by objective criteria rather than by how to study it as 
human beliefs and interests. researchers are driven by 
their own interests, beliefs, 
skills, and values. 
Causality The aim of social science should be The aim of social science is No Cause and Effect 
to identify causal explanations and to try to understand what is 
fundamental laws that explain happening. 
regularities in human social 
behaviour. 
Hypothetico- Science proceeds through a process Develop ideas through No Hypothetico- 
deductive of hypothesising fundamental laws induction from evidence; deductive reasoning 
and then deducing what kinds of mutual simultaneous 
observations will demonstrate the shaping of factors. 
truth or falsity of these hypotheses. 
Operationalisation Concepts need to be Qualitative methods - small Operationalisation 
operationalised in a way which samples investigated in 
enables facts to be measured depth or over time; emerging 
quantitatively; static design - design - categories 
categories isolated before study. identified during research 
process. 
Reductionism Problems as a whole are better Problems as a whole are No reductionism 
understood if they are reduced into better understood if the 
the simplest possible elements. totality of the situation is 
looked at. 
Generalisation In order to be able to generalise Everything is contextual; Generalisation 
about regularities in human and patterns identified -theories 
social behaviour it is necessary to then developed for 
select samples of sufficient size; aim understanding. 
of generalisations is to lead to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding. 
Research Formal, based on set definitions; Informal, evolving decisions; Research Language 
Language impersonal voice; use of accepted personal voice; use of 
quantitative words. accepted qualitative words. 
Source: Holden & Lynch, 2004, p. 403, Fig. 5, 'Key Research Implications of the Subjective 
and Objective Perspectives' 
This will be utilized later to summarise this research's approaches. 
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Whilst not explicitly shown, the border-line between Saunders et al's two outer 
layers could easily have been the spectrum from Quantitative (Positivist) to 
Qualitative (Phenomenological; Radical structuralist; Subjectivist) approaches 
to research, leading to the 'Deductive' or'Inductive' discussion. As Saunders 
et al. (2007: 117) say, the deductive approach is one'in which you develop a 
theory and hypothesis (or hypotheses) and design a research strategy to test 
the hypothesis', and then, to 'test this hypothesis you utilize another 
characteristic, the collection of quantitative data' - implying a positivist stance. 
If this research had been at the positivist end of that spectrum, it would 
'probably [have adopted] the philosophical stance of the natural scientist' 
(Saunders, et al., 2000: 85), having assumed that I was 'independent of and 
neither [affecting nor] affected by the subject of the research' (Remenyi, et al., 
1998: 33). However, this research was not designed to deliver 'quantifiable 
observations that [would] lend themselves to statistical analysis' (Saunders, 
ibid). 
Rather, I decided to 'deliberately enter the world' Moustakas (1995: 82) of 
these organisations to observe and perceive what Saunders et al. (2000: 86) 
describe as the'rich insights [in] this complex world, ' enabling the discovery of 
what Remenyi, et al. (1998: 35) called the 'details of the situation to 
understand the reality or perhaps a reality working behind them. ' In the world 
of organizational behaviour, the 'reality working behind (them)' might best be 
described as the organizational 'culture', which according to Schein (2004: 25- 
37) operates on 'several different levels' (see Fig. 5.3, overleaf), with the third 
(and lowest) level being those 'deeply embedded, unconscious, basic 
assumptions that [are] the essence of culture' (ibid: 25). It is in discovering 
these 'underlying assumptions of which group members are often unaware, ' 
Saunders et al. (ibid: 86) argue, that what they labeled phenomenologist, 
operating at the opposite end of the spectrum, '(offers) the opportunity of 
discovering this vital third level: 'the reality working behind the reality'; ' their 
underlying sense-experience. 
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Fig. 5.3: Schein's (2004)'Ievels of Culture' 
Levels of Culture 
Visible organisational 
Artifacts structures and processes 
(hard to decipher) 
Espoused Beliefs Strategies, goals, 
and Values philosophies (espoused justifications) 
Unconscious, taken-for-granted 
Underlying beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, 
Assumptions and feelings.. 
(ultimate source of values and 
action) 
© E. H. Schein (2004) Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, p. 26, Fig. 2.1 
If the approach was to be inductive (theory-building) rather than deductive 
(theory-testing), the research would be based initially on the observations and 
perceptions of those participants within the co-operating LGOs. It would be 
more 'qualitative', and would try and 'find meaning in if (Patton, 2002: 2; citing 
Halcolm's Laws of Inquiry). 
In the same way that, '(according to the empiricists) we could only know that 
which was within our experience' (Fearn, 2005: xiii), the decision was to start 
with the 'experiences' of others, or their'concrete experiences' as depicted in 
Kolb, et al. 's (1995; cited also in Remenyi, et al., 1998: 100/101, Fig. 6.1) 
'Learning Cycle', overleaf (Fig. 5.4). 
(Note: The numbers (1-4) in the model do not indicate the prescribed order of use. They are 
simply to be used as a key, to link the specific stages in the model to references within the 
text, below. For example, whilst the RHS/Inductive and LHS/Deductive links are made in the 
following discussion, there is no suggestion, in qualitative research, that Box'1' is always the 
starting point. Box '3' - 'theory'- could equally be the starting point, if an initially deductive 
approach was to be used. It is accepted fully that induction can inform deduction, and, 
equally, that deduction can inform induction, in a qualitative research process. ) 
Underlying beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, 
Assumptions and feelings.. 
(ultimate source of values and 
action) 
© E. H. Schein (2004) Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, p. 26, Fig. 2.1 
189 
Fig. 5.4: Kolb's Learning Cycle 
Concrete experience stage: 
perception 
woof 
the 
rld objective world 
Active experimentation stag 
Check out theories and hunches 
(4) by testing in new situations 
Abstract conceptualisation stage: 
step back from reality and 
draw conclusions and 
(3) generalisations 
Source: Mullins, L. J., (2002) Management and Organisational Behaviour, 6th edition, London, 
FT/Prentice Hall, p. 369, Fig. 10.4 
Stage 1 of the diagram above raises yet again the issue of 'objectivity', when it 
uses the phrase 'perception of the objective world. ' Patton (2002: 263/264) 
alludes to this when commenting on the 'advantages of fieldwork' in that it 
provides the 'opportunity to move beyond the selective perceptions of others, ' 
and that field observers 'will also have selective perceptions. ' This harks back 
to Mullins' (2005: 435) comment that: 
We all have our own 'world', our own way of looking at and understanding our 
environment and the people within it. A situation may be the same but the 
interpretation of that situation by two individuals may be vastly different. ' 
My 'objective' view will not be the same as someone else's 'objective' view, 
but the risk to be strenuously avoided, however, was, as Dodson (2002: 69) 
says, 'when it comes to presenting their findings, it's only human that some 
end up proving their own subjective bias in the name of objective science. ' 
Marshall and Rossman (1995: 146-148) proposed '20 standards for judging 
qualitative study reports' and these were utilised to help avoid this risk. 
The right-hand loop of Kolb's cycle - Concrete experience (1 - Fig. 5.4, 
above), through Observation & reflection (2), to Abstract conceptualization (3) 
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(or'theory formulation') - effectively replicates the general principles of 
induction, 'where one moves, for example, from having observed a number of 
yellow lemons (1), to the conclusion that all lemons are yellow? (3)' (Fearn, 
2005: 115). Or, 'By observing particular swimming frogs (1) we can make an 
informed guess that all frogs can swim' (3): i. e., 'These frogs can swim - 
therefore all frogs can swim' (Robinson & Groves, 2003: 30). 
At this stage, of course, we cannot legitimately conclude that'all frogs can 
swim' until we have 'tested' - Active experimentation stage (4) -'all frogs' to 
see if they'can swim'. The 'theory' may have been 'built' (induced), but not 
yet tested through to confirmation (deduced), or certainty - Halcolm (ibid) 
again: 
When in doubt, observe and ask questions. 
When certain, observe at length and ask many more questions. 
Should we come across, observe, a 'frog' that cannot'swim', we must return 
through to 'reflection' and additional 'conceptualisation' towards a new theory, 
or theories, by observing at greater'length' and asking 'many more questions'. 
This Inductive vs Deductive distinction could also be illustrated as follows: 
. Inductive - Research then Theory; 
Deductive - Theory then Research. 
However, the deductive left-hand loop - Abstract conceptualization (3), 
through Active experimentation (4), to Concrete experience (1); the 'swim-test' 
- did not form the main part of this research, as the primary aim was 
to 
establish, through observation of and reflection (2) upon the experiences of 
others(1), whether BPR, as defined, was evident (3). But whilst that was not 
the primary aim, the plan was still to 'test' -'check out' in Kolb's terms - some 
of the findings with a focus group comprising contributors and interested 
parties from the key participating organizations (4) (a'member check', Lincoln 
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& Guba, 1985: 236), identifying any 'hard' measures supporting those findings 
from the tangible results of the participants. Other emergent issues were also 
subject to some 'deductive testing' along the way. 
From the outset this was designed to be a Qualitative Inquiry, looking for 
those'rich insights' (Saunders, ibid) - placed towards the inductive end of the 
positivist-phenomenological spectrum - informed by deductive evidence 
drawing on factors from the literature review. Whilst initially approached from 
the viewpoint of a non-participant observer, it became apparent fairly early on, 
whether through actively 'teaching' the people who might eventually become 
the subjects of the research, or'passively' 'being there- what Moustakas 
(1995: 82-83) called 'Being-In... I enter with the intention of understanding and 
accepting perceptions and not representing my own views or reactions' - that 
I would be 'participating' at least to some degree, so 'participant observer' 
(Patton, 2002: 4; Saunders, et al., 2005: 105) would be a more accurate 
approach: 
'To understand fully the complexities of many situations, direct participation in and 
observation of the phenomenon of interest may be the best research method' 
(Patton, 2002: 21). 
'Direct participation' might well be 'the best', but this research did not allow 
that and so I was not able to fully'adopt the perspective of those studied by 
sharing in their day-to-day experiences' (Denzin, 1970: 185). At best it was 
'indirect', in that, for example, I was part of a team that previously (2004-2006) 
had been contracted (in the case of CountyC) to teach Service Redesign 
(SRD) to their participants (potential or actual), which itself had blurred the 
edges between participation and observation, illustrated by Saunders, et al's 
(2000), 'Typology of participant observer researcher roles' (Fig. 5.5): 
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Fig. 5.5: Typology of participant observer researcher roles 
Researcher takes 
part in activity 
Researcher's 
identity is 
revealed 
Participant Complete 
as observer participant 
Researcher's 
identity is 
concealed 
Observer as I Complete 
participant observer 
Researcher 
observes activity 
Source: Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A., (2000) Research Methods for Business 
Students, 2 "d edition, London, FT/Prentice Hall, p. 223, Fig. 8.1 
What was not 'blurred' was my identity nor purpose, and the qualitative design 
was to be 'naturalistic' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to the extent that it took place 
in the real-world settings of those participants and, within the limits 
acknowledged above. 
In summary, driven by the objectives and subsequent gaps in the literature, 
this research approach was to be largely inductive, but with some elements of 
semi-structure using key themes from the literature review as a basic 
framework. This was perhaps a more 'inside-out' approach, in that once the 
objectives and approach had been decided, the methods, etc., became 
apparent. It is appreciated that this is not the same 'outside-in' approach as 
implied by Saunder et al's 'onion', but is consistent with Churchill and 
lacobucci's (2005) view that the first step in research design is to, 'Formulate 
the Problem': 
'Only when the problem is defined carefully and precisely can research be designed to 
provide pertinent information. Part of this process includes specifying the objectives of 
the research... ' (p. 40). 
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5.5 Research Strategy 
Research strategies are intrinsically linked to the purpose of the research and 
its objectives. The primary objective - (to) ' identify and critically evaluate 
empirical research evidence on BPR, with particular emphasis on practice in 
the public sector'- was equally intrinsically linked to the original proposal's 
purpose question of, 'Is BPR 'alive and well' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 2) 
within local government? '. 
As Saunders et al. (2007: 133) point out, the 'classification of research 
purpose most often used in the research methods' literature is the threefold 
one of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, ' but, as in this case, the 
research project may have 'more than one purpose' (ibid), and that the 
purpose of the enquiry'may also change as the study proceeds' (Robson, 
2002: 58). 
Objective two -'investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change 
management practices in two selected local authorities' - would satisfy the 
'exploratory' aspect, by finding out'what is happening; to seek new insights; to 
ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light' (ibid: 59). 
The remaining objectives; three and four: 
" to make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners 
regarding the adoption of BPR as a change management technique 
within the public sector; 
to contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation 
within the public sector; 
... would satisfy 
the descriptive and explanatory purposes of the study; a) by 
aiming to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations' (ibid) 
within, primarily, the two LGOs; and b) attempting to establish some 
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'relationships between variables' (Saunders, et al., 2007: 134), using mainly 
qualitative data. 
However, a specific implication of the term 'explanatory (causal)' (Yin, 2003a: 
5) implies causal links: a study aiming to present'data bearing on cause-effect 
relationships - explaining how events happened' (ibid), and was therefore 
used with caution, as no attempt to generalise cause-and-effect relationships 
was appropriate within this research design. Whilst clearly exploratory and 
descriptive, Yin's (2003a: 69) view is that explanatory case studies are 'the 
most difficult and the most frequently challenged. ' It was not impossible, 
however, that a 'potential causal path' - whereby the case study might make 
an 'inroad into the attribution problem' - might emerge, and thereby'suggest 
important clues to possible cause-and-effect relationships, ' but these could 
not be claimed to have 'the certainty of true experiments. ' As Yin (ibid) 
emphasises, 'doing an explanatory case study might be better than not 
making any inquiry at all, ' and Paper, et al. (2001), citing Yin (1994), say'case 
studies are appropriate in new and dynamic areas of research, ' and that 
although they'rate low on generalizability, they rate high on data richness. ' 
Hartley (in Cassell & Symon, 1994) accepts that in single case studies the 
'disentangling of what is unique to the organization from what is common to 
other organizations can be difficult, ' making any attempt to generalise equally 
'difficult'. However, the purpose of this study was not to prove generalisability, 
but so long as rigour is demonstrated it can be suggestive, and Hartley says 
later that: 
'The aim of writing with a clear conceptual framework rather than a narrative will also 
help to relate theory to the literature and aid generalization. Where the researcher has 
been able to undertake more than one case study, this clearly increases confidence in 
the findings, though it is unlikely that the sample size will ever be large and single case 
studies can have authority in their own right. ' 
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Her points regarding the 'clear conceptual framework', relating 'theory to 
literature' and undertaking 'more than one case study' are relevant, and will be 
evident elsewhere in this section. 
As, therefore, with the previous 'layers', some of the spectral choices could be 
quickly eliminated; e. g. with 'Experiment' (this was not primarily a deductive 
approach); 'Archival research' ('administrative records and documents', whilst 
made available to me, were not the 'principle source of data'; Sanders, et al., 
2007: 143); as the two extremes. 
'Survey', however, whilst similarly 'associated with the deductive approach' 
(ibid: 138), was initially utilised on a small scale (18 respondents) to establish 
the degree of foreknowledge (or'preunderstanding') within CountyC's 
interviewees prior to their SRD training during 2006. For reasons that 
emerged later, this was partially ill-conceived and, reflexively, provided almost 
as many questions as answers. The opportunity to carry out the same 
process with CityC's respondents was thwarted when a temporary breakdown 
in communications saw the BPR training commence prior to this being 
possible. Even so, this probably would not qualify as 'reliable' usage -'data 
are collected consistently' (ibid: 364) - as it was not utilised to gain a 'large 
amount of data from a sizeable population, ' highlighting what they call, 'the 
capacity to do it badly! ' (ibid: 138/139). 
From the opposite direction, the chance to adopt an 'ethnographic' strategy, 
whilst'rooted firmly in the inductive approach, ' was inappropriate because of 
its prohibitively 'very time-consuming' nature, and it would have required 
immersion in the'social world being researched as completely as possible' 
(ibid: 142/143), which neither the time constraints of the study (notionally 
three years) nor the access agreements established would permit. The case 
for such 'immersion' was previously expounded by Pirsig (2006: 32-34), but 
the 'extended participant observation' (Saunders, et al., 2007: 143) required 
was not practicable. Where this study would, however, have an element of 
ethnographic approach, was in its attempt to research the 'phenomenon [of 
BPR] within the context in which it occurs' (ibid) - those LGOs - and similarly, 
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the criteria of finding a 'setting or group that will enable you to answer your 
research question(s) or meet your objectives, ' and of building 'a high degree 
of trust with [my] research participants' (ibid) adequately were met by the 
access arrangements negotiated and relationships established during SRD 
training and other UoD/Council(s) partnership activities. 
The establishment of these relationships could also have facilitated a 
Grounded Theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which, according to 
Saunders, et al. (2007: 142), should best be thought of 'as 'theory building' 
through a combination of induction and deduction, ' but whilst having accepted 
that this research would be predominantly inductive (Kolb, 1984, RHS), the 
deductive component would not be sufficiently robust to lead directly to the 
'generation of predictions' which would then be'tested in further observations' 
(Kolb, 1984, LHS). Therefore this quintessentially Kolb-like cycle of constant 
'reference to the data to develop and test theory' (ibid: 142) might be more 
appropriate for any subsequent study, following on from the 'explanatory' (ibid: 
133) remit of the objectives of this research. 
Midway along the Inductive/Deductive continuum lay 'Action research', a term 
first coined by Lewin (1946), and referred to by Patton (2002: 195) as 'going 
where the action is, talking to people and observing what is happening. ' 
Whilst he does not define it, in talking about'Clarity About Purpose' he 
confirms what was stated previously that 'Purpose is the controlling force in 
research' and, in making these 'methods decisions', that the purpose of Action 
research is to'solve a specific problem' (ibid: 213). As such it'becomes part 
of the change process by engaging the people in the program or organization 
in studying their own problems in order to solve those problems' (ibid: 221, 
citing Whyte, 1989). However, whilst this study did not set out to solve 
anyone's 'specific problem', the 'benefits' that Marshall and Rossman (1995) 
referred to from 'engaging [with) the people, ' could embrace what Moustakas 
(1995: 82) says: 
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'... represents a new experience for the other and is enough to enable a flow and 
unfolding that lead to fresh awarenesses, that clarify and inspire the person to make 
new choices, to initiate new behaviours and actions. ' 
Fig. 5.6: The 'action research spiral' 
Diagnosing 
Evaluating 3 
Planning 
Diagnosing 
Taking 
Context Evaluating action 
and 
Purpose 
ý 
A"/ 
Planning 
Taking 
Evaluating 
Diagnosing action 
1 
Planning 
Taking 
action 
Figure 5.3 The action research spiral 
Saunders et al. (2007: 141) illustrate the action research process with their 
'action research spiral' (see above, Fig. 5.6), emphasising the 'iterative nature 
of the process of diagnosing, planning, taking action and evaluating, ' which is 
little different (if rotated through 900) from Kolb's 'iterative' learning cycle also 
- below (Fig. 5.7, adapted): 
Fig. 5.7: Kolb's Learning Cycle (adapted) 
Kolb's learning cycle, adapted for the 
'Action research spiral' 
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In fact, whilst there clearly are differences (both in 'purpose' and in detail), 
there are also considerable similarities between action research and the 
principles of Action Learning (Sets), as in Fig. 5.8, below: 
Fig. 5.8: The action learning process 
OP 
Start -Present your 
challenge, problem " M 
issue or your 
question. 
It 
Mark learning, draw 
conclusions, define 
learning from experience. 
Integrate naiv knowledge 
into your practice. 
Bring results back to 
set- what worketh at 
didn't? Why? 
NV 
Set members question you 
constructively to challenge 
views and understanding, 
Perceptions, assumptions. 
Others share knoWedge- 
invited by presenter of issue. 
Insight? New 
understanding, ideas 
on taIdng action? 
J Test out talöng action in the workplace. 
Source: http: //www. natpact. nhs. uk/cros/316. php 
Whereas the action learning spiral commences with a 'specific context and a 
clear purpose, ' so the action learning set seeks to work with a specific 
organisational or individual issue (context) and to work on'real problems' 
(purpose). All of the asterisked criteria in the table overleaf align closely with 
the principles of action learning (sets); i. e. to: 'work on real problems'; 'take 
action in the light of new insight [and] begin to change the situation'; and 
'focus on learning, not only about the issue being tackled but also on what is 
being learned about oneself (e. g: http: //www. natpact. nhs. uk/cros/316. php). 
Extracting from Patton's 'Typology of Research Purposes' table (2007: 224, 
Exhibit 5.3; overleaf, Table 5.3) allows this 'strategy' also to be largely 
discarded: 
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Table 5.3: Typology of Research Purposes 
Type(s) of Research Action research 
Purpose Solve problems in a program, organization, or 
community 
Focus of Research Organization and community problems 
Desired Results Immediate action: solving problems as quickly as 
possible* 
Desired Level of Here and now"` 
Generalization 
Key Assumptions People in a setting can solve problems by studying 
them selves. * 
Publication Mode Interpersonal interactions among research 
participants; informal unpublished 
Standard for Judging Feelings about the process among research 
participants, feasibility of the solution generated 
Source: Patton, M. Q., (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3ro edition, 
London, Sage, p. 224, Exhibit 5.3 
Another issue is the degree of 'collaboration' posed by the question of Who 
Conducts the Inquiry? ' (Patton, 2002: 269), and in this case my'insider 
perspective' did not come from directly 'involving the insiders as 
coresearchers', but from my own 'empathetic neutrality- that emotional 
'middle ground' between becoming too, collaboratively involved and remaining 
too distant (ibid: 49/50). 
Within the suggested strategies 'layer', therefore, 'Case study' emerged as the 
primary choice for this research, or one of the 'ways in which qualitative 
inquiry can contribute to practical knowledge and pragmatic understandings' 
(Patton, 2002: 137). 
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5.5.1 Case Studies 
'A case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. The single leaf, even a 
single toothpick, has unique complexities - but rarely will we care enough to submit it to case 
study. We study a case when it itself is of very special interest. We look for the detail of 
interaction with its context. Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a 
single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances. ' 
(Stake, 1995: xi; also cited in Patton, 2002: 297) 
With the two 'cases' in mind, whilst doubling the potential for 'complexity', both 
were equally of 'very special interest' as both, albeit independently, 'interacted' 
with their 'context(s)'. The opportunity provided was to study both 'cases' - 
Objective 1; 'investigate BPR within the range of Change Management 
practices within LGOs' - in order to come to understand their activities within 
the 'important circumstances' of their individual strategies for change, and 
against the background of contemporary needs to do so. As Paper et al. 
(2003) found, a case study allows one to 'delve deeper than the literature. ' 
Yin (2003b: 15) states that the'most important' application will be to'explain 
the presumed causal links in real-life interventions' in order to provide 'the 
explanations (that) would link program implementation with program effects' 
(ibid) - have the BPR programs delivered the 'Building on Excellence' (BonE; 
CityC's term) or'Service Redesign' change effects in both LGOs? - but a 
more 'realist' (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 4) approach was to identify 
relationships that might then be interpreted to 'provide a causal description of 
the forces at work' (ibid), or as Hartley (1994: 212) says: 
The strength of case studies lies especially in their capacity to explore social 
processes as they unfold in organizations. ' 
The time-frame was also opportune with, through 2004,2005 and 2006, both 
organisations becoming involved in BPR or Service Redesign (SRD; 
CountyC) training, to assist in enabling their change programmes to 
commence, and therefore providing valuable 'preunderstanding' 
(Gummesson, 1991) of the context and relevant organisational issues: 
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The disciplines from which the researcher comes, as well as his or her work 
experiences, will have a strong influence upon the research strategy that is favoured' 
(Remenyi, et al., 1998: 100). 
Hartley (ibid: 218) advises one to gain a 'general overview of the structure and 
functioning of the organization, ' suggesting the option of, say, 'half a dozen 
'orientation' interviews' as one means to achieve that 'overview'. In my case 
that 'overview' had been gained in the same way as that 'preunderstanding', 
above, through other involvements within both co-operating organisations. 
In CountyC's case, the individual students' projects became the individual 
'case(s)', whereas CountyC itself would be the 'unit of analysis' (Yin, 2003b: 
22-26), and the 'time boundaries' (ibid: 26), would be those delineated by the 
duration of the individuals' projects - on the assumption they achieve(d) 
completion - or as far as the point at which they can be assumed to have 
ended, with or without that 'completion. ' 
With one of BPR's fundamental tenets being 'dramatic' (improvements in 
performance; Hammer & Stanton, 1995: 3), it was reasonable also to employ 
'purposive sampling' (Saunders, et al., 2000: 174) to seek out any 'critical 
cases' where BPR (CityC) or SRD (CountyC) has had a significant impact, 
because they'make a point dramatically (or because they are important)' 
(ibid). 
These critical cases were to be provided by the training cohorts of both LGOs 
as their trainees embarked upon (or continued with) their selected change 
projects. In CountyC's case this cohort (2006) consisted of eighteen 
personnel, all of whom completed an initial 'benchmarking' questionnaire (see 
Appendix 7) to establish their levels of knowledge, understanding and 
experience, prior to the commencement of SRD training (May to July, 2006). 
CityC, however, having planned a series of training sessions for September 
2006, subsequently cancelled those (e-mail and Voicemail, Aug. 18th) through 
'lack of numbers. ' Until more information became available on how this might 
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be progressed, I had to acknowledge this, also, as additional evidence of 
BPR's viability within that organization. This issue brought reality to the initial 
point that the data for this analysis would come from within 'one or both' of the 
target organisations, but, had CityC resumed their BPR training programme, 
the same, minimally modified, initial questionnaire would have been applied 
there also. 
Given Gershon's (2004: 29) agreement for'the whole of local government (to 
deliver) a stretching but achieveable ... minimum level of annual efficiencies 
by 2007-08, ' such impact analysis - the assessment of the 'impact of 
proposed change(s) on their own organisation' (Elexon) - might identify where 
any critical cases of LGOs' implementation of BPR/SRD had delivered those 
efciencies; has the implementation of BPR/SRD enabled these already 
'Excellent' Councils* to improve even further? 
(* CityC moved from 'Good' to 'Excellent' with their 2004/05 CPA. ) 
NB From this point the terms BPR and SRD were considered inter- 
changeable, although the use of BPR will predominate. The term Service 
Redesign was favoured by the County Council for reasons of acceptability. 
This became apparent during the delivery of training when the leaders of their 
Change Management Team (CMT) informed the University of Derby (UoD) 
tutors that use of the term 'Business Process Reengineering' (BPR) was 'less 
acceptable. ' This in itself provided an illustration of the contextual, if not also 
cultural, differences obtaining between two otherwise geographically close 
LGOs. 
Whilst the purposive sample was primarily those two training cohorts, a further 
opportunity and additional 'access' was gained with a London Borough 
Council (LBC) for a supplementary one-off interview - held on Friday, 28th 
July, 2006. This approach followed LBC's presentation at the London GovNet 
Conference on 28th June, 2006, where they reported on their 'successes' with 
BPR. Whilst LBC might not themselves have claimed to be exercising 'best 
practice' within their field, on their website they did claim to have progressed 
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'From 'weak' to 'good' in 18 months - and 'getting even better, ' under the 
banner, 'Improvement Continues. ' 
In her paper'Building Theories from Case Study Research', Eisenhardt (1989: 
536) states that 'The case study is a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings, ' and that (citing 
Yin, 1984) case studies 'can involve either single or multiple cases, and 
numerous levels of analysis. ' 
In the same paper she also states that an 'initial definition of the research 
question, in at least broad terms, is important in building theory from case 
studies. ' 
Yin (2004: xiv) makes the distinction between the "case" and the "case study", 
where, 'The "case" is the real-life set of events from which data will be drawn. 
The case can be a concrete affair. ' In contrast, 'the "case study" is the 
substance of your research inquiry, consisting of your research questions, 
theoretical perspectives, empirical findings, interpretations, and conclusions' 
(ibid: xiv). 
On this basis there were two differing 'single settings'; the two 'case studies' of 
CityC and CountyC, with, in each 'setting', a difference in the 'cases' 
presented. In CountyC's case, the 'cases' were the individual 'concrete' 
projects of the 2006 SRD cohort; whereas in CityC's case, the 'case' itself 
evolved from the potential of a similar 'cohort' of BPR projects, into the more 
general issue of where the Council-wide approach to BPR was going. 
Within this study, the 'initial' proposal had been to 'test Hammer & Champy's 
(2001: 2) assertion that 'Re-engineering is, in fact, one of the success stories 
of business history, ' but in the context of its employment within UK local 
government change programmes. ' In broad terms, it was to establish if BPR 
was 'alive and well' (ibid) within local government? ', and therefore whether it 
had been the 'enormous success' (ibid: 5) that local authorities had 
proclaimed, or at least intended, BPR to be, within that context. Those broad 
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aims were then translated into the specific research objectives (repeated 
earlier) and embracing the two participating organisations - the research 
focus. 
Mintzberg (1979: 585) noted that 'No matter how small our research sample 
or what our interest, we have always tried to go into organizations with a well- 
defined focus - to collect specific kinds of data systematically. ' The'well- 
defined focus' of this research was to be found in those primary research 
objectives. 
Without a research focus, ... 'as Eisenhardt (ibid) says, 
'it is easy to become 
overwhelmed by the volume of data' (p. 536). 
However, Eisenhardt's multiple case approach was challenged by Dyer and 
Wilkins because it'neglects some of the strengths of the classic case study 
method' (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991: 613). Their criticism of Eisenhardt's use of 
'multiple cases (contexts)' was that it focused 'so much on the constructs 
developed and their measurability that we often miss the context, the rich 
background of each case, ' because, the more'contexts a researcher 
investigates, the less contextual insight he or she can communicate' (ibid: 
614). This would result, they suggested - because of the constraints of the 
'number of cases being studied' - in descriptions that would be 'rather "thin", 
focusing on surface data rather than deeper social dynamics'; what Light 
(1979) called the 'deep structure' of social behaviour. In simple terms, this 
was a breadth versus depth argument. 
In this research, however, the'number of cases' examined were primarily in 
the same two (organisationally similar) 'contexts' - CityC and CountyC - 
therefore the ensuing descriptions were less likely to be 'thin'; and the 
additional concern expressed (Dyer & Wilkins, ibid: 615) over the difficulty of 
understanding the 'political behavior' (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) - 
because of the 'several cases' (Dyer & Wilkins, ibid) from which examples 
were chosen - was equally less likely, because in this case the political 
behaviour would all, primarily, be within the same two'contexts', those same 
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'social settings'. This research's strategy is aligned with Hartley (ibid) who 
suggests case studies can be 'theoretically exciting', 'meaningful' and data- 
rich, ' and she challenges the 'simplistic' argument that they lack 'rigour and 
reliability and that they do not address the issues of generalizability' by saying 
that this 'level and type of argument is totally outmoded' (p. 208). 
5.6 Choice of Method 
Whilst there had been a small amount of quantitative data collection - e. g. the 
initial questionnaire with CountyC - the predominant 'method' in this study 
was to focus on the generation of 'non-numerical data' (Saunders, et. al., 
2007: 145), so it is legitimate to claim that, to some extent, the research 
choice had nonetheless been 'multiple methods'. However, Saunders et al. 
point out that the term 'multi-method' is 'restricted within either a quantitative 
or qualitative world view, ' so it would be more legitimate to describe this 
research choice as a 'multi-method qualitative study' (ibid). Patton (2002: 68) 
is more sanguine about this and sees no need to be a 'qualitative methods 
purist, ' advocating instead a 'large repertoire of research methods, ' which can 
include (e. g. ) 'analyses of quantitative data' and 'in-depth interviewing. ' This 
point is emphasized because two items (Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Kettinger 
et al., 1997) emerged during the research and both were used to gather 
supplementary numerical data to support the 'in-depth interviews': 
'Multiple methods and a variety of data types can contribute to methodological rigor 
(Patton, ibid). 
The choice of semi-structured interviews for Stage 2 of data capture was 
based on the knowledge of what the participants in each case had been doing 
by that time. In CountyC's case, most had completed their Learning Through 
Work (LTW) project assignments and, following assessment by a fellow tutor, 
these provided the topic lead for those particular participants. In CityC's case 
the interviewees were members of CityC's 'Pilot Group' trainees, plus the new 
Change Managers and the Head of Change Management. In both cases a 
similar 'guide' was used to list the 'questions or issues that [were] to be 
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explored in the course of the interview' (Patton, 2002: 343), see Appendices 8 
and 9. 
The style of the interviews was a mixture of 'formal' and 'informal' (Holden & 
Lynch, 2004), or 'conversational' (Patton, ibid: 342), where some of the 
questions were allowed to 'flow from the immediate context. ' In addition to the 
'guided' structure, in both cases all interviews commenced with a statement of 
the background, purpose, legitimacy and anonymity of the process, and then 
by the completion of the 'BPR definition' sentence, and then the Hammer and 
Stanton (1995) 'Organizational Readiness' self-diagnostic questionnaire. 
All interviews were digitally recorded and then transcribed verbatim. 
The possibility of repertory grids had been considered but rejected because of 
the difficulty that: 
'... it is quite complex, both for the researcher to use and for the respondent to 
complete' (Bryman & Bell, 2003: 134). 
Another aspect was its requirement for respondents to 'base their responses 
on a common set of stimuli' (ibid: 135), which was considered inappropriate 
for this study where participants were requested to talk more freely, albeit 
within the context of semi-structured interviews. 
This choice of primarily qualitative method is supported by a detailed 
appendix (see Appendix 10) using Marshall and Rossman's '20 standards for 
judging qualitative study reports' (1995: 146-148). 
5.7 Time Horizon 
The investigation of the two Councils was to be 'Cross-sectional', rather than 
'Longitudinal' (Saunders, et al., 2007: 148), but with the intention of studying 
the progress of the SRD/BPR training participants, as they pursued their own 
redesign/re-engineering projects over the succeeding 12-18 months -'(Even) 
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with time constraints it is possible to introduce a longitudinal element to your 
research' (ibid). This time-frame was chosen for three key reasons: 
a) the initial 3-year duration of the researcher's PhD funding (what Patton - 2002: 
68 - calls the 'constraints of resources and time'); 
b) the advantageous parallel timing of the two LGOs' BPR/SRD training and 
change initiatives, and; 
c) if their'management [was] serious about reengineering' (Hammer & Champy, 
2001: 118), then (it) 'usually takes a year (ibid), so the time 'constraint' should 
not, in theory, have been an impediment. 
5.8 Research Access 
The strong contacts previously built within both LGOs resulted in my being 
granted the desired research 'access' for this evaluation from the outset. The 
existing customer/supplier and partnership arrangements between UoD and 
the two sponsoring LGOs inevitably resulted in numerous kaizenesque (Imai, 
1997) discussions on all sides, as we continually strove to improve their 
respective HE programmes, but this position was not abused by overtly 
attempting to manipulate the'phenomenon of interest' (Patton, 2002: 21), e. g. 
their change programmes. It had to be acknowledged, however, that any 
such conversations or discussions would unavoidably have potential to 
influence the 'phenomenon of interest' (ibid), and that in fact the very nature of 
some of those conversations and discussions might have been attempting to 
create such influence. 
5.9 Data Collection 
The data for this analysis has '(typically) come from fieldwork' (Patton, 2002: 
4) within, primarily, both of the target organisations - from 'observations and 
interviews out in the real world(s)' (ibid: 11) of those LGOs: 
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'... open-ended responses permit one to understand the world as seen by the 
respondents' (ibid: 21). 
At the outset it had been considered that this would be a Qualitative Inquiry 
from the viewpoint of a 'non-participant observer (ibid: 4); what Moustakas 
(1995: 82-83) calls 'Being-In'... 'I enter with the intention of understanding and 
accepting perceptions and not representing my own views or reactions': 
'Evaluative research, quite broadly, can include any effort to judge or enhance human 
effectiveness through systematic data-based inquiry' (Patton, 2002: 10). 
However, this was of necessity reviewed because, whilst there might have 
been no intention to manipulate the 'phenomena of interest' (ibid: 21), nor to 
represent 'my own views or reactions, ' it was unreasonable to maintain that 
this would be the case when: 
a) the CityC Change Management Team (CMT) had sought my'feedback' after at 
least one of their initial 'Highways' workshops; 
b) I had been engaged in teaching on the CityC's Management Development 
Programme, one declared aim of which was to'promote organisational change' 
within CityC (Dexter, et al., 2006), and; 
c) I was also involved with CountyC in the actual training of some of their own 
personnel in Service Redesign (SRD -'reengineering') techniques. 
So, whilst not qualifying as an actual 'participant', at the very least I might 
have influenced the thinking and/or actions of some of these LGOs' 
personnel: 
'To observe is to interact, so the "scientific" detachment of structuralists or any other 
rationalist position is untenable' (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995: 79). 
Given therefore that I had continued as part of the teaching team for the 
CityC's bespoke management and leadership development programme, and 
had contributed to CountyC's Service Redesign training programme, it was 
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impossible to continue to support a fully 'non-participant observer' standpoint. 
By any account I was 'participating', even if indirectly, as 'the very act of 
observation influences what is seen' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 39). I was, at the 
very least, 'being with' (Moustakas, ibid). 
The so-called fly on the wall 'position' was therefore equally 'untenable', as the 
fly becomes a distraction, an irritant, even, because people do know that it is 
there. I needed to be 'in', amongst those researched, at least to the extent 
that any distraction was minimised and the fly, when off the wall (and 
disguised as a'human') became therefore less visible. 
The overall structure of the research was as follows: 
5.9.1 Stage 1- Discovery/Exploratory 
Linking back to the 'form' (Yin, 2003b: 7) of the research questions, the initial 
aim was to consider which of Kipling's (1902) 'Six Honest Serving Men' were 
relevant to the task. I was asking "'who, " "what, " "where, " "why, " or "how" 
questions' (Yin, ibid) regarding BPR activities. 
This was carried out through a variety of means (including access to 
documentation; interviews with Senior Managers, Council Change Managers, 
Training & Development Managers and line managers; observation of 
meetings; participation (as both tutor and observer) in training events; 
questionnaires with project leaders) to establish, in broad terms, who was 
doing what, where and why they were doing it, and, to some degree, how they 
were approaching BPR: 
CountyC: an initial questionnaire was used to gain an insight into the current 
(pre-SRD training; see Appendix 7) level of understanding of BPR and other 
change/quality mechanisms; why the participants were involved in the 
programme; and their perceptions as to why CountyC were adopting this 
method of (relatively) radical change. 
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In this case also, I was part of the teaching team on the SRD/BPR training 
programme, from May to July 2006. 
(NB Within the County Council Training and Change Management units, BPR 
was referred to as'Service Redesign' [SRD], but'BPR' has been used here 
interchangeably. ) 
In CountyC's case, the question of who was doing what, where and why they 
were doing it, and, to some degree, how they were approaching BPR, was 
answered primarily by the submission of 'Learning Through Work' (LTW) 
assignments to a colleague (leader of the Service Redesign/SRD training, 
SRT), which - after his initial, formal 'academic feedback' - were passed to 
me for follow-up through planned face-to-face interviews. These took place 
from December 2006 through to March 2007, and covered most of the SRT 
cohort (12 out of 18 participants). 
CityC: attendance at consultants' early meetings with CityC personnel (inc. 
their Highways Dep't) was agreed, to observe the design approach, both by 
the consultants and the Council, and to be'in at the start' of the process. With 
the unfortunate loss of the opportunity to be present during the training of 
CityC's 'Pilot Group', the initial data collection was via interviews with the 
(then) two new, 'temporary', change managers, and the head of CityC's 
change management team. As with CountyC, relevant documentation - 
Customer Service Review, Change Management Strategy, Workforce 
Development Plan 2007/2010 - was also made freely available. 
BoroughC: additional access was gained to a south London borough council 
(LBC), following their presentation at a GovNet event (June 28th 2006) on their 
successes with BPR - interview with Council Leader and Director of 
Customer and Corporate Services on 28th July 2006 - and a copy of that 
'presentation' was also supplied. 
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5.9.2 Stage 2- Projects 
CountyC: following the UoD-provided BPR (SRD) Training (May-July 2006) 
and the submission of their LTW (Learning Through Work) projects, in-depth 
interviews were held during Dec. '06 and Jan. /Feb. /March '07 with the bulk of 
the course participants (12) to provide further feedback on those projects, and 
to question them more deeply on their progress (or lack of) to date: 
'Qualitative researchers rely quite extensively on in-depth interviewing' (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999: 109). 
The questions/interview design focused on the CSF/CFF* emerging from the 
research to date and from the literature. These interviews were followed up 
approximately one year later to gather outcomes and results as part of the 
'Impact Analysis'. (* CFF -'Critical Failure Factors'; Al-Mashari & Zairi, 1999. ) 
CityC: following the cancellation of the second and third tranches of BPR 
training, in-depth interviews were held with senior CityC managers (Change 
Management, Training, Director/Chief Officer level) and operational managers 
who had been part of the'Pilot Group', focusing on those same areas of, their 
understanding of BPR, leadership issues, and the 'readiness' of the Council to 
embrace change at this more radical end of the TQM-BPR spectrum. As with 
CountyC, these in-depth interviews were audio-recorded, then transcribed 
verbatim, prior to review and subsequent 'Template Analysis' (Symon & 
Cassell, 1998: 118-134; King & Cassell, 2007). The 'verbatim' aspect was 
primarily for the purposes of accuracy, or fidelity -'the ability of the 
investigator later to reproduce exactly the data as they become evident to him 
or her in the field' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 240; Brown, 2007) - and later 
reference: 'clearly the greater fidelity can be obtained using audio or video 
recordings'... 'the authenticity of which cannot later be denied' (ibid: 240/241). 
More importantly perhaps, my personal approach to the interviews was a 
preference to fully engage with the interviewee, rather than have my head 
down for the bulk of the time, scribbling away making inadequate and 
212 
inaccurate notes of only a fraction of what was said. Whilst Lincoln and Guba 
(1985: 241), however, 'do not recommend recording except for unusual 
reasons, ' the advances in technology since this view was posited have 
increased the convenience and reliability of that process. For example, whilst 
they claim as one of their opposing arguments that 'finding the right spot on 
the tape for this purpose [in order to 'return to an earlier point'] is a difficult 
task, ' with 'tape' no longer the medium of choice, the ability to find precise 
locations from a digital recording using a PC has obviated this 'difficulty'. 
City Homes (ex-CityC Housing Dep't): A further opportunity arose regarding 
'City Homes- a CityC ALMO (Arms-Length Management Organisation) - 
where the researcher was invited to a presentation on a 'process-based' 
change initiative - Thursday, 7th Dec., 2006. This opportunity was followed by 
others within this ALMO; e. g. to assist a BPR training day on 17th May 2007, 
subsequent observational involvement, and the chance to interview two 
participants. 
In both main cases (Councils), this stage of data collection continued until 
sufficient data was deemed to have been gathered; the indication of this being 
that'no new information is forthcoming' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 202) from the 
projects/interviews. 
Consequently the original plan was to hold periodic, 1: 1 interviews with 
selected (but possibly all) participants, spaced probably (but not necessarily) 
at six-month intervals. Those interviews were designed to be'semi- 
structured' because - as with structured interviewing - whilst there was likely 
to be a 'series of [largely] pre-established questions' (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: 
68), I sought to go beyond the allied 'limited set of response categories' (ibid), 
but rather, as with 'unstructured interviewing', to utilize an approach that could 
'provide a greater breadth of data..., given its [the research's] qualitative 
nature' (ibid: 74). 
Having said that, the unstructuredness was not such that the interviews were 
solely 'conversational' (Patton, 2002: 342), nor so 'open-ended' (ibid) as to 
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lose their purposiveness (Saunders, et al., 2000: 174), though many of the 
questions did 'flow from the immediate context' (Patton, ibid). However, 'no 
plan of battle survives engagement with the enemy, ' so this emergent nature 
of that 'flow' was part of the plan, and the initial 'six-month intervals' became 
approximately one year. 
The aim had remained ultimately to test Hammer and Champy's (2001: 2) 
assertions that Reengineering was'alive and well' within LGOs; that it is'in 
fact, one of the success stories of business history' (2001: 2); and whether it 
has been the'enormous success' (ibid: 5) claimed, in this UK, public sector 
context. To do this, two approaches were utilized. 
The first approach was to establish whether what was being claimed as 
Reengineering or BPR (or SRD) matched the criteria auditable back to 
Hammer and Champy's original definition of, 'the fundamental re-thinking and 
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in 
critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service 
and speed. ' The key words in this were (and therefore still are) 'fundamental', 
'radical', 'dramatic' and, most importantly, 'processes', and the means to 
establish adherence to this was to ask participants to give their definition of 
BPR by completing the sentence: 
'Business Process Re-engineering (or Service Re-Design/SRD) is defined as... ' 
Using this, the first aim was to understand the actuality - that it really was 
'reengineering' being undertaken - in line with the primary objective; (to: ) 
'investigate BPR within the range of Change Management practices within 
LGOs' - as opposed to some other, less well defined and more gradual 
change process, in order to establish the point at which it might then be 
suggested these LGOs had 'tipped' (Gladwell, 2000), from 'small and cautious 
steps' (Hammer, 1990) and 'incremental' approaches, over to an essentially 
more 'radical' BPR. 
214 
The second approach was to establish the organisation's 'state of readiness' 
for embarking upon such a 'radical' process of change, and utilize Hammer 
and Stanton's (1995: 86-88) suggested tool, 'The Self-Assessment 
Diagnostic', which covered the three areas of 'Reengineering Leadership', 
'Organizational Readiness', and 'Style of Implementation' (see Appendix 11). 
5.9.3 Stage 3- Impact Review 
One key issue here was to establish, through further interviews and document 
analysis, whether 'dramatic' improvements and gains had been made, with 
supporting evidence. See 'Impact Analysis' (Chapter 7, p. 338) for how this 
plan had to evolve as the research progressed. 
It was during this phase also that a further, emergent, research instrument 
was used for gauging the participants' views of their project's 'radicalness', 
based on Kettinger et al's (1997) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet'. 
In CountyC this was 'tested' with a brand new cohort of SRD trainees, all of 
whom had reached 'Project Initiation Document' (PID) stage of their proposed 
projects. These results were grouped to gain a feel for the overall view from 
that specific new cohort, whilst also acknowledging the statistical problems in 
doing such an 'average'. 
Within CityC, because of the suspension of further BPR training, this was 
tested with the most senior change manager (since promoted to Head of 
Service, Customer Service), in a retrospective context. This one 
questionnaire is considered in greater detail in the 'Impact Analysis' section. 
5.10 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Analysis was essentially about reduction, to constituent parts; primarily 
through template analysis (King & Cassell, 2007): 
'Each phase of data analysis entails data reduction as the reams of collected data are 
brought into manageable chunks, and interpretation as the researcher brings meaning 
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and insight to the words and acts of the participants in the study' (Marshall & Rossman, 
1995: 113). 
Yet this process, for me, was not about 'constituent parts'. Constituencies, to 
some degree, yes, but not constituent parts. It was about the 'whole'. The 
whole issue of BPR being 'alive and well' in the UK public sector, in this case 
LGOs, articulated through research objectives and broken into constituent 
parts, but it was about the whole. 
One of (if not) the primary reasons for recording the interviews verbatim was 
to maximise the potential of an essentially brief and notionally hour(+)-long 
opportunities to engage in discussion on this subject; robust discussion. 
Discussion that would have been far less robust - probing and revealing, as 
they were - had the focus been on capturing, in manuscript, mere inarticulate 
and inaccurate fragments (<10%, maybe? ) of those exchanges. 
Listening again later, as I did in each case to 'correct' the draft transcriptions, I 
occasionally winced at that very robustness, at my'challenge'. In most cases, 
however, the interviewees made positive comments regarding those same 
opportunities - to discuss - opportunities normally (or at least, often) denied 
them. Many of these were 'off-record', but some were captured and these are 
a few examples: 
. 'But sitting there with you, it takes you out of the culture... So it - it opens you up and 
you actually think slightly more freely. ' (MS/LM1-2) 
" 'And you're probably more honest as well. With you. Because sometimes it's difficult 
to be very honest with someone who is very senior to you, for fear, of pushing things 
too far; for fear of it not being, accepted. ... we'd love to be able to 
have this type of 
conversation with the person that we've listed in here, for example. We'd love to be 
able to do that. And we'd love to be able to work through those issues and move 
things forward, but I'm not quite sure how it would be received. ' (ET/LM1-2) 
'... it's been - it's nice to have an opportunity just to say, "This is how I see it, " 
because you don't do that when you're at work. ' (RT/Non-Mgr) 
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"I think that it it's been really useful for a few reasons. One because it's made me 
think, more and more about, the project that we've - we've been working on [Name] 
and I and perhaps, that we need to go back to the beginning and, think about what 
we're doing, and funnily enough, I have actually got a meeting with that department 
this afternoon... ' (BH/LM1-2) 
" 'Sorry to be having a bit of a dump, really, because that was an opportunity to, um, 
talk about some frustrations that I don't always, get a chance to talk about. ' (EM/HoS) 
" 'I've really enjoyed that again. ' (FB/CMT) 
This was the 'richness' of the whole. 
Throughout the course of an interview one could sense the essence of 
corporate cause-and-effect. Not in the sense of positivistic causal links, but in 
the chaos and uncertainty of the corporate world; or, even, the order and 
stability of corporate certainty, within the chaos of an uncertain world. In 
modern parlance one might say; 'Whatever... " 
Whatever; whoever; wherever; why-ever; whenever; however; Kipling, again. 
Those 'six honest serving men', serving the cause (and effect? ) of analysis. 
This drew me back to that fundamental positivism-to-non-positivism spectrum 
-'QUANTS v QUALS' (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) - and the compatibility 
versus incompatibility argument of the'paradigm wars'. Intuitively, I believed, 
I had settled on pragmatism, and I was with Rorty (Fearn, 2005: 154) on that, 
I didn't want to 'encourage them'. I believed, as Einstein had, that 'you can't 
count everything that counts, and everything that counts can't be counted. ' 
What'counted', in my case (cases), were the interactions within each of those 
robust interviews. I always came away sensing the richness of the whole. 
And yet, somehow, those wholes had to be analysed; not quantitatively, but 
qualitatively. Some form of reductivism would obtain -'selecting, pruning, 
editing, commenting, interpreting, delivering judgements' - involving the 
'prejudices of (this) narrator' (Schama, 1992: 322). But only so far. I could 
not - must not - lose the everyday experiences of the real worlds of the 
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participants, wherein lay the richness of the data. As Gleick (1988: 6) said, 
'Everyday experience and real pictures of the world have become legitimate 
targets for inquiry. ' In these uncertain but real worlds, for me at least, the 
positivist/quantitative case finally foundered. Gleick again: 'chaos eliminates 
the Laplacian fantasy of deterministic predictability' (ibid). There was just too 
much going off. Yet, from this 'too much', some analysis must be attempted. 
But what form of qualitative analysis can capture the 'overall impression upon 
leaving'? Whole-sense analysis? No. Some form of reductivism had to be 
used. The reductivism of this narrator. My perceptions. My interpretation of 
what'counted'. This was my research, and I needed to do my'own thing' 
(Robson, 2002: 43). Somewhere within this too-muchness, I needed to seek 
out the'order masquerading as randomness' (Gleick, 1988: 22). What might 
be those'initial conditions' upon which BPR within LGOs might be so 
'sensitively dependent'? Was it possible to identify the 'nails', for the want of 
which BPR would be 'lost'? 
Marshall (1984: 116; cited in Bryman & Bell, 2003: 293) described 'herself as 
an 'interpretor' rather than a manipulator of data, ' someone who, inductively, 
is: 
'... concerned with capturing other people's meanings rather than testing hypotheses. ' 
In discussing the'nature of qualitative research' Bryman and Bell (2003: 279) 
commence by saying that it is a strategy that'usually emphasizes words 
rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data, ' adding that: 
'As a strategy it is inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist, but qualitative 
researchers do not always subscribe to all three of these methods. ' 
Whether I 'always subscribe to all three' of those methods is debatable, but it 
appears to be the case this time, whilst acknowledging some limitations. 
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The process consisted of gathering, cross-checking and analysing the 
findings from the breadth and depth of data gathered. Analysis was both 
'thematic' (King & Cassell, 2007) - seeking evidential correlations with those 
pre-established criteria, and CSF/ CFF previously identified - and emergent, 
identifying any new issues (contextual, cultural) arising from the discussions 
and observations: 
'In the very act of constructing data out of experience, the qualitative researcher singles 
out some things as worthy of note and relegates others to the background' (Wolcott, 
1994: 13). 
The process began with verbatim transcription of the interviews by a third 
party. On receipt of the transcriptions the recordings were also listened to 
again from end to end, whilst correcting the detail of the transcripts (missing 
or misinterpreted words or phrases) in manuscript. The typed versions were 
then corrected in the finest detail so they were as accurate as possible. The 
transcripts were then analysed, initially using the 'themes' from the Literature 
Review, plus capturing any new or emergent themes. During this stage of the 
process the digital recordings were listened to again, sometimes repeatedly, 
to clarify any intonation or interpretation issues where the meaning may have 
been in doubt. Theme'cards' (examples in Appendix 12) were created for 
every interviewee and encoded so the precise words/phrase/quotation could 
be reclaimed as necessary. It was during this stage that some of the issues 
(quotations, etc. ) within the corrected transcripts were inevitably 'relegated to 
the background, ' the remainder - those deemed relevant - being transferred 
to 'cards'. 
After all the interviews had been analysed and those relevant extracts 
transferred on to cards, an Analysis Process Review Meeting was held in 
December 2007 to distil the major themes and validate the initial 
interpretations (see Analysis Stage 2 for full details of this stage of the 
process). 
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Subsequently, 'interpretations' were formed - where possible, but not always, 
into those 'major themes' - what Prasad (1993; cited in Bryman & Bell, 2003: 
283/284) described as 'grouping together incidents, events, or pieces of 
conversation related to a particular theme. ' At this stage also 'others', again, 
were 'relegated', as part of that interpretivist approach, and this became the 
research's 'Conclusions'. 
This is where some criticisms could occur, should these interpretations be 
seen to be 'too impressionistic and subjective' (ibid: 299), where: 
'... these criticisms usually mean that qualitative findings rely too much on the 
researcher's often unsystematic views about what is significant and important, and also 
upon the close personal relationships that the researcher frequently strikes up with the 
people studied. ' 
These possibilities cannot be denied. However, this is countered by the 
robustness of the process being 'tested' and challenged at various stages 
throughout the final year. Personal 'relationships' were not an issue, as they 
were based on prior inter-organisational co-operation, they were not so 'close' 
as to lose the purpose of the interviews taking place. 
5.11 Stage 4- Member Checking 
Themes were then synthesised from all the cards (approximately 700) into 
'Conclusions' (see sep. section), using a form of presentation, based on 
Brown (2007), using direct quotations from the anonymised participants. 
The summarised findings were subsequently 'tested' with the Heads of 
Change Management in both Councils. Owing to the sensitivity of the initial 
findings, each manager was met separately on grounds of confidentiality. The 
results of these two meetings are precised at the end of the main 'Impact 
Analysis' section. 
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5.12 Data Presentation 
It was decided to present the findings by'stage ; within those stages by Case 
Study (Council), and within each case study by theme. The style of data 
presentation is initially descriptive, using specific quotes from participants 
(Brown, 2007), combined then with analysis and interpretation. However, 
whilst the philosophical approach is interpretive, the data presentation avers 
towards the actuality, in order to retain the richness provided by the interview 
process (Wolcott, 1994). 
5.13 Assuring the Quality of the Research Process 
5.13.1 Reliability 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003: 32), 'reliability' is: 
'concerned with the question of whether the results of a study are repeatable. ' 
In qualitative research, Bryman and Bell (p. 35) call this 'dependability', and in 
terms of 'external reliability', they say that the 'degree to which a study can be 
replicated ... is a difficult criterion to meet in qualitative research' (p. 288). 
The reliability in this case was achieved by the application of a relatively 
consistent but semi-structured approach, and by adopting an appropriate 
'empathetic stance' (Saunders, et al., 2007), relevant to each participant. No 
two 'conversations' would have been the same - either between participants, 
or if different interviewers had seen these same interviewees - but in the 
context of these situations, and that a group of my'peers' have acted as 
'auditors' (Bryman & Bell, 2003: 289), the results are considered dependable. 
5.13.2 Validity 
Similarly, in qualitative research Bryman and Bell (2003: 288) suggest that 
validity equates to 'transferability', and since such research 'typically entails 
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the intensive study of a small group, or of individuals sharing certain 
characteristics (i. e. depth rather than breadth), ' they say that 'qualitative 
findings tend to be oriented to the contextual uniqueness ... of the social 
world being studied' (ibid: 289). Whilst these two Councils (cases) were 
'unique' in respect of their individual identities, they also 'share certain 
characteristics' with many other LGOs across the UK. This does not infer that 
the results would be transferable, but, as Lincoln and Guba (1985: 124) state: 
'the degree of transferability is a direct function of the similarity between the two 
contexts' (their emphases). 
That there are similarities between UK LGOs in the broader sense is clear, 
but it would be up to each individual LGO to consider the potential for 
transferability to (or generalization within) its own 'unique' context, or'social 
world'. 
5.13.3 Bias 
How do I know my own bias? At times I am a rational-linear thinker, at others, 
lateral. The rational-linear part of me might accept BPR as a 'reasonable' 
change process, no different in principle from TQM, Six Sigma, IIP, EFQM, or 
'change management' generally. In other words, I might be 'biased' in favour. 
The lateral part of me would want me to go off-piste' and search for all the 
other angles prior to implementation - if not'biased' against, then at least 
cautious. 
I had no wish to 'make it work' in those organizations through the aegis of this 
research, although some might perceive potential for a conflict of interest 
through my involvement with training on the topic in at least one of the co- 
operating LGOs. 
There was also the issue of 'participant bias', or interviewees saying 'what 
they thought their bosses wanted them to say' (Saunders, et al., 2007: 149). 
Whilst normally this might be'designed out' by ensuring the'anonymity of 
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respondents' (ibid), this was not possible in these cases, as far as the Change 
Management Teams (CMT) were concerned, as they knew who had been 
trained, and therefore 'approached', but anonymity of respondents' responses 
was maintained throughout by'coding' their identities. Similarly, and primarily 
because of the previously established 'trust' between interviewer and 
interviewees, participant bias was deemed to be minimal or non-existent. 
5.13.4'Goodness': Value and Logic 
Marshall and Rossman (1995) discuss the issues of 'value' and 'logic' of 
qualitative research in the context of defending the 'soundness' of the project 
and 'demonstrating the usefulness' of the work. Whilst initially aimed at 
developing a logic to'defend' a proposal, their subsequent'20 standards' are 
utilized here to assist in judging the 'goodness' of this qualitative study' (ibid: 
146-148) - see Appendix 10. 
5.13.5 Ethics 
At all stages of this research every participant was assured that the conduct of 
the research would comply with the University of Derby's code of conduct for 
research ethics: 
'As a reflection of its core organisational values the University of Derby is concerned to 
protect the rights, dignity, safety and privacy of research participants, the welfare of 
animals and the integrity of the environment. The University of Derby is also concerned 
to protect the health, safety and academic freedom of researchers and the reputation of 
the University as a centre for appropriately conducted, high quality research. 
Underpinning the standards are the ethical imperatives of Do No Harm (non- 
malfeasance) and Do Good (beneficence)' (http: //www. derby. ac. uk/research/ethics). 
In addition each participant was assured of both organisational and individual 
anonymity, and as such all identities have been randomly 'coded' to avoid 
personal identification. Whilst the difficulty of organisational anonymity is 
accepted, both have also been 'renamed' within all the core text. Also, all 
223 
participants were offered (and some accepted) complete verbatim transcripts 
of the interviews in which they took part. 
5.13.6 Testing 
Lincoln & Guba (1985: 314) describe'member checking' as both formal and 
informal, and where: 
'data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions are tested with members of 
those stakeholding groups from whom the data were originally collected, is the most 
crucial technique for establishing credibility' (ibid). 
In this investigation a short but 'formal' session was arranged between myself, 
one member of the 'supervision team' (primarily to take notes), and the Head 
of Change Management in each participating LGO, respectively, in order that 
the'claim to credibility' could be more 'meaningfully' entertained (ibid: 315) - 
see Analysis & Findings, Stage 4, 'Member Check', Testing (8.1, p. 369). 
5.14 Summary 
To summarise it might be useful to reconsider the 'onion' from the inside-out, 
or approximately in reverse. Starting with the objectives of the research 
(Churchill & lacobucci, 2005), the basic strategic choice was for a Case Study 
(Hartley, 1994) based on qualitative enquiry using mixed methods (Patton, 
2002). Time horizons were primarily cross-sectional (Saunders, et at., 2007) 
but augmented by previous experience and interventions over a period of two 
years. Data collection was in the main based on in-depth interviews, plus 
observation and secondary data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: Moustakas, 1995; 
Patton, 2002), but planned and emergent questionnaires were also used in 
support. Primary analysis was thematic ('template'; King & Cassell, 2007), 
with later Impact Analysis (group and individual), followed by representative 
conclusion testing. The research approach was primarily Inductive, with 
elements of semi-structure - summarised in Table 5.4, overleaf: 
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Table 5.4: Summarised Methodology 
Summarised Methodology 
Choice of Mixed methods; primarily Qualitative, with some 
Method Quantitative data in support 
Time Horizons Cross-sectional, with interventions over two years 
Data Collection Initial questionnaire (one case only) 
& Analysis In-depth interviews (28) - mainly semi-structured 
Observation, plus Secondary data 
Emergent supplementary surveys (27; 27; 22 respondents) 
Primary thematic ('template') analysis; impact analysis 
Conclusion 'testing' 
Strategies Case Studies (aligned with Hartley, 1994) 
Approaches Inductive, with some semi-structure 
Philosophies: Interpretive 
(Ontology Ontology: Social Construction 
& Epistemology) Epistemology: Subjectivist 
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